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前言

Preface

The unprecedented pursuit of 'One Country Two Systems' (henceforth 1C2S) demands unyielding exploration and persistence from stakeholders. Since 1997, we have made headway in the realization of 1C2S, but at the same time, have also encountered many challenges. To assist full implementation of 1C2S, in July 2017, Path of Democracy established the 1C2S Index and released its first report in relation thereto with a view to conduct an objective evaluation of the continued implementation of 1C2S by reviewing the accomplishments and shortfalls of 1C2S at the 20th Anniversary of Hong Kong SAR.

「一國兩制」是前無古人的嘗試,1997年至今既取得成果,也遇到挑戰,實踐過程需要社會各界不斷探索。民主思路在香港回歸20年之際發布第一份關於「一國兩制」概況的客觀評價,希望鑑察其成就與缺失,為全面準確貫徹此方針謹盡綿力。

The 1C2S Index is based on both local opinion and international perception on the current state of 1C2S. In order to measure local sentiment, we conduct periodic public surveys in Hong Kong on aspects such as 'Hong Kong people ruling Hong Kong', judiciary independence, the high degree of autonomy and other important issues. We also looked at global studies carried out by international think tanks and how Hong Kong is being rated on aspects like human rights, rule of law, freedom of speech and freedom of association. These independent evaluations are also incorporated into the Index to give a more balanced view on how the World including Hong Kong people look at the state of 1C2S.

「一國兩制」指數編製自關於「一國兩制」 現狀的本地民意及國際評價。我們定期進行 民意調查,就港人治港、高度自治、司法獨 立及其他重要範疇了解香港市民想法。我們 亦參考國際機構對香港在人權、法治、言論 自由和結社自由等範疇的評分,把以上獨立 意見揉合於指數之中,為香港及世界各地對 「一國兩制」現狀的觀感作出中肯評估。

We also devised and introduced the 1C2S Mass Media Index (MMI) by making use of big data analytics to measure the media sentiment of Hong Kong towards 1C2S since 1988 with real-time monitoring and predictive alerts. In compiling our reports, we also sought views on current issues related to 1C2S, such as the public's emigration plans, national security and economic integration.

除此之外,我們借助大數據技術,推出「一國兩制」與情指數去衡量新聞情緒,追溯自 1998年迄今香港媒體的有關報導,實現即時 觀測與預警。 編製報告時,我們亦探討「一 國兩制」實踐中的熱門議題,例如移民海 外、國家安全、經濟融合等。修例風波觸發 對「一國兩制」的關注及擔憂,我們就此進 行兩輪額外的調查,了解民意變化。

We extend our sincere gratitude to the research team involved in the production of our seventh edition of the 1C2S Index report: Gillian Tam, Ting Hin Yan, and Ian Chan. We are also grateful to Hong Kong Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies of the Chinese University of Hong Kong for completing the telephone polls on our behalf.


報告更新至第七版,我們衷心感謝研究團隊:譚迪文、甄定軒及陳譽仁,亦謹此向執 行電話調查的香港中文大學香港亞太研究所 致以謝意。

Going forward, to better inform policy makers and the public, we will continue to conduct public surveys and update international indices every six months, and to monitor media sentiment regularly to gauge the latest perceptions of the public, the international community and the media on 1C2S.


展望未來,我們會繼續每半年進行民意調查及更新國際指數,亦會定期追蹤輿情指數,從而反映香港市民、國際社會及本地媒體對「一國兩制」的最新觀感,供決策者及公眾參考。

Ray Poon Co-convenor (Research) 潘學智 民主思路聯席召集人(研究)





摘要 **Key Findings**



Plagued with recurring COVID-19 cases, Hong Kong continued to face similar challenges as it did in the first half of 2020. Economically, businesses regardless of their scale experienced tremendous struggle to survive after the end of anti-pandemic subsidies. Unemployment rate rose to 6.4% and 6.6% in the last two guarters of 2020 to reflect the large-scale layoff in certain industries like aviation, tourism and retailing. Politically, the Legislative Council witnessed the most dramatic sequence of events, from the postponement of elections for a year, to NPCSC's decision to disqualify four LegCo councillors after whence the pan-democrats resigned en masse in protest, to scattered cases of self-imposed exiles of politicians and activists. On the other hand, mass arrest of politicians and activists through the end of 2020 and new requirement of all civil servants to pledge allegiance to the HKSAR and Basic Law apparently served as a telltale sign of across the board retreat of opposition voices.

新冠肺炎疫情反覆,2020上半年的挑戰延續至下 半年。經濟上,防疫抗疫基金結束後,大小企業 面對嚴峻困境。受累於航空、旅遊及零售等行業 的大規模裁員,2020年最後兩季的失業率分別升 至6.4%及6.6%。政治上,立法會經歷翻天覆地的 變化:推遲選舉一年、全國人大常委會作出決 定,令四名議員失去議席、民主派議員總辭抗 議、政治人物及社運人士流亡海外。直至年底, 大規模逮捕民主派人士,公職人員須宣誓效忠 《基本法》,在不少人眼中是對反對聲音的壓 泊。

On the international front, while tension between US and China clearly lessened as the US was engrossed in their own presidential election, Hong Kong remained within the foci of certain international relations narratives where laxed immigration pathways were offered to Hong Kongers as a response to the enactment of the National Security Law. A significant portion of those planning to emigrate or had already done so considered themselves seeking refuge, being pushed away by Hong Kong's failing or perceived failure of 1C2S. The fear of brain drain and depletion of 'authentic' Hong Kongers loomed larger by day as more countries of the Five Eyes began to offer express arrangements for Hong Kongers to gain citizenship.

至於國際前沿,美國聚焦於本土的總統大選,為 中美緊張局勢帶來喘息空間。不過,香港仍是國 際話題的主角,因為有些國家向港人提供寬鬆的 移民途徑,作為對《港區國安法》的回應。不少 有計劃或者已經移民的人,視自己受「一國兩 制」的失敗所迫,而走到外地尋求庇護。隨著更 多五眼聯盟國家為港人鋪設獲得公民身分的捷 徑,香港逐漸擔憂人才及「真香港人」的流失。

A small but significant part of the future narratives now focus on how Hong Kongers might build a future in Hong Kong. While some of these suggestions are ambitious and almost unfeasible, they pessimistically point to the absence of future imaginations about HK under 1C2S. No matter how peripheral these narratives might be, they also point to the crisis of public confidence that one must attend to. In our seventh edition of the 1C2S Index report, we hope to shed some light on the subject with substantial quantitative data from our latest round of survey from December 2020 to January 2021.

現時的前途討論中,有一未算主流,但相當重要 的部分,關乎香港人如何在香港建立未來。部分 建議雖具雄心惟不大可行,共同點是反映市民對 「一國兩制」的未來感到悲觀。這些討論或許微 不足道,背後反映的公眾信心危機卻不容忽視。 第七版「一國兩制」指數報告整合2020年12月至 2021年1月所得的民意調查結果,我們希望藉著客 觀數據探討香港與「一國兩制」何去何從。

Confidence in 1C2S close to bottoming

At face value, while the city returned to peace after the introduction of National Security Law (NSL), it is also clear that the 'aftermath' of NSL is still unfolding. Continued uncertainty about 1C2S is reflected in the perpetuating trend of decline in 1C2S index. The latest reading of 5.48 is the lowest since the inception of the Index in mid-2017.

Despite a record low score, three of the nine dimensions from Index (A): Public Opinion rebounded to late-2019 level. Amongst these increases, 'full implementation of 1C2S', recorded a statistically significant rise, just slightly below early-extradition protest level. This is perhaps an unexpected outcome considering the apparent fear and almost universal uncertainty induced by the enactment of NSL which many considered as a serious encroachment on the core values constituting 1C2S. Nonetheless, the peace and stability restored by the twin-event of NSL enactment and COVID-19 containment measures might not be unwelcomed by many after almost a year of unprecedented turmoil. It must also be stressed that despite a statistically significant increase from last round, the score of 'full implementation of 1C2S' is still one of the lowest, recorded at 2.70.

From our past reports, it has been a consistent pattern that the Hong Kong public host higher expectations and much more critical view on the integrity of 1C2S. Changes in Index (B): International Perception tends to be more diverse and less drastic. Continued decline in Democracy Index was unsurprising considering the series of events, such as mass arrest of politicians and activists allegedly breaching the NSL. Nonetheless, due to time lag in the compilation of international indices, further decline at the international level is anticipated given the current socio-political situation.

「一國兩制」信心觸底回穩

《港區國安法》實施後,社會表面上回復寧靜, 但仍存暗湧。「一國兩制」指數再度下跌,反映 「一國兩制」內的不確定性揮之不去。指數最新 得分是5.48分,為2017年中推出以來最低點。

儘管錄得歷年最低分,指數(A):民意調查九個範疇中有三個反彈至2019年底水平,包括達統計上顯著水平的「全面落實『一國兩制』」,得分接近修例風波之前的水平。《港區國安法》的實施令不少市民懷疑「一國兩制」的核心價值被侵蝕,如此得分可能教人感到意外。不過,經過動盪的一年,《港區國安法》與疫情下的限制措施共同平靜和穩定了社會,未必所有人也視之為洪水猛獸。然而,必須強調的是,即使「全面落實『一國兩制』」比上輪有統計上的顯著增長,得分仍是本輪最低的結果之一,只有2.70分。

在過去的報告中,香港市民一直比國際社會對「一國兩制」有更高期望,評分亦因而較嚴格。 所以,指數(B):國際評價的變化相對多樣化和 平穩。大規模逮捕涉嫌觸犯《國安法》的政客與 社運分子後,民主指數有所下降實屬意料之內。 國際智庫在整合全球評分時,數據一般滯後,鑑 於香港近期的社會狀況,國際社會的評價很可能 進一步下降。

Overwhelming support for the continuation of 1C2S

Despite the fall in the Index, overall support for the continuation of 1C2S beyond 2047 remained overwhelmingly high at 74.1%, with a net value of 59.9%. Support across all groups with different political inclinations varied narrowly within a few percentage points. Support for other future options was marginal: direct administration under the central government stood at 6.0%, having rose by 1.1 percentage points, whereas 'Hong Kong independence' stood at 2.0%, having dropped by 0.3 percentage points. Though the public's current evaluation of 1C2S is quite critical, the majority of them still regard 1C2S as the right system for Hong Kong's future.

For most people, 'maintaining a high degree of autonomy' (66.4%) remained the most favourable condition to the continuation of 1C2S. Support rate for 'democratising further' remained at 53.3%, as with last round, and continued to surpass 'maintaining economic prosperity and stability' (51.6%) as the second most important condition. The conventional political divide over the issue of 'democratizing further' and 'maintaining national security' stagnated as cross-inclination support for the latter displayed sign of modest growth while that for the former remained largely constant. Nonetheless, the difference between these two conditions remained large though the juxtaposition eased since June 2020.

廣泛支持繼續實行「一國兩制 |

雖然指數下跌,市民對2047年後繼續實行「一國兩制」的支持度仍然高達74.1%,淨值為59.9%。所有政治派別之間只有數個百分點之差。其他前途選項亦缺乏支持:6.0%支持內地直轄,2.0%支持完全獨立,兩者比上輪分別微升1.1個百分點及下跌0.3個百分點。即使市民對當前「一國兩制」的實施狀況有一定批評,他們依然相信「一國兩制」是適合香港未來的體制。

對大部分市民而言,「維持高度自治」(66.4%)仍然是有利於繼續實行「一國兩制」的首要選項。「政制進一步民主化」支持率維持53.3%,與上輪一樣取替「經濟維持繁榮穩定」(51.6%)成為第二有利條件。在「政制進一步民主化」和「維護國家安全」問題上,傳統政治分歧依舊。前者的支持率相約,後者在各政治派別有輕微增長跡象,兩者的差距雖然自2020年6月起緩和,卻仍然鮮明。

Easing political polarization

After months of accelerating political polarization, the latest round showed that the phenomenon eventually eased and was beginning to reverse. As the city returned to peace, rise in moderation welcomed the arrival of 2021 as the proportion of moderates returned to its late-2019 level at 53.6%, having rose by 3.6 percentage points. Pro-establishment supporters also embarked on a recovery trend after a 1.5 percentage-point increase, its population-makeup of 10.6% just surpassed other non-establishment supporters who witnessed a dramatic decrease of over a quarter to only 9.3% in proportion. Taken together, different trajectories displayed by the above groups signified the more than year-long polarization is now showing signs of alleviation, matching the subsiding momentum of the 2019 social movement.

The rise of moderation was also seen among youths (aged 18 to 29), again corresponding to the subsiding sentiment of the 2019 social movement. While non-establishment supporters remained the largest group, accounting for 56% of the youth population, the democrats-resistance camp makeup experienced deradicalization. Supporters of the resistance camp among 18-29 years dropped by over one-third while democrats rose by 3 percentage points. These two camps are now of equal proportion of 28% each, reversing the phenomenon of radicals surpassing democrats recorded in last round. The proportion of non-establishment supporters were closely followed by moderates who experienced a growth of 4.9 percentage points rising to 40.7%. The rise of moderation among 18-29 age group has been a healthy development, nevertheless, one should remain vigilant to the possibility of re-radicalization.

政治兩極化緩和

過去一段時間,政治急速兩極化,在最新一輪開始緩解並逆轉。隨著城市恢復和平, 2021年迎來溫和派的回升,佔比重回2019年底水平,上升3.6個百分點,達53.6%。建制派支持者開始復甦趨勢,佔比增加1.5個百分點,達10.6%,重新超越急劇下降多於四分一至9.3%的抗爭派。不同政治傾向組別的變化趨勢說明,長達一年多的嚴重兩極化有瓦解跡象,與勢頭已慢慢減退的2019年社會運動吻合。

18-29 歲年輕人中,溫和派同樣冒起,呼應社會運動的高亢情緒續漸冷卻。雖然非建制派仍是組別中最大的群體,佔56%,但陣營內經歷去激進化,支持者由抗爭派轉移至民主派。18-29 歲組別中抗爭派下降多於三分之一,而民主派則上升 3 個百分點,兩者平分秋色,各佔年輕組別人口的28%,扭轉上輪抗爭派超越民主派的現象。溫和派上升4.9 個百分點,達40.7%,緊隨非建制派。溫和政治再現無疑是健康的發展,但我們仍需保持警惕,以防激進主義再次主導。

Divergence of citizens' identity as 'Hong-kongers' or 'Chinese'

Citizens' self-identification as 'Hongkongers' or 'Chinese' started to diverge after a period of parallel increase. Although the divide appeared to be narrowing down in the latest round, the gap was still wide. Since June 2020, the public's self-identification as 'Hongkongers' dropped from 8.55 to 8.26 while that as 'Chinese' rose from 4.38 to 4.73, both returning to late-2019 levels.

Most Hong Kong citizens are typically cognizant of their dual identity as both 'Hongkongers' and 'Chinese'. This has gradually changed since 2019. While over half of the public acknowledged dual identity in earlier surveys, this had dropped to 35.3% and was surpassed by citizens identifying themselves strongly as 'Hongkongers only' (53.1%) in January 2021, despite having dropped 6.9 percentage points since June 2020.

As a result of the declining dual identity, the correlation between the two stated identities weakened. The two identities used to mutually reinforce each other. Now, there is only sign of polarization. The negative correlation became statistically significant in this round. A stronger identification as 'Hongkonger' now accompanies a weaker one as 'Chinese', and vice versa. The loss of the mutuality of the two identities as 'Hongkonger' and 'Chinese' risks challenging the implementation of 1C2S in the future.

香港人與中國人身分認同背馳

過去一段時間,市民對「香港人」和「中國人」 兩種身分認同同步增強,近期調查則顯示兩者開始分歧。分歧在最新一輪有所收窄,但仍然存在。自2020年6月,大眾對「香港人」的認同感由 8.55分回落至8.26分。同期,對「中國人」的認同 感則由4.38分升至4.73分,兩者均回到2019年底 水平。

香港市民普遍擁有「香港人」和「中國人」雙重身分認同,情況自2019年6月起逐步轉變。過往調查中,擁有雙重身分認同的市民由超過一半,下降至2021年1月的35.3%,被對「香港人」有較強認同感的市民(53.1%)超越,惟後者亦較2020年6月下降6.9個百分點。

隨著雙重身分認同大不如前,這兩種身分的相關 性亦變得模糊,由過去的相輔相成,變為現在的 背馳傾向。相關等級係數的負值於今輪達統計上 顯著水平,說明「香港人」身分認同越強,「中 國人」身分認同則越弱,反之亦然。「香港人」 和「中國人」兩種身分認同的共存空間消失,將 會是短期內實踐「一國兩制」的一大挑戰。

Implications

The decline in most indicators in our latest report suggested that the crises of confidence in the future of 1C2S and Hong Kong has continued, though at a much-attenuated rate. However, we also found that the majority of Hong Kong public supported the continuation of 1C2S beyond 2047. It is difficult to reconcile the fact that despite what appeared to be a marked decline in confidence of the 1C2S, people of Hong Kong still overwhelmingly indicated they were in favour of the continuation of the same beyond 2047. A possible explanation is that while the immediate perception is bad, the longer view of 1C2S still holds good.

Public discontent appeared to be tapering down. The proportion of population identifying themselves as 'Chinese' embarked on a modest rate of increase. People with emigration plans remained at its high watermark but slightly decreased, while enthusiasm for developing new life chapter in the Greater Bay Area diminished. The proportion of moderates showed sign of growth while non-establishment supporters, especially the radical subgroup, declined at a remarkable rate. Pro-establishment supporters surpassed the resistance camp for the first time since the onset of the anti-extradition movement.

Assertive responses from Beijing may introduce a stabilizing element to the 1C2S model in the long-run, bringing down radical views and certain actions. The two rival camps showed extreme views over the impact of National Security Law and the pledge of allegiance by civil servants. Moderates was the only group countering this juxtaposition, while largely negative about the former, they were more or less indifferent to the latter. Rationality exists in our mainstream society, but it is vulnerable to being attacked. Policymakers must take care to ensure that moderate voices continue to enjoy a nourishing and safe environment in a divided society.

Nonetheless, the proportion of resistance camp is still oscillating at its heights, especially among youth. It may be unfair to say that their criticisms of 1C2S arose solely out of misunderstanding. Our society It is rather more appropriate to view their disillusionment and radicalization as a result of prolonged oversight of the deep-rooted problems in the implementation of 1C2S. Both the central and HKSAR governments need to tackle and resolve these issues with patience and care.


啟示

本報告中多項指標下滑,但降幅收窄,反映市民對香港及「一國兩制」未來的信心危機繼續徘徊低位。儘管對「一國兩制」信心驟降,我們同時發現香港市民更廣泛地支持於2047年後延續「一國兩制」。兩種取態看似不容易調和,可能說明市民對「一國兩制」的即時印象轉差,但是長遠評價仍然不俗。


公眾的不滿情緒似乎稍微減弱。「中國人」身份 認同有輕微增長。移民比率雖維持高位,但錄得 微降。打算前往大灣區開展人生歷程則減少。溫 和派的佔比有一定升幅,非建制派支持者,尤其 是激進一翼,則急速下降。建制派支持者於本輪 超越抗爭派支持者,是修例風波以來的第一次。

北京用強硬措施處理香港問題,長遠可能為「一國兩制」發展注入穩定因素。雖然兩大政治陣營對《港區國安法》及公職人員宣誓效忠反應極端,溫和派則少受政治立場綑綁,對前者印象負面,對後者則沒有特別傾向。社會主流仍然理性,但極容易受到攻擊,決策者應確保理性聲音在撕裂的社會上有一隅之地。


不過,年輕一代愈來愈接受運用激進手法去實現政治目標,抗爭派的人口比例,尤其在年輕人中,仍徘徊高位。難以再相信市民的不滿情緒與再激進化乃憑空而來,或是將他們對「一國兩制」的批評完全歸咎於對政局的誤解。實踐「一國兩制」的過程中,存在長期未能解決的深層次矛盾,中央政府及特區政府必須付出耐心及與努力去解決及緩和。



「一國兩制」概覽 1C2S at a Glance



1C2S Index 「一國兩制」指數	1C2S Mass Media Index 「一國兩制」與情指數	Moderates 溫和派	Continuation of 1C2S 延續「一國兩制」	Dual Identity 雙重身分認同
5.48 (↓ 0.2%)	78.6 (↑ 11.9 %)	53.6% (↑ 3.6 %)	74 .1% (\ 4.0 %)	35.3% (↑ 2.8 %)
2021.1	2021.1	2021.1	2021.1	2021.1



2017.0	2017.12	2018.0	2018.12	2019.0	2019.12	2020.6	2021.1	
Self-conduct of administrative affairs 自行處理行政事務		Independent judiciary 獨立司法權			Independent legislature 獨立立法權		Economic Freedom 經濟自由	
3.34		4.	.00		3.62		8.83	
(↓1.7%)		(↓3.9%)			(↓2.3%)		(-)	
	Original ways of life 原有生活方式		Freedom of speech 言論自由		Democratisation 民主政制發展		Personal Freedom 個人自由	
4.41		3.92			3.01		8.36	
(↑0.6%)		(↓	3.1%)		(↓2.3%)		(-)	
'Hong Kong people ad Hong Kong' and 'high autonomy' princ 「港人治港丶 高度自	degree of iples		ntation of 1C2S 「一國兩制」	dialogu	ng differences via e and negotiation i協商解決矛盾		Democracy Index 民主指數	
2.77		2.	.70		2.59		5.57	
(↓1.6%)		(↑ 14.1%)		(↑2.4%)			(-)	



1 簡介 Introduction

This is the seventh edition of our 'One Country Two Systems' (henceforth 1C2S) Index report. The purpose of the 1C2S Index is to provide an objective assessment on the implementation of 1C2S. Our first Report was released in mid-2017, on the 20th anniversary of the return of Hong Kong to China. We update the 1C2S Index every six months, at mid-year and year end.

香港回歸20週年之際,民主思路於2017年中首次發布「一國兩制」指數,旨在為香港實踐「一國兩制」作客觀評價。指數於年中與年底,每半年更新,這是第七版報告。

Every half year, we update the 1C2S Index through updating Index (A): Public Opinion and Index (B): International Perception respectively with a new public survey and with the latest data from international indices. To complement our Index, we also introduced a new index: 1C2S Mass Media Index (MMI) that uses big-data techniques to measure the sentiment of Hong Kong newspapers since 1998.

我們每半年進行電話調查及收集國際指數的最新數據,更新指數(A):民意調查及指數(B): 國際評價,從而更新「一國兩制」指數。我們還推出嶄新的「一國兩制」與情指數,檢視從1998年起香港報章對「一國兩制」的情緒,利用大數據技術去補充指數之不足。

We commissioned the Hong Kong Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies of the Chinese University of Hong Kong to conduct telephone poll between 22 December 2020 to 13 January 2021 to compile Index (A). During the survey period, the mass arrest against democrat primaries took place. Readers must take note that the incident happened at almost exactly the mid-point of the survey period, dividing the respondents roughly into two halves, respectively completing the survey before and after the event.

本報告委託香港中文大學香港亞太研究所進行電話調查,反映2020年12月22至2021年1月13日的狀況而編製指數(A)。期間發生民主派初選大搜捕,剛剛落在調查日期的中間點,一半受訪者於事件發生前,另一半在事件發生後完成調查,讀者解讀時必須留意這一點。

On the other hand, not every indicator of Index (B) can be updated to 2020 because international indices are released with a considerable time lag. MMI was updated to the end of January 2021.

另外,由於各項國際指數整合數據存有時差,指數(B)不是所有指標均能更新至2020年,而「一國兩制」與情指數則更新至2021年1月底。

In our latest survey, we also included other topical issues related to 1C2S, such as the continuation of 1C2S beyond 2047, citizen's identity, attitude towards emigration and public opinions on the Greater Bay Area. To fully capture the socio-political reality of the city, we introduced new questions to gauge the impact of recent socio-political changes such as the enactment of NSL, the central government's attempts to assist COVID-19 containment in Hong Kong, and the pledge of allegiance by civil servants.

電話調查也一併探討其他關乎「一國兩制」的重要議題,包括2047年後繼續實行「一國兩制」、市民的身分認同、移民海外與及粵港澳大灣區發展。為更準確拿捏香港的社會政治現實及近期的社會及政治變化的影響,本輪新增的問題主要圍繞《港區國安法》實施、中央政府協助香港防控新冠肺炎疫情及公職人員宣誓事件。

It should be stressed that Index (A), Index (B) and MMI are determined by perception and may or may not reflect the reality. Even so, changes in perceptions of 1C2S of the Hong Kong public, of international think tanks, and of the Hong Kong press are nevertheless important. We will analyse the reasons for the changes in these perceptions as they are crucial for the implementation of 1C2S.

In our report, all scores are in a scale of 0-10. An asterisk ('*') indicates a change in scores compared with the previous round that is big enough to be statistically significant. If there is no mentioning of statistical significance about a score, it means that the change concerned is statistically insignificant.

指數 (A) 、指數 (B) 及與情指數的評分取決於 觀感,可能不完全反映現實。儘管如此,香港市 民、國際智庫和本地媒體的觀感變化對實施「一 國兩制」仍然至關重大,所以我們也會分析其背 後的變化原因。

本報告的所有評分尺度為0至10分。如不同輪次調查之間的評分差異達統計上顯著水平,將會以星號(「*」)註明。未有註明者,則代表評分差異在統計上並不顯著。



2 「一國兩制」指數 1C2S Index

The 1C2S Index is the average of Index (A): Public Opinion, the evaluation of the Hong Kong public on different dimensions of 1C2S, and Index (B): International Perception, the evaluation of international think tanks on various aspects of freedom and democracy in Hong Kong. The methodology is explained in Appendix I.

「一國兩制」指數為指數(A):民意調查及指數(B):國際評價的平均值。前者為香港市民對「一國兩制」不同範疇的評分,後者為國際智庫對香港自由民主水平的評分。編製方法詳見附件 I。


Figure 1 shows the scores of the 1C2S Index since its inception. The latest reading in January 2021 is 5.48. Compared to last round in June 2020, the index fell by 0.01 or 0.2%, producing a new lowest since the index's inception. Changes in Indices (A) and (B) will be detailed in the following sub-sections.

圖1顯示「一國兩制」指數自編製迄今的變化。 2021年1月的最新讀數為5.48分,自2020年6 月下跌0.01或分0.2%,創下指數新低。指數 (A)及指數(B)的變化將於以下章節詳細解釋。

Due to the increasing scepticism towards 1C2S and time lag in data availability, the 2020 estimated score of Index (B) is likely to be upwardly biased. This implies the decline in the 1C2S Index is likely to be understated. In this respect, decision makers in Hong Kong should take careful note of the declining trend and its ramifications.

鑑於國際社會對「一國兩制」的疑慮未見好轉, 以及整合全球評分的數據滯後,2020 年指數 (B)的估算分數可能偏高,是以可能低估了「一 國兩制」指數的跌幅。此跌勢及其影響值得決策 者關注。

Figure 1: 1C2S Index 圖 1: 「一國兩制」指數



Scores Changes 變化 5.48 -0.01 (↓ 0.2%) 3.37 -0.02 (↓ 0.6%) 7.59 - -

Note: Dotted line indicates a revision in indicators

註:虛線為指標經過修訂

2.1. Index (A): Public Opinion

Table 1 shows that after a slight rebound in December 2019, the trend of recovery of Index (A) reversed and dropped to a new low of 3.37 in January 2021, though the decline was statistically insignificant.

Unlike last round where all dimensions declined, three of the nine dimensions experienced rebound from June 2020, one of these increases was also statistically significant, namely, 'full implementation of 1C2S' (raised by 14.1% to 2.70). Other dimensions recorded positive changes in this round were 'original ways of life' and 'resolving differences via dialogue and negotiation', which increased by 0.6% and 2.4% respectively.

Overall, as in previous rounds since the outbreak of the anti-extradition movement, no items score higher than the median of 5. The two dimensions scoring relatively higher at or over 4 are 'independent judiciary' (4.00) and 'original ways of life' (4.41). Whereas those scoring the lowest include: "Hong Kong people administering Hong Kong" and "high degree of autonomy" (2.77), 'full implementation of 1C2S' (2.70) and 'resolving differences via dialogue and negotiation' (2.59).

In past surveys, item ratings typically varied within a relatively narrow band which was most plausibly due to a 'holistic rating' that the general public held on 1C2S. For instance, the range recorded in the latest round oscillates between 2 plus and 4 plus. Normally, the narrow range implies that regardless of the specific item surveyed, their answers would be shaped by an overall impression, rendering the range in relation to their answers for each specific item relatively small.

2.1. 指數(A): 民意調查

表1顯示指數(A)自2019年12月的回升後,2021年1月再下跌至歷史低位3.37分,但跌幅未達統計上顯著水平。

跟上一輪全數下跌不同,本輪九個範疇中有三個 自2020年6月起反彈,其中一項更達統計上顯著水 平,即「全面落實『一國兩制』」(上升14.1%至 2.70分)。其他在本輪調查錄得增長的範疇有 「原有生活方式」及「對話協商解決矛盾」,分 別錄得0.6%及2.4%增幅。

整體如同修例風波後的數輪調查,沒有範疇得分高於中位數5分。兩個得分達到或者超過4分的範疇有「獨立司法權」(4.00)及「原有生活方式」(4.41)。得分最低的包括「『港人治港、高度自治』原則」(2.77)、「全面落實 『一國兩制』」(2.70)及「對話協商解決矛盾」(2.59)。

各範疇評分高低差別不大,相信市民心中對「一國兩制」有一個概括評分。與上輪結果相約,最新一輪評分在2分多至4分多之間。一般而言,評分差距不大代表無論詢問甚麼項目,市民的答案也受到心中的概括評分影響,因此對各細項的評分不會過於偏離整體上的概括評分。

	2019.8	2019.10	2019.12	2020.6	2021.1	
Average 平均分	3.98	3.26	3.53	3.39	3.37	\
Original ways of life 原有生活方式	5.34	4.28	4.55	4.39	4.41	
Independent judiciary 獨立司法權	4.52	3.93	4.27	4.16	4.00	
Freedom of speech 言論自由	4.8	4.04	4.36	4.04	3.92	
Independent legislature 獨立立法權	4.21	3.34	3.75	3.71	3.62	
Self-conduct of administrative affairs 自行處理行政事務	3.98	3.31	3.49	3.40	3.34	
Democratisation 民主政制發展	3.61	2.90	3.21	3.08	3.01	
'Hong Kong people administering Hong Kong' and 'high degree of autonomy' principles 「港人治港、高度自治」原則	3.48	2.78	2.99	2.82	2.77	
Full implementation of 1C2S 全面落實 「一國兩制」	2.95	2.30	2.53	2.37	2.70	*
Resolving differences via dialogue and negotiation 對話協商解決矛盾	2.9	2.46	2.63	2.53	2.59	\

2.1.1. Generation gap and political divide

Figure 2 shows Index (A) by age in the past surveys. While 18-29 and 40-49 age groups continued to drop to their lowest, all other age groups recorded giving a higher average score than in June 2020.

The generation gap in the evaluation of 1C2S is obvious and widening. The average scores of younger age groups were lower than those of older age groups. While mean scores are generally low since the outbreak of the social movement in June 2019, residing well below the median of 5, that produced by 18-29 age group is markedly lower at 2.18 in Jan 2021. Those aged over 70 years, which always produced the highest score, modestly rebounded from 4.22 in June 2020 to 4.29 in Jan 2021.

Figure 3 shows Index (A) by political inclination in the past surveys. In this round, average score produced by all political groups, including the pro-establishment supporters, collectively dropped. Despite a drop of 8.8% since June 2020, the average score given by pro-establishment supporters remained higher than other groups, at 7.16. Meanwhile, the low score of non-establishment supporters fell even lower to 1.48.

Statistical tests revealed that there was obvious and consistent discrepancy in evaluation scores across all political inclinations. In comparison with moderates, the evaluations of pro-establishment supporters significantly higher. Evaluations of non-establishment supporters were significantly lower. After the democrats and other non-establishment supporters converged in late 2019, estranged the latter again from the general non-establishment trend with its average score plummeting by 17.6%, compared to a mere 2.5% drop in the democrat group. The trend of polarisation is evident not just between supporters of different political strata, but also within these strata.

2.1.1. 代溝及政治鴻溝

圖2顯示過去調查中,各個年齡組別在指數(A)的評分。最新一輪結果顯示代溝正在擴大,18-29歲和40-49歲年齡組別評分繼續跌勢,降至最低點,所有其他年齡組的平均得分均高於2020年6月。

從這些數字可見市民對「一國兩制」評價的代溝顯而易見。年輕一代的評分普遍低於較年長的組別。雖然社會運動後各年齡組別皆跌穿5分的中位數,18-29歲組別的分數比其他組別明顯地低,2021年1月最新平均分為2.18分。70歲或以上的長者一如既往評分最高,由2020年6月的4.22分微升至2021年1月4.29分。

圖3顯示過去調查中,不同政治傾向在指數(A)的評分。最新一輪中所有政治傾向受訪者,包括建制派均錄得跌幅。儘管建制派支持者的評分較2020年6月結果下跌8.8%,7.16分仍比其他組別高。非建制派支持者評分更跌至1.48分。

經統計檢測,不同政治傾向的評價存在既明顯又一貫的差異。建制派評分比溫和派顯著較高,而非建制派評分則比溫和派顯著較低。自從民主派及其他非建制派評分在2019年底趨同後,後者再次偏離非建制派的總體趨勢。其他非建制派本輪的平均分急跌17.6%,而民主派只跌2.5%。由此可見,兩極化趨勢不但見於不同政治派別之間,更存在於派別之中。

Figure 2: Index (A): Public Opinion (by age)

圖 2:指數 (A) : 民意調查 (按年齡組別劃分)





Figure 3: Index (A): Public Opinion (by political inclination)

圖 3:指數 (A) : 民意調查 (按政治傾向劃分)



2.2. Index (B): International Perception

We obtain scores on Hong Kong's freedom and democracy from international think tanks to compile Index (B). These scores are derived from Cato-Fraser Institutes' Human Freedom Index, which comprises the Economic Freedom Index and Personal Freedom Index, and the Economic Intelligence Unit's Democracy Index. The scores and ranks of Hong Kong since 2010 are shown in Table 2.

As international studies cover a very large number of countries, they do not always reflect the latest conditions. We will update the indices with data from comparable international indicators whenever possible. The method of updating is detailed in Appendix I.

Hong Kong has always ranked number one in Economic Freedom Index, with a score of around 9, the latest score dropped to its lowest since 2010 but is still relatively high at 8.83. The drop in the index score perhaps reflected the credit rating of Hong Kong downgrades in late 2019 and early 2020, but the high score also testified to the economic resilience of Hong Kong.

Hong Kong's score in Personal Freedom Index peaked at 8.94 in 2010, dropped to an estimated score of 8.36 in 2020. Given the adverse publicity in the international media on recent political events in Hong Kong, the decline of 6.4% from its peak is not surprising. Nonetheless, Hong Kong's 2020 score of 8.36 is still relatively high.

The Democracy Index rose from 5.92 in 2010 to a peak of 6.50 in 2017, rising by 9.8%, reflecting that Hong Kong has made some progress in democratisation vis-à-vis the increase of directly elected seats in the legislature. However, Hong Kong's score fell to 5.57 in 2020, falling by 14.3% from the peak in 2017. The new score of 5.57 makes a historic low.

Index (B) rose from 7.94 in 2010 to a peak of 8.05 in 2014, rising by 1.4%, largely as a result of the rise in Hong Kong's Democracy Index. Since then, it has embarked on a declining trend. The latest reading came in at 7.59, representing a drop of 5.7% from the peak.

2.2. 指數(B): 國際評價

我們從國際智庫對香港自由民主水平的評分編製指數(B)。評分取自「經濟自由指數」、「個人自由指數」及「民主指數」三項指數。首兩項指數由卡托研究所及菲沙研究所編製,第三項指數則由經濟學人智庫編製。「經濟自由指數」和「個人自由指數」的平均分被稱為「人類自由指數」。表2顯示香港由2010年起的分數和排名。

由於國際調查覆蓋大量國家,數據不一定反映最新情況,我們將按其他相應的國際指數估算香港 最新的評分。更新方法詳見附錄I。

香港在「經濟自由指數」長期名列世界第一,評分約為9分。最新評分雖跌至2010年起最低位,但仍處於相當高的位置,有8.83分。跌勢或者反映2019年底及2020年初不同國際機構對香港降低信用評級,但此高分說明香港經濟抗逆力。

香港的「個人自由指數」評分最高為2010年的8.94分,一直下滑至2020年估算的8.36分。鑒於國際社會對香港近期的政治事件反應負面,由最高位下跌6.4%並不令人意外。儘管如此,2020年的8.36分仍然不俗。

香港的「民主指數」由2010年的5.92分上升至2017年6.50分的頂點,升幅為9.8%,反映立法會增加直選議席令民主化取得一定進展。不過,2020年的評分由2017年的高峰下降14.3%至5.57分,創歷史新低。

指數 (B) 由2010年的7.94分上升至2014年8.05分的頂點,升幅為1.4%,主要因為香港的「民主指數」上升。其後持續下跌,最新評分下降至7.59分,自高峰下跌5.7%。

Table 2: Index (B): International Perception

表 2:指數 (B) :國際評價

		Human Freedom Index 「人類自由指數」	Democracy Index	Aggregate	
	Economic Freedom 「經濟自由」	Personal Freedom 「個人自由」	Sub-aggregate 分數	「民主指數」	總分
2010	8.91 (1)	8.94 (23)	8.93 (1)	5.92 (80)	7.92
2011	8.88 (1)	8.94 (22)	8.91 (1)	5.92 (80)	7.91
2012	8.84 (1)	8.89 (23)	8.87 (1)	6.42 (63)	8.05
2013	8.81 (1)	8.76 (26)	8.79 (2)	6.42 (65)	8.00
2014	8.85 (1)	8.80 (27)	8.83 (2)	6.46 (66)	8.04
2015	8.84 (1)	8.70 (31)	8.77 (4)	6.50 (67)	8.01
2016	8.86 (1)	8.52 (33)	8.69 (3)	6.42 (68)	7.93
2017	8.90 (1)	8.62 (30)	8.76 (3)	6.31 (71)	7.94
2018	8.94 (1)	8.53 (32)	8.74 (3)	6.15 (73)	7.87
2019	8.83^	8.36^	8.60^	6.02 (75)	7.74
2020	8.83^	8.36^	8.60^	5.92 (80)	7.59

Note: '^' denotes updates based on comparable indicators 註:「^」為更新自相應的國際指標

2.2.1. Components of Personal Freedom Index

Table 3 shows Hong Kong's scores and ranks in the seven components of the Personal Freedom Index from 2010 to 2020. During this period, the score of 'security & safety' has dropped by 0.02 as HK fell to eighth place in the category while the score of 'movement' has been constant at 10. Since 2019, 'association & assembly' dropped further from 6.47 to 4.85 and 'expression & information' from 9.17 to 9.06, suggesting concerns on personal freedoms in Hong Kong from the international community.

2.2.1. 「個人自由指數 | 的子項目

表3顯示從2010年至2020年,香港在「個人自由指數」七個子項目上的分數和排名。期間,「安全」評分下跌0.02分,屈居世界第八,「遷徙自由」評分則保持10分。自2019年,「言論自由」由9.17分跌至9.06分,「結社、集會及公民社會自由」則由6.47分跌至4.85分,跌幅顯示國際社會對香港的個人自由有所顧慮。

Table 3: Personal Freedom Index

表 3:「個人自由指數」

Year 年份	Rule of Law 法治	Security & Safety 安全	Movement 遷徙自由	Religion 宗教自由	Association, Assembly & Civil Society 結社、集會及 公民社會自由	Expression & Information 言論自由	Identity & Relationships 性別認同及關係	Aggregate 總分
2010	7.50 (17)	9.93 (3)	10.00 (1)	8.16 (73)	8.25 (74)	9.44 (39)	10.00 (1)	8.94 (23)
2011	7.50 (17)	9.97 (1)	10.00 (1)	8.09 (73)	8.26 (75)	9.42 (39)	10.00 (1)	8.94 (22)
2012	7.39 (19)	9.95 (4)	10.00 (1)	8.19 (66)	7.95 (83)	9.38 (46)	10.00 (1)	8.89 (23)
2013	7.39 (19)	9.47 (39)	10.00 (1)	8.29 (57)	7.81 (88)	9.33 (47)	10.00 (1)	8.76 (26)
2014	7.80 (14)	9.53 (35)	10.00 (1)	8.13 (68)	7.32 (96)	9.26 (49)	10.00 (1)	8.80 (27)
2015	7.79 (16)	9.54 (34)	10.00 (1)	8.35 (59)	7.08 (100)	9.28 (48)	9.00 (36)	8.70 (31)
2016	7.14 (23)	9.53 (34)	10.00 (1)	8.47 (41)	6.78 (105)	9.22 (49)	9.00 (37)	8.52 (33)
2017	7.14 (23)	9.96 (2)	10.00 (1)	8.47 (39)	6.78 (105)	9.17 (48)	9.00 (30)	8.62 (30)
2018	7.07 (23)	9.91 (8)	10.00 (1)	8.26 (49)	6.47 (108)	9.17 (48)	9.00 (30)	8.53 (32)
2019	7.07^	9.91^	10.00^	8.26^	4.85^	9.06^	9.00^	8.36^
2020	7.07^	9.91^	10.00^	8.26^	4.85^	9.06^	9.00^	8.36^

Note: Number in brackets indicates world ranking; 'A' indicates updates based on comparable indicators

註:括號為國際排名;「1」為更新自相應的國際指標

2.2.2. Comparison with Hong Kong's neighbours

As Hong Kong is a highly developed region and given that highly developed regions tend to have comparatively higher scores in freedom and democracy as compared with developing regions – we have selected certain neighbouring developed countries and territories (namely, Japan, South Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan) as benchmarks for comparison and assessment of Hong Kong's performance. We have also compared the respective scores of the Mainland and Hong Kong under the indices, for the purpose of identifying whether Hong Kong has become increasingly 'mainlandised' under 1C2S. For brevity, we will refer to Japan, South Korea, Singapore, Taiwan, and the Chinese mainland as 'neighbours'.

Table 4 compares Hong Kong and its neighbours in the various indices of Index (B) in 2020. Hong Kong's score in Economic Freedom was world leading while its score in Personal Freedom Index was at par with its developed neighbours. Due to Hong Kong's superlative performance in Economic Freedom Index, its score in Human Freedom Index was stronger than the four developed neighbours. However, Hong Kong's Democracy Index was lower than its developed neighbours, even Singapore who always used to score lower than Hong Kong surpassed Hong Kong in the latest index score. Consequently, Hong Kong's Index (B) score of 7.59 was lower than Japan's 8.41, Korea's 8.22, and Taiwan's 8.57, but above Singapore's 7.50. It was much higher than Mainland's 4.80.

Table 5 compares the 2020 Personal Freedom Index of Hong Kong with its neighbours. Hong Kong's scores were in the same league as those of our developed neighbours (Japan, Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan), and were much higher than those of the Mainland. Hong Kong's aggregate score of 8.38 was higher than that of Singapore's 7.81 but slightly lower than Japan's 9.10, Korea's 8.79, and Taiwan's 8.85.

In comparison with its four developed neighbours, Hong Kong was relatively strong in 'security & safety' and 'movement', but relatively weak in 'rule of law' and 'association, assembly & civil society'. Hong Kong was more or less at par with others in the remaining four components, namely, 'religion', 'expression & information', and 'identity & relationships'. Hong Kong's relatively low score in 'rule of law' and 'association, assembly & civil society' nevertheless warrants concern.

2.2.2. 比較鄰近地區

一般而言,發達地區的自由與民主指數,均高於發展中的地區。由於香港是高度發展的地區,所以我們選取鄰近的發達國家及地區,包括日本、南韓、新加坡及台灣作比較,藉以評價香港的表現。我們亦比較中國內地與香港的自由民主指數,以觀察在「一國兩制」之下的香港是否趨向「大陸化」。為簡便起見,我們將日本、南韓、新加坡、台灣與中國內地稱為「鄰近地區」。

表4比較2020年香港和鄰近地區的指數 (B)。香港的經濟自由名列世界前列,個人自由亦媲美鄰近發達地區。香港的經濟自由卓越,使其「人類自由指數」勝過以上四個鄰近發達地區。不過香港的「民主指數」則低於它們,包括以往香港經常超越的新加坡。整體來說,香港的指數 (B) 評分落後於日本的8.41分、南韓的8.22分和台灣的8.57分,但領先新加坡的7.50分。香港在各種指數的評分則比中國內地的4.80分高出不少。

表5比較2020年香港和鄰近地區的「個人自由指數」。香港評分良好,接近日本、南韓、新加坡及台灣等鄰近發達地區,並大幅拋離內地。香港的總分為8.38分,遠遠高於新加坡的7.81分,但略低於日本的9.10分、南韓的8.79分及台灣的8.85分。

比較四個鄰近發達地區,香港在「安全」和「遷 徙自由」較優勝,「法治」及「結社、集會及公 民社會自由」則相對遜色。其餘四項,即「宗教 自由」、「言論自由」和「性別認同及關係」, 香港與鄰近發達地區不相伯仲。儘管「法治」及 「結社、集會及公民社會自由」的評分低的情況 亦令人擔憂。

Table 4: Index (B): International Perception of Hong Kong and neighbours (2019)

表 4:香港與鄰近地區之指數 (B) :國際評價 (2019)

		Human Freedom Index 「人類自由指數」	Democracy Index	Aggregate	
	Economic Freedom 「經濟自由」	Personal Freedom 「個人自由」	Sub-aggregate 分數	「民主指數 」	總分
Hong Kong 香港	8.83	8.38	8.61	5.57 (87)	7.59
Mainland China 中國內地	6.33	5.81	6.07	2.27 (151)	4.80
Japan 日本	8.01	9.10	8.56	8.13 (21)	8.41
Korea 韓國	7.87	8.79	8.33	8.01 (23)	8.22
Singapore 新加坡	8.65	7.81	8.23	6.03 (74)	7.50
Taiwan 台灣	7.92	8.85	8.39	8.94 (11)	8.57

Note: Updates based on comparable indicators

註:更新自相應的國際指標

Table 5: Comparing Personal Freedom Index of Hong Kong and neighbours (2019)

表 5: 比較香港與鄰近地區之「個人自由指數」(2019)

	Rule of Law 法治	Security & Safety 安全	Movement 遷徙自由	Religion 宗教自由	Association, Assembly & Civil Society 結社、集會及 公民社會自由	Expression & Information 言論自由	Identity & Relationships 性別認同 及關係	Aggregate 總分
Hong Kong 香港	7.07	9.91	10.00	8.26	4.85	9.06	9.00	8.38
Mainland China 中國內地	4.14	9.23	5.00	3.29	1.69	5.75	9.00	5.81
Japan 日本	7.97	9.96	10.00	9.04	9.52	9.42	8.17	9.10
Korea 韓國	7.64	9.75	8.33	9.10	8.84	9.11	9.00	8.79
Singapore 新加坡	7.68	9.56	8.33	6.25	5.08	8.06	7.33	7.81
Taiwan 台灣	6.94	9.31	10.00	9.18	9.14	9.51	10.00	8.85

Note: Updates based on comparable indicators

註:更新自相應的國際指標

2.3. 1C2S Mass Media Index

Media sentiment is an important factor in the formation of public opinion. We attempt to use big data techniques to measure media sentiment towards 1C2S and monitor how 1C2S is conveyed in the mass media to provide a timely barometer of public sentiment. 1C2S MMI is a net sentiment index of newspaper articles over a given time. To dovetail with our main Index, we compile the MMI biannually. We have mined over 157,000 news articles and around 79 million words from 21 local daily newspapers to compile the MMI (See Appendix I for details). MMI is set at 100 in the base month of July 2017, the 20th anniversary of Hong Kong's return to China.

In the longer run, subject to resource availability, MMI opens up many opportunities of further research in public opinion formation. The MMI can be compiled at high frequency intervals (e.g. monthly) as it is not subject to the long time lags of surveys. It is also possible to investigate the effect of specific significant on media sentiment, or to compare sentiments in the local and overseas media.

Newspaper is only part of the media, and the MMI does not cover news reported by traditional electronic media such as television and radio, nor news carried by new media. Measuring the sentiments of news reported by television and radio is very difficult as there is no comprehensive text-based data base available. Measurement of sentiments of new media is also very difficult as it will be very demanding on resources. Furthermore, while widely accepted credibility ratings of different newspapers are available through regular opinion polls, comparable ratings on the credibility of different new media outlets are not available. We thus confine our study to newspaper articles on 1C2S.

It should be noted that many newspapers have also broadcasted their news through online outlets such as websites and mobile apps. In so far as the news articles of these online outlets are the same as their printed versions, the sentiments of these articles are already included in our MMI regardless of whether they are printed or broadcasted online. IC2S MMI currently only gauges sentiment of an important subset of mass media, namely, printed newspapers, as a general representation of sentiment in mass media.

2.3. 「一國兩制」輿情指數

媒體所傳遞的情緒是形成民意的重要因素,故此,我們嘗試利用大數據技術去衡量媒體情緒,藉此透視大眾傳媒對「一國兩制」的感受及意見,編製輿論情緒對「一國兩制」的晴雨表。「一國兩制」輿情指數為一段時間內報紙文章的情緒淨值指數,以半年結為基礎,配合我們的主指數及補充其不足之處。輿情指數從21家本地報章搜集超過157,000篇報導,逾7,900萬字(詳見附錄I)。輿情指數的基數月訂為2017年7月,基數為100,以標誌回歸20周年的情況。

長遠而言,如資源許可,輿情指數能為民意形成開拓更多研究機會。輿情指數不受以傳統調查方式收集民意時所產生的滯後影響,因此能以高頻率編製(例如每月)。它亦可以調查特定重大事件對媒體情緒的影響,或比較本地及海外媒體的情緒。

報紙只是媒體的一部分,輿情指數不包括電視、電台等傳統電子媒體報導的新聞,也不包括新媒體所報導的新聞。由於電視和電台沒有全面的文本數據庫,所以要衡量它們的新聞情緒非常困難。衡量新媒體的情緒則對資源有較高要求,所以也非常困難。此外,民意調查定期評估不同報紙的公信力,得到廣泛認可,新媒體的公信力卻沒有相應的評價。故此,我們的研究將會聚焦於與「一國兩制」有關的報紙文章。

值得注意的是,不少報紙也透過網站、手機程式 等網上媒介傳播。這些網上媒介的報導與印刷版 本大多相同,所以無論是印刷或網上版本,其情 緒已經涵括在輿情指數之中。目前,輿情指數只 衡量大眾傳媒的一個重要部分——印刷報紙,以 評估大眾傳媒整體的輿情。

2.3.1. Recent trend

Although the promulgation of the Outline Development Plan for the Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area sparked hopes for future economic growth, Beijing's 1C2S ambition over Taiwan also drew public attention as to whether Hong Kong is a flawed example of the experiment. The anti-extradition movement emerged abruptly and caused the worst governance crisis since the Handover in June 2019 which dragged MMI from 91.6 to 84.5 points in the first half of 2019 before plummeting further to 67.2 as 2019 drew to a close.

Year 2020 began with personnel change in the central government responsible for Hong Kong affairs, involving the upgrade of the central committee on Hong Kong and Macau affairs from 'coordination group' to 'leading group', restructuring of the Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Office and new directorship of the Hong Kong Liaison Office. After this massive wave of news coverage pushed MMI upward to 73.0, it showed a minor drop as COVID-19 crisis management aroused debates over cross-border visitor control, followed by sentimental speculations about the impact of National Security Law which pushed MMI down to 66.7 in June 2020.

The latter half of 2020 was no less controversial as the much-feared and -despised National Security Law was eventually enacted and the LegCo election was postponed for a year. The argument over 'executive-led system' and 'separation of powers' caused unease among some. Such sentiment peaked when the HKSAR government announced immediate disqualification of four lawmakers following an NPCSC decision and the arrest of pro-democracy mogul Jimmy Lai. Notwithstanding the shock these events induced, MMI steadily rose and reached 78.0 by the end of the year. The rise coincided with Xi's assuring remark on the future of 1C2S in a speech he delivered for the 40th anniversary of Shenzhen SEZ as well as the place of 1C2S in China's 14th Five-Year Plan and the 2035 Vision.

2.3.1. 近期趨勢

雖然《粵港澳大灣區發展規劃綱要》為未來經濟發展帶來希望,中央政府提出的「一國兩制」台灣方案,令群眾思考香港是否一個可取例子。 2019年6月爆發的反修例運動蘊釀回歸後最大的管治危機,令輿情指數在上半年由91.6點拖低至84.5 點,下半年更急瀉至67.2點的谷底。

2020年始於中央涉港部門的人事變動,包括中央港澳工作協調小組升格為領導小組、港澳辦改組、中聯辦任命新主任。連日的傳媒報道一度把與情指數推高至73.0點,但於新冠肺炎的封關爭議中稍微回落,緊接後來對《港區國安法》的各種揣測,令與情指數於2020年6月跌至66.7點。

2020年下半年同樣不乏爭議,廣受恐懼的《國家安全法》終於實施、立法會選舉被推遲一年、有關「行政主導」及「三權分立」的爭論等都引起了公眾的不安。不安的情緒更在特區政府宣佈人大常委會取消立法會四名議員資格以及泛民領袖黎智英被捕後達至頂峰。儘管這些事件引起了重大的迴響,輿情指數卻穩步上升,年底更達78點。升幅恰恰與習近平在深圳經濟特區成立40週年致辭中就「一國兩制」未來的發言、「一國兩制」在中國的「十四五規劃」中的「2035年遠景」中所佔位置等事件重叠。

The latest figure in January 2021 is recorded at 78.6, showing that the upward trend observed in the latter half of 2020 continued despite the mass arrest against democrat primaries.

即使發生泛民大搜捕,2021年1月輿情指數的最新 數字持續2020下半年的升勢,錄得78.6點。

2018.12

2019.6

2019.12


2020.6

2020.12

2021.1

Figure 4: 1C2S MMI (2019-2021)

圖 4:「一國兩制」輿情指數(2019-2021)



Scores 評分	Changes 變化
91.6	(↓ 7.6%)
84.5	(↓ 7.1%)
67.2	(↓ 17.4%)
66.7	(↓ 0.5%)
78.0	(↑ 11.3%)
78.6	(↑ 0.6%)

2.4. Evaluations of 1C2S

1C2S is unprecedented in history. There have always been doubts if Hong Kong can remain a free city as part of a country ruled by a communist party. Problems and difficulties in the implementation of 1C2S are thus to be expected.

24 years after Hong Kong's return to China, despite some declines in scores in selected international indices, Hong Kong still leads the world in Economic Freedom, and ranked reasonably well in Personal Freedom. According to the 2020 Human Freedom Index, Hong Kong ranked world's number three after New Zealand and Switzerland. It is a fact that Hong Kong is still one of the freest territories in the world.

Though Hong Kong's Index (B): International Perception declined somewhat lately, Hong Kong's 2020 score at 7.74 was still relatively high. We are still in the same league as our developed neighbours: above Singapore, but slightly lower than Japan, Korea, and Taiwan. The gaps between Hong Kong and the Mainland in all the above Indices on freedom and democracy remained very big, showing that allegation of 'Mainlandisation' is unfounded.

The latest Index (A): Public Opinion was recorded at 3.37. The mean score of the nine items continued to be pessimistic and for the fourth consecutive rounds, none of the nine items received scores higher than the median of 5. 'Original ways of life', which always obtained the highest score in past surveys remained well below 5 at 4.41 but represented the highest score of all dimensions in January 2021. Some other items that usually scored less favourably in previous rounds of survey continued to drop below 3, including 'the successful implementation of the "Self-Governance, High Autonomy" principles', 'full implementation of 1C2S' as well as 'resolving differences via dialogue and negotiations'.

2.4. 「一國兩制」的評價

「一國兩制」是史無前例的嘗試,輿論不斷懷疑 香港是否能夠在共產黨領導的國家之內維持自 由,「一國兩制」的實踐出現困難與挑戰實屬意 料中事。

回歸24年,儘管部分國際指標錄得下降,香港的經濟自由排名保持世界前列,個人自由排名仍然亮麗。跟據《2020人類自由指數》,香港排名全球第三,僅次於新西蘭和瑞士。香港仍然是全球最自由的地區之一。

雖然近年香港的指數 (B) :國際評價下跌,2020年的7.74分仍然不俗。與鄰近香港的發達地區不相伯仲:高於新加坡,但稍低於日本,南韓和台灣。評分比中國內地高出甚多,印證香港被「大陸化」的說法缺乏根據。

最新的指數(A):民意調查錄得3.37分。九個範疇的平均分連續第四輪不超過中位數5分,其中評分一直最高的「原有生活方式」跌至4.41分,亦是2021年1月調查中的最高分數。其他評分一般較低的範疇,如「成功落實『港人治港、高度自治』」、「全面落實『一國兩制』」和「透過對話協商解決矛盾」繼續錄得少於3分。



In comparison to the evaluations of international think tanks, the evaluations of the Hong Kong public are less positive. Though the moderate decline in 'expression & information' appear to align with Hongkongers and the international community's concern of the socio-political future of Hong Kong, it should be acknowledged that the public is more demanding in their assessments due to their high expectations of 1C2S. Hong Kong's people's starting point is a system with a sophisticated legal system that enshrines both rule of law and personal freedoms, and gradual democratisation that had already been in progress prior to the return to China. These in turn induced greater expectations amongst the public with respect to the high degree of autonomy and human rights enshrined by the Basic Law.

Changes in scores in the indices are likely to be affected by significant political events and other landmark events that occurred since December 2019. Listed below are the major events that occurred since the last report from January to June 2020. The major events that occurred in previous reports from mid-2017 to late 2019 are listed in Appendix II.

國際智庫對香港的評分相對較高,而香港市民所給予的評分相對較低,是由於兩者的評價準則有所不同。國際智庫的評分涵蓋大量發展中國家及地區,而香港已屬發達地區之列,所以得分會處於較高的區間。另外,市民心目中對「一國兩制」有較高期望,所以給予較嚴格的評分。香港在回歸前已有成熟的法治基礎和高度人身自由,政制亦逐步民主化,所以市民對基本法承諾的高度自治和保障人權及自由有更高期望。

2020年下半年發生不少政治爭議和重大事件,與 「一國兩制」指數的變化有一定關係,上一版報 告涵蓋至2020年6月,其後發生的重大事件臚列如 下。早輪調查期間的重大事件詳見附錄II。

Table 6: Significant events (2020 H2) 表 6:重大事件一覽 (2020 H2)

7.9, 10.22 & 11.13

Australia, UK and Canada offered express immigration channels to Hong Kong residents. China indicated that BNO might no longer be recognized as valid travelling document.

7.11 & 7.16

More than 600,000 casted ballots in the two-day pro-democracy primaries. The Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Office and the Liaison Office condemned the illegality of the primaries, after which the former LegCo councillor, Au Nok Hin and the convenor of Power for Democracy, Andrew Chiu resigned from the coordination work

7.15, 8.7 & 8.11

The US president, Donald Trump, signed the Hong Kong Autonomy Act, with which eleven mainland and Hong Kong officials were financially sanctioned. Products labelled as 'Made in Hong Kong' are also forbidden to be imported into the US.

7.31

HKSAR government announced the postponement of LegCo election for a year, with the NPCSC deciding to extend the term of office of all LegCo members.

8.10

Nine people, including the founder of Apple Daily, Jimmy Lai, were arrested and charged of conspiring with foreign forces to endanger national security and embezzlement. A police raid consisting of 200 officers was performed on the Apple Daily headquarter.

8.17

After reviewed by the Education Bureau, content touching upon 'the separation of powers' in liberal studies textbooks was omitted and clarified that the HKSAR is an 'executive-led government'.

8.23 & 12.30

12 anti-extradition protesters were arrested in China's territorial waters on suspicion of illegal border crossing to Taiwan. They were in detention until December, ten of them were sentenced for imprisonment from seven months to three years by the mainland court. Two cases involving underage suspects were extradited to Hong Kong.

9

James Spigelman, non-permanent judge of the Court of Final Appeal resigned, foreign newsagent rumoured that his resignation was related to the National Security Law. Another non-permanent judge, Peter Millett, also announced that he would no longer hear cases in Hong Kong due to old age and long travels.

9.22

The Police amended the definition of 'media representatives' and would no longer acknowledge membership issued by the Hong Kong Journalists Association and Hong Kong Press Photographers Association. Only media outlets registered under the government news system and internationally reputable news agents would be recognized.

10.5

Education Bureau cancelled the registration of a teacher for the first time with the reason of 'promoting pro-independence message'.

7.9. 10.22 & 11.13

澳洲、英國及加拿大提出便利港人移居當地措施,中方表示考慮不承認BNO作為有效旅行證件。

7.11 & 7.16

為期兩天的民主派初選結束,超過60萬人投票。港澳辦及中聯辦指控初選違法,前立法會議員區諾軒和民主動力召集人趙家賢先後退出協調工作。

7.15, 8.7 & 8.11

美國總統特朗普簽署《香港自治法案》,以金融方式制裁 11位中港官員,並禁止進口美國產品貼上「香港製造」標 籤。

7.31

特區政府押後立法會選舉一年,全國人大常委會決定全體 議員延任至少一年。

8 10

壹傳媒創辦人黎智英等9人被拘捕,涉勾結外國或者境外勢 力危害國家安全及串謀欺詐等罪。警方高調派遣200人搜查 壹傳媒大樓。

8.17

高中通識課本經教育局閱覽後,部分刪走關於三權分立的內容,指香港偏向行政主導。

8.23 & 12.30

12名反修例示威人士,涉嫌非法越境往台灣,於中國海域 內被海警逮捕,拘留至12月。其中10人於內地法庭判處七 個月至三年囚禁,另外兩名未成年人士移交予香港警方。

9

終審法院海外非常任法官施覺民辭任,外媒指時間與《港區國安法》有關。另一名非常任法官苗禮治亦指年邁不宜長途旅程,不再來港審案。

9.22

警方修訂《警察通例》下「傳媒代表」的定義,不再承認 記協和攝記協會員證,只有向政府登記及國際認可及知名 的非本地新聞機構才獲得承認。

10.5

教育局首次以「教材散播港獨信息」名義取消一名教師的 註冊。

11.11

NPCSC declared that LegCo councillor who does not fulfil the legal requirements of upholding the Basic Law will be immediately stripped of their qualifications as LegCo Councillor. HKSAR subsequently disqualified Kenneth Leung, Alvin Yeung, Dennis Kwok and Kwok Ka Ki. 15 other pro-democratic camp LegCo councillors resigned en masse in protest, leaving only Cheng Chung-tai and Pierre Chan remained.

11 21

Online radio host was arrested on suspicion of money laundering and providing financial support for anti-extradition youth protesters in exile to Taiwan and secession.

11.26

Civil Service Bureau demanded that all civil servants will have to sign declaration of loyalty to government.

12.3 & 12.11

Former Legco Councillor, Ted Hui announced his resignation from the Democratic Party and was in exile to the Netherlands with his family. Sixtus Leung of Youngspiration also indicated his wish to seek political refuge in the US.

12.8

Former LegCo councillor, Wu Chi Wai, Eddie Chu, Leung Kwok Hung and the convenor of Civil Human Rights Front, Figo Chan and other District Councillors were arrested for their suspected participation in the illegal assemble on 1 July.

12.21

The Court of Final Appeal ruled that the Emergency Ordinance and the Anti-mask Law are both constitutional, all rallies will forbid face coverage whether or not they are legal.

12.31

After Home Affairs Bureau declaring its illegality, Hong Kong Citizens' Deliberative Platform announced that due to failure to reach consensus, the platform will terminate their fundraising work and will immediately dissolve.

11.11

全國人大常委會決定,凡依法認定不擁護《基本法》、不效忠香港特別行政區者,即時喪失議員資格。特區政府隨即取消梁繼昌、楊岳橋、郭榮鏗及郭家麒四人議席。15名 民主派議員集體辭職以示抗議,只有鄭松泰和陳沛然留任。

11.21

網台主持等人發起眾籌,支援出走台灣的反修例青年,涉嫌洗黑錢及資助分裂國家而被捕。

11.26

公務員事務局決定,全體現職公務員簽署效忠聲明。

12.3 & 12.11

前立法會議員許智峯宣布退出民主黨,與家人流亡丹麥。 青年新政梁頌恆也表示身處美國,計劃尋求政治庇護。

12.8

前立法會議員胡志偉、朱凱廸、梁國雄、民陣召集人陳皓 桓等多人名區議員涉及於七一遊非法集結等多項罪行而被 捕。

12.21

終審法院裁定《緊急法》與《蒙面法》均合憲,合法與非 法遊行集會皆不可以蒙面。

12.31

民政事務局形容平台是「非法」後,由本土派區議員牽頭的「公民議政平台」宣布因無法達到共識,終止籌組工作,即時解散。

Though the 1C2S Index did not recover to the pre-extradition level of around 6.3 to 6.4, it was still well over the median of 5. While 1C2S has problems in implementation, as could be expected of any unprecedented system, it is clearly not unworkable. The decline in this report should be viewed in this context.

雖然「一國兩制」指數未能回復修例運動前6.3至6.4分水平,分數仍比中位數5分為高。正如任何 史無前例的制度一樣,實踐「一國兩制」時遇到 問題乃意料之內,並非代表它不可行。本輪調查 評分的下降應該由此角度解讀。

2.4.1. Impact of internal governance

Internal governance issues that are not strictly related to 1C2S appear to have important effects on evaluations of the Hong Kong public and media, but do not affect international evaluations as much. It is important to bear this in mind when reading the findings identified in this Report.

For example, in the period before mid-2018, both MMI and Index (A) performed well despite the disqualification of six LegCo members from late 2016 to mid-2017, and the sentencing of the 3 student protestors in the Civic Square occupation to prison by the Court of Appeals on August 2017. The announcement of CY Leung in late 2016 that he would not run for a second term and the subsequent election of the new CE had strong positive effects on MMI that outweighed the effect of the above controversies. The honeymoon period of the new administration from mid-2017 to mid-2018 also appeared to have an important positive effect on Index (A).

The sharp declines in Index (A) and MMI starting from late 2018 can be attributed to political controversies over the disbandment of the pro-independence Hong Kong National Party, the rejection of work visa for Victor Mallet and the anti-extradition movement. At the same time, the waning approval ratings of the government reflected that internal governance issues surrounding the Lantau Tomorrow Vision reclamation project and the proposed increase of age threshold for elderly welfare payments also affected Hong Kong's public and media negatively.

2.4.1. 內部管治的影響

與「一國兩制」無直接關係的內部管治問題,對 香港市民和輿情的評價似乎有一定影響,但對國 際評價影響不大。在解讀此報告的結論時,應予 以考慮。

例如,即使2018年中之前發生不少政治爭議,包括六名立法會議員被褫奪議席,以及佔領公民廣場的三名學生於上訴法院判刑入獄,指數(A)及與情指數皆表現良好。梁振英於2016年底宣佈不角逐連任,及後新一屆行政長官選舉對與情指數有明顯的正面作用,蓋過上述爭議的影響。新政府於2017年中至2018年中的蜜月期對指數(A)也有一定正面影響。

指數(A)及輿情指數於2018年底之後明顯下降,可以歸因於香港民族黨被取締,馬凱簽證爭議及反修例運動。同時,「明日大嶼願景」填海計劃及提高長者綜援申請年齡等內部管治事件導致特區政府民望下滑,對市民和傳媒也有一定負面影響。

2.4.2. Impact of international situation

The attitude of the West towards China has in recent years shifted from engagement to confrontation as the West increasingly fears that its supremacy being challenged by the rise of China. Evaluations of international think tanks may not be free of western ideological biases against the rise of China, but they may also reflect genuine weaknesses in the implementation of 1C2S. Furthermore, their effects on international investors cannot be underestimated as Hong Kong is an easy target in the 'New Cold War', as evident in the passage of the Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act in November 2019 and Hong Kong Autonomy Act in July 2020. The existential ambiguity of Hong Kong presents a real vulnerability.

Much of the negative international evaluation on the rule of law in Hong Kong can be attributed to a misunderstanding of the fundamental concept of 1C2S: Hong Kong is not an independent country, it is part of a civil law country but with an independent judiciary that practices common law in relation to self-autonomy issues. The Hong Kong judiciary also has power to deal with constitutional issues but it must defer to interpretations of the national Constitution and the Basic Law by the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress. This is different in nature from courts of common law countries but not uncommon in civil law countries. This suggests the Hong Kong judiciary has a higher level of independence and judicial function than many courts at the district level of other civil law countries. This is not a weakness of the Hong Kong judicial system but rather a unique characteristic of the Hong Kong Court under 1C2S that the HKSAR Government needs to emphasize in the international arena.

Western think tanks have downgraded Hong Kong's scores on 'rule of law', citing the interpretation of the Basic Law by Beijing in 2016 as a reason. However, interpretation of the Basic Law first occurred in 1999 and it is nothing new. The Hong Kong judiciary is still the same judiciary which had received high scores from western think tanks just a few years back, and it is as independent as always as demonstrated by recent prosecutions and convictions of a former Chief Executive and other high-ranking officials of the HKSAR Government. It appears that western perceptions of China and Hong Kong have changed more than Hong Kong has.

2.4.2. 國際形勢的影響

西方愈來愈擔心中國崛起將會挑戰其優勢,所以對中國的態度由合作轉向對抗。西方智庫對「一國兩制」的評價不能完全擺脫此意識形態的轉向,但也可能反映「一國兩制」在實踐上的真正弱點。它們對國際投資者的影響不容小覷,因為香港很可能在「新冷戰」下首當其衝成為戰靶,2019年11月通過的《香港人權及民主法案》及2020年7月通過的《香港自治法案》正驗證這一點。

部分負面評價源於「一國兩制」的概念和實踐存在誤解:香港並非獨立國家,而是擁有獨立司法權,以普通法實行內部自治的大陸法國家一部分。司法機構有權力處理憲制問題,但必須服膺人大常委會對國家《憲法》與香港《基本法》的解釋。此安排雖然與普通法國家的法庭存在本質上的不同,但在大陸法國家的地區法庭有更大的質法機構比不少大陸法國家的地區法庭有更大的獨立性及司法權,此非香港司法制度的缺點,反倒是香港法庭在「一國兩制」下的獨特之處,值得特區政府向國際社會闡明。

近年部分西方智庫基於2016年的人大釋法降低香港法治的評分,其實人大釋法早於1999年已經發生,並非新生事物;而直到2015年,香港司法仍然得到西方好評。近年香港部分高官及某前特首被起訴及定罪的案例,說明香港司法仍然與以往一般獨立,只是西方對中國及香港的觀感有所改繼。

2.5. Suggestions

Given the biases and misunderstandings identified above, it is important for the HKSAR Government to consider spearheading a concerted effort involving all sectors of Hong Kong including the business community, the academia, professional bodies, and like-minded think tanks and NGOs to promote the image of Hong Kong under 1C2S. Such effort may include:

- Setting up a broadly representative committee to advise the HKSAR Government on all issues relating to 1C2S;
- Setting up a dedicated office under a relevant policy bureau to explain and address the concerns of and answer any queries regarding the National Security Law from the public including the international business community;
- Establishing a semi-official high-level think tank on external relations to undertake various private initiatives such as being responsible for mounting and coordinating outreach efforts, mobilizing support from all sectors of our and international communities, and enhancing Hong Kong's presence in APEC related networks;
- Setting up an early warning system within the government to alert and manage expectation of public on all possible issues which might affect 1C2S or the perception of quality of governance;
- Setting up a system whereby international media would be timely, fully and properly briefed on issues affecting 1C2S;
- Paying more attention to the education of young members of the public in relation to issues such as understanding of the 1C2S, true meaning of rule of Law, human rights and related freedoms, moral standards, broadening of societal as well as international perspectives, and increase awareness of national issues;
- Promoting, assisting and encouraging local think tanks to conduct periodical exchanges with influential foreign think tanks interested in Hong Kong affairs;

2.5. 建議

為釐清以上偏見與誤解,特區政府應領導香港各界,包括政府、商界、學界、專業團體、目標相近的智庫和民間組織,共同努力向國際社會闡釋香港在「一國兩制」下的實況,包括:

- 設立具廣泛代表性的委員會,協助政府處理 所有有關「一國兩制」的問題;
- 相關政策局內成立專責部門,解釋及回應公 眾及國際商業社會對《港區國安法》的疑 問;
- 成立專注香港涉外關係的半官方高層智庫, 負責推動和協調涉外工作,動員社會各界支 持,加強香港在APEC網絡中的角色;
- 政府內部建立監察系統,就可能影響「一國 兩制」或治理質素的所有可能衝突,管理公 眾的期望;
- 建立機制使國際媒體能夠充分及恰當地知悉 影響「一國兩制」的議題;
- 注重青年教育,擴闊對「一國兩制」的理解、法治的意義、人權及自由、道德標準、 社會觸覺、國際視野及國情認識;
- 鼓勵在香港經商的西方商人為香港發聲;

- Motivating Hong Kong's business communities from western countries who are willing to defend Hong Kong in the international arena; and
- Enhancing Hong Kong's presence in APEC related networks and forums, e.g., the APEC Business Advisory Councils (ABAC), APEC Study Centres, the Pacific Economic Cooperation Council (PECC), and other tripartite forums that involve business people, academics, and NGOs in the Asia-Pacific. As a free economy and global city, Hong Kong should find a sympathetic hearing in the vast APEC related networks in the Asia-Pacific.
- 促進、協助和鼓勵本地智庫與關注香港事務 的外國重要智庫定期交流;及
- 強化香港在APEC龐大網絡內的影響力,例如亞太經合組織商業諮詢理事會(ABAC),亞太經合組織研究中心,太平洋經濟合作理事會(PECC)以及其他三方論壇。作為一個自由經濟體和國際都會,亞太區內APEC龐大的網絡應該對香港有一定認同。



3 去激進化跡象 Sign of Deradicalization

Figure 5 shows the composition of Hong Kong population by political inclination. Moderates (which include centrists and those without specific political inclination) remained the largest group (53.6%), followed by the non-establishment supporters (35.7%), and pro-establishment supporters (10.6%). Non-establishment supporters are further divided into democrats (26.4%) and 'others' (9.3%), which constitutes mostly the resistance camp.

(53.6%),包括「中間派」和「沒有政治傾向」的市民。非建制派排列第二(35.7%),建制派佔最少(10.6%)。非建制派可以再細分為民主派(26.4%)和以抗爭派為主的其他非建制派(9.3%)。

圖5顯示香港市民的政治傾向。溫和派為最大組別

From mid-2017 to December 2018, the proportion of moderates and pro-establishment in the population rose while that of non-establishment supporters declined. Since then, the population of moderates experienced some sharp declines which continued into early 2020. The political rift was consolidating as moderates continued to decrease by 0.9 percentage points from December 2019 in June 2020. However, the drop froze at 50% and rebounded in Jan 2021 to early-extradition levels. The latest proportion of moderate is recorded at 53.6%.

從2017年中至2018年底,溫和派和建制派的佔比上升,而非建制派則下降。自此以後,趨勢開始逆轉,並持續至2020年初。儘管2020年上半年變化未如2019年期間波動,政治撕裂愈來愈嚴重。溫和派從2019年12月至2020年6月下跌0.9個百分點,但跌幅於50%止步,2021年1月度數更反彈至2019年10月水平,最新的溫和派佔比有53.6%。

latest round, In the the juxtaposition between pro-establishment and non-establishment supporters eased. With a rise of 1.5 percentage points in the second half of 2020, pro-establishment recovered to 10.6%, resuming to its pre-extradition level. On the other hand, non-establishment supporters dropped by a total of 5.3 percentage points (from 41.0% to 35.7%). Among non-establishment supporters, the proportion of democrats and others dropped by 1.6 percentage points, (from 28.0% to 26.4%), and 3.7 percentage points (from 13.0% to 9.3%) respectively. For the first time since August 2019, pro-establishment supporters outnumber that of other non-establishment supporters.


建制派及非建制派的對立性在新一輪結果顯示緩和跡象。建制派在2020年下半年有1.5個百分點的上升,把佔比帶回修例風波前的水平,達10.6%,而非建制派中的民主派及其他非建制派支持者,則分別跌1.6個百分點(由41.0%跌至35.7%)及3.7個百分點(由13%跌至9.3%)。建制派的佔比在本輪超越其他非建制派,是修例風波後的首次。

The resurgence of radicalism took place abruptly from June 2019 and continued into the first half of 2020 amidst a hopeful trend of de-radicalisation and the rise of moderation all through 2018. In the latest round, moderates as well as non-establishment supporters embarked on some remarkable trends of rise and decline respectively. In combination with a quickly declining population of other non-establishment supporters, the overall trajectory points to a narrowing political divide. It appeared that the subsiding momentum of the anti-extradition movement is beginning show in the political makeup of the population

去激進化及溫和政治在2018年興起,卻在2019年6 月急速逆轉並持續到2020年的上半年。最新一 輪,溫和派及非建制派各自錄得大幅度向上及向 下調整,結合其他建制派佔比的急速下降,政治 分野整體上有收窄的跡象。社會運動的休整似乎 也反映於市民的政治傾向。

Figure 5: Political inclination of population

圖 5:香港市民政治傾向



3.1. De-radicalisation of youths

Figure 6 shows the change in the composition of youths (aged 18 to 29) by political inclination. The proportion of moderates rose from 35.8% in June 2020 to 40.7% in Jan 2021 (an increase of 4.9 percentage points) while the proportion of the non-establishment group dropped from 62.8% to 56.0% (decreasing by 6.8 percentage points). Within the non-establishment group, the proportions of democrats rose from 24.9% to 28.0% (increasing by 3.1 percentage points) while other non-establishment decreased from 37.9% to 28.0% (declining by 9.9 percentage points). This is the second time democrats and other non-establishment supporters were of equal share within the 18-29 age group.

Up till December 2018, there had been encouraging signs of de-radicalization of youths, where population of moderates were high and rising. This trend, however, was reversed most notably from June 2019 onwards, as the proportion of non-establishment supporters witnessed a steep rise, surpassing moderates for some time. At the same time, within the non-establishment group, other non-establishment supporters overtook democrats by a large margin. In the latest round, the situation of radicalisation clearly eased as growth in moderates and democrats clearly surpassed the proportion of other non-establishment supporters. Nonetheless, despite a dramatic drop of about a third in the proportion of other non-establishment, almost one-third of youth identifying themselves as resistant camp is still a worrisome phenomenon.


3.1. 香港青年的去激進化

圖6顯示青年(18至29歲)的政治傾向變化。由2020年6月至2021年1月,溫和派的比例由35.8% 上升至40.7%(升4.9個百分點),非建制派的比例則由62.8%跌至56.0%(下降6.8個百分點)。非建制派中,民主派的比例由24.9%回升至28.0%(升3.1個百分點),其他非建制派則由37.9%回落至28.0%(跌9.9個百分點)。民主派再次與其他非建制派在18-29歲青年組別中比例均等。

截至2018年底,青年溫和派不但高企,還慢慢攀升,呈現令人鼓舞的去激進化跡象。但趨勢由2019年起急速扭轉,令溫和派屈居於急速增長的非建制派之後。更甚者,青年抗爭派已經超越民主派,而且差距進一步拉遠。最新一輪結果顯示,溫和派及民主派的增長,減低了其他非建制派的比例,群眾明顯有去激進法的跡象。儘管其他非建制派在年輕組別中經歷超過三分一的大幅度下降,約三成年輕人仍定位自己為抗爭派,情況令人擔憂。

Figure 6: Political inclination of youths

圖 6:青年的政治傾向



4 2047 年後延續「一國兩制」 Continuation of 1C2S beyond 2047

An issue of utmost importance for the future of Hong Kong is the continuation of 1C2S beyond 2047. Table 7 shows that 74.1% of the public still agreed to the continuation of 1C2S beyond 2047. While those who chose 'should' remained steady, there had also been a slight increase in 'should not' to 14.3%, leading to a decrease in the net support by 6 percentage points from 65.9% to 59.9% in January 2021.

Figure 7 shows the net support produced by respondents of different political inclinations. Even after some dramatic political events in relation to the enactment of National Security Law, net support across most groups with different political inclinations in Hong Kong still maintained over 60%, with the exception of the resistance camp, who nevertheless produced a support rate of almost 50% (46.3%). Though the public's current evaluation of 1C2S is quite critical, quite an overwhelming majority of them still regard 1C2S as the right system for Hong Kong's future.

Overall, the net support generally reached 60% across most age groups and political inclinations, with the exception of the following cohorts: those ageing 18-29 years (46.9%) and other non-establishment supporters (46.3%), dropping some further 10.8% and 7.9% from June 2020 respectively.

2047年後是否繼續實行「一國兩制」乃關乎香港 前途的關鍵議題。表7顯示74.1%市民同意香港應 該於2047年後延續「一國兩制」。認為「應該」 的受訪者維持平穩,認為「反對」則微升至 14.3%,導致支持度淨值由65.9%下跌6個百分點 至2021年1月的59.9%,只比2019年10月最低位稍 微高0.4%。

圖7顯示不同政治派別的支持度淨值變化。即使經歷一連串《港區國安法》引起的政治事件,所有政治派別對延續「一國兩制」仍有超過60%人支持,抗爭派則仍產生差不多50%支持率(46.3%)。縱使市民現時對「一國兩制」的評分不高,他們依然相信「一國兩制」是適合香港未來的體制。

所有年齡組別及政治傾向的受訪者支持度淨值一般達60%或以上,除了以下組別:18-29歲(46.9%)和其他非建制派(46.3%),兩者分別從2020年6月水平再跌10.8%及7.9%。

Table 7: Attitudes towards the continuation of 1C2S after 2047

表 7:2047 年後香港應否繼續實行「一國兩制」


	2019.6	2019.8	2019.10	2020.6	2021.1
Should 應該	75.5%	75.5%	73.5%	77.2%	74.1%
Should not 不應該	8.6%	10.1%	14.1%	11.3%	14.3%
Should not: Direct administration under CPG 不應該:內地直轄	-	-	-	4.9%	6.0%
Should not: Complete independence 不應該:完全獨立	-	-	-	2.3%	2.0%
Don't know 唔知道	15.8%	14.4%	12.4%	11.5%	11.6%
Net value 淨值	66.9%	65.4%	59.5%	65.9%	59.9% *

Net value: Percent who chose 'Should' less percent who chose 'Should Not'

淨值:認為「應該」的百分比減去認為「不應該」的百分比

Figure 7: Net Value of support for continuation of 1C2S by political inclination

圖 7:繼續實行「一國兩制」的支持度淨值(按政治傾向劃分)



4.1. Alternative future arrangements for Hong Kong

In view of the re-emergence of the debate around possible futures of Hong Kong, new options were offered to respondents choosing 'should not'. We carefully limit the options to only widely debated alternatives, that is, 'direct administration under CPG' and 'complete independence'. Interesting patterns arise. Of the 14.3% voting 'should not', a majority (accounting for 6.0% overall) chose 'direct administration under CPG, having rose by 1.1 percentage points from June 2020, followed by an overall 2.0% supporting 'complete independence', which decreased by 0.3 percentage point from last round. The result suggests that both options, but particularly 'independence', do not appear to be a viable option for many despite recurring and intensifying crisis of confidence in 1C2S.

4.1. 香港的其他前途選項

社會偶有討論香港的其他前途選項,本輪調查把2047年後應否延續「一國兩制」的題目延伸,若受訪者選擇「不應該」,將被詢問所屬意的前途選項。設計題目時我們把選項收窄至較為人所知的方案:「內地直轄」及「完全獨立」。14.3%認為不應該延續「一國兩制」的受訪者中,最多人選擇「內地直轄」,佔整體6.0%,自2020年6月上升1.1%。選擇「完全獨立」的則佔整體2.0%,較上輪下跌0.3%,說明「一國兩制」信心危機看似加劇,但是其他選項並無支持基礎。

Table 8: Support for alternative future arrangement after 2047 (by age) 表 8: 2047 年後其他前途選項的支持度(按年齡劃分)

	Direct Administration under CPG 內地直轄	Complete Independence 完全獨立	Others 其他	Don't know / Difficult to say 唔知道 / 好難說
18-29	4.0%	4.8%	6.5%	9.7%
30-39	4.5%	2.7%	1.8%	9.1%
40-49	4.8%	1.2%	2.4%	11.4%
50-59	7.2%	1.7%	3.1%	9.8%
60-69	5.8%	1.1%	1.1%	15.7%
<i>⊒</i> 0	9.7%	0.5%	1.7%	14.1%
All respondents 所有受訪者	6.0%	2.0%	2.7%	11.6%

Table 9: Alternative future arrangement after 2047 (by political inclination) 表 9: 2047 年後其他前途選項的支持度 (按政治傾向劃分)

	Direct Administration under CPG 內地直轄	Complete Independence 完全獨立	Others 其他	Don't know / Difficult to say 唔知道 / 好難說
Pro-establishment 建制派	14.3%	0.0%	0.8%	4.4%
Moderates 溫和派	7.2%	1.2%	2.4%	14.9%
Non-establishment 非建制派	2.2%	3.5%	3.8%	8.1%
Non-est.: Democrats 非建制派:民主派	2.1%	1.9%	3.7%	10.3%
Non-est.: Others 非建制派:其他	2.3%	7.9%	4.2%	2.1%
All respondents 所有受訪者	6.0%	2.0%	2.7%	11.6%

4.2. Favourable conditions to the continuation of 1C2S beyond 2047

If respondents agreed to the continuation of 1C2S after 2017, they were then asked to choose what conditions would be favourable to the continuation of 1C2S from the following list (they were allowed to choose more than 1 item):

- Political system democratises further;
- Maintaining national security (previously appeared as: Completing legislation of Article 23);
- Maintaining a high degree of autonomy;
- Maintaining economic prosperity and stability; and
- Others (please specify).

Figure 8 shows the percentages of respondents who chose each of the five conditions. For all respondents, 'maintaining a high degree of autonomy' (66.4%) remained the most important item, while 'democratising further' (53.3%) maintained at the same level as it did in June 2020 and continued to secure its second place for three consecutive rounds. 'Maintaining economic prosperity and stability' (51.6%), which always occupies second place on the list before June 2019, stayed in third place for the third time. 'Maintaining national security', which previously appeared as 'Completing legislation of Article 23', was recorded at 15.1%, which rose by 5 percentage points since last round.

Figure 9 shows how the pattern of choice differed by political inclination and the increasingly stark contrast among groups of different political inclinations. Pro-establishment supporters' support for 'maintaining national security' dropped by 7.8 percentage points from its highest recorded in June 2020 while 'democratizing further' rebounded by 6.4 percentage points from its lowest to 15.3%. This is an interesting observation immediately after the enactment of the National Security Law and was also seen in the Moderates who showed greater support to the two said conditions. In fact, Moderates' support for 'maintaining national security' reached its record high of 20.4% though it remained at fourth place.

4.2. 2047 年後繼續實行「一國兩制」 的有利條件

如果受訪者同意於2047年後繼續實行「一國兩制」,他們會進一步被邀從下列清單中選出有利於2047年後繼續實行「一國兩制」的條件(可選擇多於一項):

- 政制進一步民主化;
- 維持國家安全(前為「完成23條立法」);
- 維持高度自治;
- 經濟維持繁榮穩定;及
- 其他(請註明)。

圖 8 顯示對所有市民而言,「維持高度自治」 (66.4%) 仍然是首要選項。「政制進一步民主化」 (53.3%) 維持 2020 年 6 月水平,連續第三輪保 持次要位置。2019 年前經常穩居第二位的「經 濟維持繁榮穩定」(51.6%) 連續第三輪未能超前, 居於第三。「維護國家安全」(前為「完成 23 條 立法」) 升至 15.1%,自上輪上升 5 個百分點。

圖9按各政治傾向,顯示市民選擇各條件的比例。 建制派對「維護國家安全」的支持度從2020年6月 的歷史高位下降7.8個百分點,對「政制進一步民 主化」的支持度卻從最低的15.3%回彈6.4個百分 點。溫和派對上述兩個條件的支持度在上升之 中,是《港區國安法》實施後出現的意外現象。 溫和派對「維護國家安全」的支持甚至達記錄高 位,有20.4%,雖然仍只佔領第四位置。 Though support for 'maintaining national security' remained exceptionally low among non-establishment supporters, the item recorded increases since June 2020 among even the resistant groups. Democrats' ratings of different conditions were relatively stable since the anti-extradition movement while other non-establishment supporters' view become more consolidated as 'political system to democratize further' gained overwhelming support of 88.4% in the latest round, securing first place for the fourth consecutive rounds.


雖然非建制派對「維護國家安全」的支持率普遍偏低,自2020年6月起,項目在較激進的其他非建制派中卻錄得升幅。反修例風波後民主派對各項條件的評分一直平穩,其他建制派支持者的意見則愈來愈鮮明,最新一輪結果顯示「政制進一步民主化」在其他非建制派中已連續第四輪登上最重要條件,支持率更創下歷史新高,有88.4%。

Figure 8: Favourable conditions for the continuation of 1C2S after 2047 圖 8: 2047 年後繼續實行「一國兩制」的有利條件

80%			Scores	Changes
70%			評分	變化
60%		■ Maintaining a high degree of autonomy 維持高度自治	66.4%	(\ 3.2%)
50%		■ Political system democratizng further 政制進一步民主化	53.3%	-
40%		■ Maintaining economic prosperity and stability 經濟維持繁榮穩定	51.6%	(↓ 0.3%)
30%		■ Maintaining national security 維護國家安全	15.1%	(↑ 5.0%)
20%		■ Others / Don't know 其他 / 唔知道	4.6%	(↓1.5%)
10%				
0% 20	018.12 2019.6 2019.12 2020.6 2021.1			

Figure 9: Favourable conditions for the continuation of 1C2S after 2047 (by political inclination)

圖 9: 有利於 2047 年後繼續實行「一國兩制」的條件(按政治傾向劃分)



5 市民的身分認同 Citizens' Identity

We also surveyed how citizens identify themselves: whether as 'Hongkongers' or 'Chinese'. Figure 10 shows members of the public continue to identify themselves much more strongly as 'Hongkongers' than as 'Chinese'. The identities started to diverge after a period of parallel increases. In June 2020, the public's identification as 'Hongkongers' reached its highest of 8.55 while that as 'Chinese' dropped to its lowest of 4.38. In the latest round, the divide between these two identities eased as 'Hongkongers' and 'Chinese' returned to late 2019 levels at 8.26 and 4.73 respectively.

我們分別詢問市民對「香港人」及「中國人」身分的認同程度。圖10顯示市民對「香港人」的認同強於「中國人」,兩種身份認同同期增長後開始出現分歧。「香港人」認同度於2020年6月達8.55分高峰,「中國人」則跌至編制報告以來最低位,只有4.38分。最新一輪結果顯示兩種身份重回2019年底水平,分別為8.26分及4.73分。

The extent to which the public identified themselves as 'Hongkonger' and 'Chinese' can be better demonstrated by Figure 11, a graph mapping the mix of identities rated by respondents against time. On the 0 to 10 scale, the median is 5, which indicates a moderate level of identification. Ratings that are higher than the median indicate relatively strong identification; ratings that are lower than the median indicate relatively weak identification. These levels of strength can be grouped into four categories, dual identity (strong in both identifications), stronger identification as 'Hongkongers', stronger identification as 'Chinese', and others which include those without a dominant identity.

圖11更清晰地呈現市民對兩種身分的認同程度。 按0分至10分的尺度,中位數為5,代表中等認 同。高於中位數代表較強認同,低於則代表較弱 認同。對兩種身分不同程度的認同可歸為四類: 雙重身分(對兩種身分均擁有較強認同),對 「香港人」身分有較強認同,對「中國人」身分 有較強認同,以及包括沒有主要身分的其他身分 認同。

It is relatively clear that most Hong Kong citizens are typically cognizant of their dual identity as both 'Hongkongers' and 'Chinese', though this has gradually changed since June 2019. While the patterns from earlier surveys were very similar, in which a majority of the public (between 55.9% to 57.3% before December 2018) had relatively strong identification as both 'Hongkongers' and 'Chinese', dual identity further declined to 32.3% in January 2021 and 'Hongkongers only' remained the dominant identity surpassing the 'Hongkonger/Chinese' dual identity, despite having dropped by 6.9 percentage points from last round. Changes to both levels of identifications were statistically significant.

大部分市民擁有「香港人」及「中國人」雙重身分認同,但比例於2019年6月後逐漸改變:大部分市民(2018年12月前介乎55.9%至57.3%)對「香港人」及「中國人」兩種身分均擁有較高認同。2021年1月調查發現雙重身分認同跌至32.3%,自上輪調查起,「香港人」雖然經歷6.9個百分點的降幅,卻繼續佔據主流身份位置並遠遠超越雙重身份。兩種身份認同程度的改變均達統計上顯著水平。

Identification as 'Chinese' may not be the same as patriotic, but identification as both 'Hongkongers' and 'Chinese' is a pre-requisite for 'devotion to China and Hong Kong'. The fact that the proportion of Hong Kong people with dual identity continues to decline within the past 8 months points to the adverse impact of the current socio-political climate has on the implementation of 1C2S. We have not overlooked a possibility that current persistent international condemnation of China also has an impact on how Hongkongers look at themselves. The importance or otherwise of this will hopefully become clearer in time.

認同「中國人」身分未必等於「愛國」,不過同時認同「中國人」及「香港人」兩種身分卻是「愛國愛港」的先決條件。市民的雙重身分認同在短短八個月持續下跌,反映社會與政治環境對落實「一國兩制」的重大挑戰。現在,國際社會對中國口誅筆伐,對塑造香港人自我認同的作用不能忽略,其影響力需時瞭解。

Figure 10: Citizens' identity scores

圖 10:市民的身分認同評分





Figure 11: Citizens' identity mix

圖 11: 市民的混合身分認同





5.1. Rank correlation

As a result of the declining dual identity of both 'Hongkongers' and 'Chinese', the correlation between the two stated identifications widened. The two identities used to mutually reinforce each other but currently, in recent rounds, there were signs of polarization instead and reached statistical significance. The negative correlation increased slightly from -0.06 in June 2020 to -0.07 in Jan 2021. A stronger identification as 'Hongkonger' now accompanies a weaker one as 'Chinese' (see Table 10). The converse, on the other hand, also holds. The loss of mutuality of the two identities as and 'Chinese' risks challenging 'Hongkonger' implementation of 1C2S in the near future and one must take careful note of this.

5.1. 等級相關係數

隨著雙重身分認同大不如前,這兩種身分的相關性距離也隨之拉遠,由過去的相輔相成,變為現在的背馳傾向。最新的相關等級係數由2020年6月的-0.06輕微下降至2021年1月的-0.07,關係達統計上顯著水平,說明「香港人」身分認同越強,「中國人」身分認同則越弱,反之亦然(見表10)。「香港人」和「中國人」兩種身分認同的共存空間消失,將會是短期內實踐「一國兩制」的一大挑戰。

Table 10: Rank correlation of citizens' identity

表 10:市民的身分認同等級相關係數

	2017.6	2017.12	2018.6	2018.12	2019.6	2019.8	2019.10	2020.6	2021.1
Correlation 相關係數	0.13	0.18	0.17	0.17	0.17	0.12	-0.02	-0.06	-0.07
t-statistic t 檢定統計	4.06	5.58	5.53	5.55	5.43	3.85	-0.69	-1.82	-2.26 *

6 熱門議題 Topical Issues

6.1. Responsibility of conflicts

Table 11 shows allocation of blame between Mainland and Hong Kong when conflicts arise in the implementation of 1C2S. In Jan 2021, 46.6% of the public suggested that Mainland would be responsible while 14.2% assigned the responsibility to Hong Kong. Both of these values appeared to have eased from their extremes recorded around the time of the anti-extradition movement. On the other hand, those who chose 'equally responsible' fell from its usual 50% to just more than one-third for the third consecutive round, receiving a record low of 34.2%. Nonetheless, the tendency of blaming only Mainland clearly subsided in this round and the decrease in net value was statistically significant

Generally, net values tend to decrease with age and increase as political inclination lean away from the pro-establishment end. However, there were exceptions, the net value of the 30-39 age group was slightly lower than that by the 40-49 age group, meaning the former tended to place the blame on Hong Kong more than Mainland. Pro-establishment supporters produced the only negative net value as expected whereas moderates also produced the lowest positive net value of 14.2%.

The results suggest that both the central and Hong Kong governments ought to reflect on its own responsibility for deadlocks and conflicts between government and people.

6.1. 出現矛盾的責任

表11顯示當實踐「一國兩制」出現矛盾時,應歸咎責任於內地或香港。2021年1月調查顯示,46.6%市民認為責任屬於內地,14.2%則認為責任屬於香港,兩個結果均從反修例運動發生以來最極端的情況舒緩下來。此外,選擇「一半半」的人數由以往50%上下,連續第三輪跌至只有大約三分一,本輪是有記錄以來最低的34.2%。儘管如此,將矛盾責任歸咎於內地的傾向在本輪調查明顯減少,淨值的降幅達統計上顯著水平。

整體上,淨值隨年齡的增長而下降,並隨政治傾向偏離建制派而增加,但也有例外,30-39歲組別所產生的淨值比40-49歲組別的略低,意味前者傾向將責任歸咎於香港,而非內地。正如預期。建制派支持者產生唯一的負淨值,溫和派支持者則產生最低的正淨值,有14.2%。

結果說明,中央政府與香港均需就政府和市民之 間的僵局和矛盾反思自身責任。

Table 11: Responsibility for conflicts

表 11:出現矛盾的責任

	2019.6	2019.8	2019.10	2020.6	2021.1	
The Mainland 內地	29.0%	34.0%	45.4%	50.1%	46.6%	
Hong Kong 香港	16.1%	12.4%	11.5%	8.3%	14.2%	
Equally Responsible $-\pm \pm$	50.1%	47.3%	36.4%	35.7%	34.2%	
Don't Know 唔知道	4.8%	6.4%	6.7%	5.8%	5.0%	
Net Value 淨值	12.9%	21.6%	33.8%	41.8%	32.4%	*

Net Value: Percent who chose 'The Mainland' less percent who chose 'Hong Kong'

淨值:認為屬「內地」的百分比減去認為屬「香港」的百分比

6.2. Emigration

Table 12 shows public's emigration plans. Those who have 'no plans' to emigrate remained the majority (61.1%), over those who 'have plans' (32.7%). Both items recorded slight drops of 1.8 and 1.4 percentage points respectively as net value also experienced similarly small decline of 0.4 percentage point since June 2020 to -28.4%. None of these changes was statistically significant.

Table 13 and Table 14 show the percentages of age groups and groups of different political inclination who plan to emigrate (net emigration). Between June 2020 and Jan 2021, the steadily growing overall net emigration discontinued and dropped by 1.8 percentage points. All subgroups of different political inclinations recorded a generally similar high degree of desire to emigrate. Having produced the only positive net value of 18.5%, other non-establishment supporters were particularly drawn to the idea emigration.

Past studies have suggested that surveys often inaccurately amplify the number of individuals who seek to emigrate, for only a fraction of those who express interest in emigrating eventually do so in reality. Caution should therefore be exercised in interpreting the above findings, though they still provide valuable reference of the degree and extent of concern. The laxing of immigration requirements by 'popular' countries in response to the implementation of the Hong Kong National Security Law might also mean that plans to emigrate might not necessarily be induced by a lack of confidence in 1C2S or the socio-political situation of Hong Kong but simply seen as 'opportunities not to be missed' by those who wanted to immigrate in any event.

6.2. 移民海外

表12顯示市民的移民計劃。「無打算」移民的人數遠遠拋離「有打算」者,比例分別為61.1%和32.7%。比較2020年6月,兩者分別錄得1.8及1.4個百分點的輕微跌幅,淨值同時微降0.4個百分點,但差異不達統計上顯著水平。

表13及表14顯示不同年齡及政治派別有計劃移民的百分比。2020年6月至2021年1月期間,移民淨值的升勢停止並回落0.4個百分點。不同政治派別的受訪者均對移民有相當高的渴望。其他非建制派組別產生的唯一正數淨值,18.5%,顯示該組別對移民的渴望特別強烈。

根據過往研究,在民調中聲稱移民的人數,往往遠超真正移民的人數。民調結果雖有一定參考價值,但要小心解讀。溫和派聲稱無信心而計劃移民,一方面可能是對中央政府及建制派不滿,另一方面亦可能是擔心非建制派破壞社會穩定,例如覺得激進政治將會損害香港法治及經濟,兩種可能性皆不能排除。除此之外,就港區國安法的實施,多國以放寬移民門欄向北京施壓,不能排除有人視之為不能缺失的機會,並不一定對一國兩制失去信心的表現。

Table 12: Public's emigration plans 表 12: 市民移民海外的計劃

	2019.6	2019.8	2019.10	2020.6	2021.1
Have Plans 有打算	18.0%	24.1%	28.6%	34.5%	32.7%
No Plans 無打算	79.1%	73.3%	69.3%	62.5%	61.1%
Don't Know 唔知道	2.9%	2.6%	2.1%	3.0%	6.2%
Net Value 淨值	-61.1%	-49.2%	-40.7%	-28.0%	-28.4%

Net Value: Percent who chose 'Have Plans' less percent who chose 'No Plans'

淨值:認為「有打算」的百分比 減去認為「無打算」的百分比

Table 13: Net emigration (by age) 表 13: 移民淨值(按年齡劃分)

	2019.6	2019.8	2019.10	2020.6	2021.1
18-29	-52.7%	-40.5%	-31.7%	1.4%	-9.9%
30-39	-38.2%	-21.8%	-16.2%	-25.4%	-25.5%
40-49	-58.0%	-42.6%	-31.2%	-27.7%	-19.6%
50-59	-60.5%	-50.8%	-38.6%	-26.6%	-19.9%
60-69	-77.0%	-64.0%	-52.2%	-36.4%	-44.5%
≧70	-85.2%	-81.5%	-80.5%	-55.8%	-53.2%
All respondents 所有受訪者	-61.1%	-49.2%	-40.7%	-28.0%	-28.4%

Table 14: Net emigration (by political inclination)

表 14: 移民淨值(按政治傾向劃分)

	2019.6	2019.8	2019.10	2020.6	2021.1
Pro-establishment 建制派	-95.3%	-90.0%	-79.7%	-82.6%	-77.8%
Moderates 溫和派	-62.5%	-51.5%	-46.1%	-35.5%	-34.4%
Non-establishment 非建制派	-39.6%	-29.7%	-23.0%	-5.8%	-5.1%
Non-est.: Democrats 非建制派:民主派	-44.5%	-34.2%	-29.0%	-20.0%	-13.3%
Non-est.: Others 非建制派:其他	-18.6%	-14.5%	-10.9%	24.8%	18.5%
All respondents 所有受訪者	-61.1%	-49.2%	-40.7%	-28.0%	-28.4%

6.3. Willingness of living or working in other cities of Greater Bay Area (GBA)

Table 15 shows that those who are 'willing' to live or work in GBA discontinued its trend of recovery in the previous round, the latest reading is only 8.2%. Nevertheless, those 'unwilling' returned to pre-extradition movement levels to 67.8%, leading to an increase in net willingness to -59.6%. Perhaps unexpectedly, pro-establishment became less willing to live or work in the GBA area, the drop of 27.3 percentage points in their net willingness since June 2020 was the only statistically significant change in this round.

Table 16 highlights the willingness of living or working in other cities of GBA by age. For youths (age 18 to 29), those 'unwilling' oscillated its high watermark at -78.4%, this was the lowest net willingness recorded among all age groups despite efforts from the government to increase incentives to youths to pursue careers in GBA area through the implementation of the GBA youth employment scheme.

6.3. 前往粵港澳大灣區其他城市居住或 發展的意願

表15顯示會考慮前往大灣區的受訪者從上輪錄得的升勢中回落,最新讀數只有8.2%,不會考慮的則降至反修例運動前水平,有67.8%,淨值上調至-59.6%。

表16顯示不同年齡層北上大灣區居住或發展的意願。儘管政府大力推行青年大灣區就業計劃,鼓勵青年到大灣區發展,不會考慮的青年(18至29歲)的比率徘徊高位,達-78.4%,更是所有年齡組別中最低的意願淨值。所有年齡組別的意願淨值均錄得升幅,60-69歲組別除外。

Table 15: Willingness of living or working in the GBA 表 15: 前往粤港澳大灣區居住或發展的意願

	2018.12	2019.6	2019.8	2020.6	2021.1
Willing 會考慮	13.0%	12.9%	7.8%	11.9%	8.2%
Not willing 不會考慮	62.6%	67.6%	73.9%	72.6%	67.8%
Maybe / Don't Know 或者 / 唔知道	24.4%	19.6%	18.2%	15.6%	24.0%
Net Value 淨值	-49.5%	-54.7%	-66.1%	-60.7%	-59.6%

Net Value: Percent who chose 'Willing' less Percent who chose 'Not willing'

淨值:「會考慮」的百分比 減去「不會考慮」的百分比

Table 16: Net willingness of living or working in the GBA (by age) 表 16: 前往粵港澳大灣區其他城市居住或發展的意願淨值(按年齡劃分)

A 10. 所任与尼庆八号些来记规中旧任办	2018.12	2019.6	2019.8	2020.6	2021.1
18-29	-33.9%	-51.7%	-65.3%	-78.8%	-78.4%
30-39	-48.8%	-57.6%	-71.0%	-62.3%	-58.6%
40-49	-52.5%	-41.7%	-58.0%	-59.8%	-56.5%
50-59	-45.8%	-46.7%	-60.0%	-63.1%	-55.8%
60-69	-55.0%	-59.9%	-65.6%	-50.1%	-61.3%
≧70	-64.4%	-77.0%	-81.4%	-48.5%	-47.9%
All respondents 所有市民	-49.5%	-54.7%	-66.1%	-60.7%	-59.6%

6.4. The performance of HKSAR

6.4.1. Perception of the impartiality of the law

Table 17 shows the perception of respondents on impartiality of the law. The impartiality of courts has been under severe attack recently. Such public distrust is reflected in the net value of -15.8% where over half of the respondents (50.3%) disagreed that the principle of 'equality before the law' holds true in present-day Hong Kong with just one-third (34.5%) holding the opposite view.

Table 17: Perception of the impartiality of the law 表 17: 對法律公正性的觀感

6.4. 特區政府的表現

6.4.1. 市民對法律公正性的觀感

表17顯示大眾對法律公正性的觀感。司法機關的公正性近期受到嚴重打擊,公眾對司法公正性的不信任度反映於-15.8%的淨值上,當中超過一半(50.3%)受訪者不同意「法律面前人人平等」體現於現今的香港社會,只有三分之一受訪者(34.5%)持相反意見。

	All respondents 所有受訪者
Agree 同意	34.5%
Disagree 不同意	50.3%
Don't know / Difficult to say 唔知道 / 好難講	2.6%
Net Value 淨值	-15.8%

6.4.2 Safeguarding national security and national interest

Table 18 shows the respondents evaluation of the government's ability in safeguarding national security and national interest. There is no determining public evaluation on the performance of Hong Kong on safeguarding national security and national interest as the proportion agreeing and disagreeing with the success of Hong Kong in maintaining the sovereignty of China were strikingly similar, respectively recorded at 41.5% and 42.0%, producing a net value of -0.5%.

6.4.2. 維護國家安全及國家利益

表18顯示受訪者對政府維護國家主權、安全和發展利益的評價。公眾對政府的相關表現並沒有很鮮明的意見,同意及不同意政府有履行維護國家主權、安全和發展利益的比例十分相近,分別為41.5%及42.0%,淨值則為-0.5%。

Table 18 :Evaluation of the government's ability in safeguarding national security and national interest 表 18: 對政府維護國家安全及利益的評價

	All respondents 所有受訪者
Agree 同意	41.5%
Disagree 不同意	42.0%
Don't know / Difficult to say 唔知道/好難講	3.5%
Net Value 淨值	-0.5%

Net value: Percent who chose 'Positive impact' less percent who chose 'Negative impact'

淨值:「同意」的百分比 減去「不同意」的百分比

6.4.3 Maintaining economic prosperity and stability

Table 19 shows respondents' perception of the government's ability in maintaining economic prosperity and stability. Different from our Mainland counterpart as an unwaveringly capitalist city, maintaining economic prosperity and stability has always been the defining condition for the realization of 1C2S and the top priority of the HKSAR government. The latest round, however, discovered that over half of all respondents (51.7%) disagreed that the HKSAR government succeeded in doing so, with just over one-third of respondents (34.5%) agreeing. The net value was recorded at -17.2%.

6.4.3. 保持經濟繁榮穩定

表19顯示市民對政府維持經濟繁榮穩定的評價。實行資本主義制度向來是香港與內地之間的區分所在,維持經濟繁榮穩定因此一直是香港政府實現「一國兩制」的重任。本輪調查卻發現超過一般受訪者(51.7%)不同意香港政府在相關方面獲得成功,只有超過三分之一(34.5%)受訪者同意。淨值為-17.2%。

Table 19: Perception of the government's ability in maintaining economic prosperity and stability 表 19: 對政府維持經濟繁榮穩定的評價

	All respondents 所有受訪者
Agree 同意	34.5%
Disagree 不同意	51.7%
Don't know / Difficult to say 唔知道/ 好難講	1.9%
Net Value 淨值	-17.2%

Net value: Percent who chose 'Agree' less percent who chose 'Disagree'

淨值:「同意」的百分比 減去「不同意」的百分比

6.4.4 Confidence in the educational system of Hong Kong

Table 20 shows the level of confidence the public displayed toward the education system in Hong Kong. As the apparently 'youth-dominated' social unrest began to settle at the beginning of 2020, the educational system and its different components underwent rigorous evaluations. Significant structural changes subsequently made roused some concerning voices. As a result, 72.6% of all respondents reported that a decrease in confidence in the educational system of Hong Kong in 2020. More people felt that their level of confidence remained unchanged (18.3%) than increased (4.0%). The net value was -68.6%.

6.4.4. 對香港教育制度的信心

表20顯示近年市民對香港教育制度的信心。社會運動在2020年初平息後,教育制度隨即成為焦點。調查發現,72.6%受訪者因為近年對教育制度的信心下降,比起信心增加(4.0%),更多人認為他們的信心並沒有改變(18.3%)。淨值為-68.6%。

	All respondents 所有受訪者
Increased 增加	4.0%
Decreased 減少	72.6%
Unchanged 沒有改變	18.3%
Don't know / Difficult to say 唔知道/ 好難講	5.2%
Net Value 淨值	-68.6%

Net value: Percent who chose 'Increased' less percent who chose 'Decreased'

淨值:「增加」的百分比 減去「減少」的百分比

6.5 Recent political controversies

6.5.1 Impact of the National Security Law

Table 21 shows the public's reception of the impact of the National Security Law. There has been no obvious change to the perception of the National Security Law as it remains unpopular among almost two-thirds (62.3%) of all respondents in the latest round. Nonetheless, those finding the law to have exerted positive impact also rose by a modest 5 percentage points from June 2020 to 17.3% while less people thought that the law has no impact, the latter dropped from 21.1% to 14.8%. Taken together, the net value was recorded at -45.0% and points to more divided perceptions of the impact of the National Security Law.

6.5 近期政治爭議對「一國兩制」的影響

6.5.1 《港區國安法》實施

表21顯示受訪者評估《港區國安法》對「一國兩制」的影響。公眾對《港區國安法》的實施仍然偏向負面,市民對該法的評價沒有明顯的改變,最新一輪調查中有大約三分之二受訪者認為法例對「一國兩制」帶來負面影響(62.3%)。認為有正面影響的也從2020年6月微升5個百分點至17.3%,認為沒有影響的人數則有下降跡象,由21.1%跌至14.8%。淨值為-45.0%。總括而言,市民對《港區國安法》的評價愈趨極端。

Table 21: Impact of the National Security Law on 1C2S 表 21: 訂立《港區國安法》對「一國兩制」的影響

	2020.6	2021.1
Positive impact 正面影響	12.3%	17.3%
Negative impact 負面影響	61.5%	62.3%
No impact 沒有影響	21.1%	14.8%
Don't know / Difficult to say 唔知道/ 好難講	5.1%	5.7%
Net Value 淨值	-49.2%	-45.0%

Net value: Percent who chose 'Positive impact' less percent who chose 'Negative impact'

淨值:「正面影響」的百分比減去「負面影響」的百分比



6.5.1.1 Impact of the mass arrest against pro-democracy primaries

As indicated earlier, the mass arrest of politicians happened at almost exactly the mid-point of the survey period, dividing the respondents roughly into two halves. Table 22 shows the change in the respondents' perception of the NSL before and after the event. Expectedly, the proportion of respondents perceiving the NSL to have exerted a negative impact rose only modestly by 1 percentage point after the mass arrest while the respondents holding the opposite view decreased by 6.5 percentage points. As a result, the net value recorded after the event (-48.8%) was at a similarly high rate as that produced in June 2020 (-49.2%), apparently nullifying the growth in net value recorded before the event which was recorded at -41.3%.

6.5.1.1 民主派初選大搜捕

民主派初選大搜捕發生在電話調查期間,事前事 後大概把受訪者分為兩半。表 22 顯示受訪者事件 前後對《港區國安法》的觀感。認為該法有負面 影響的受訪者在事件後輕微上升1個百分點,持相 反意見的則下降6.5個百分點,屬意料之中。

Table 22: Impact of the National Security Law on 1C2S (before and after the mass arrest against pro-democracy primaries) 表 22: 訂立《港區國安法》對「一國兩制」的影響(民主派初撰大搜捕前後)

	Before mass arrest of pan-democrats 民主派大搜捕前 (N=499)	After mass arrest of pan-democrats 民主派大搜捕後 (N=491)	Entire survey period 全段訪問日期 (N=990)
Positive impact 正面影響	20.5%	14.0%	17.3%
Negative impact 負面影響	61.8%	62.8%	62.3%
No impact 沒有影響	13.4%	16.2%	14.8%
Don't know / Difficult to say 唔知道/ 好難講	4.4%	7.0%	5.7%
Net Value 淨值	-41.3%	-48.8%	-45.0%

Net value: Percent who chose 'Positive impact' less percent who chose 'Negative impact'

淨值:「正面影響」的百分比減去「負面影響」的百分比



6.5.2. Impact of assistance from the central government to contain the pandemic

Table 23 shows the perceived impact of assistance from the central government to contain the pandemic on the implementation of 1C2S. Despite the central government's continual assistance to HKSAR in containing the pandemic in both material and immaterial forms, some were concerned about the impact of these efforts on the implementation of 1C2S. It is recorded that 40% of all respondents found these efforts to have no impact on 1C2S, while 29.7% found them exerting positive impact. Those finding them to have negative impact were relatively low at 22.0%. The net value produced was 7.7%.

6.5.2. 中央提供醫療協助控制疫情

表23顯示市民對中央政府向香港提供醫療協助抵抗新冠肺炎對「一國兩制」實施的影響。雖然中央政府為香港的防疫工作持續提供物質上及技術上的協助,有人卻擔心事件對「一國兩制」實施的影響。調查發現40%受訪者認為中央的抗疫援助對「一國兩制」實施沒有影響,29.7%則認為有正面影響。認為有負面影響的相對的低,只有22.0%,淨值為7.7%,反映公眾對中央政府在抗疫工作的參與反應相對正面。

Table 23: Impact of assistance from the Central government to contain the pandemic on 1C2S 表 23: 中央提供醫療協助控制疫情對「一國兩制」的影響

	All respondents 所有受訪者
Positive impact 正面影響	29.7%
Negative impact 負面影響	22.0%
No impact 沒有影響	40.0%
Don't know / Difficult to say 唔知道/ 好難講	8.3%
Net Value 淨值	7.7%

Net value: Percent who chose 'Positive impact' less percent who chose 'Negative impact'

淨值:「正面影響」的百分比 減去「負面影響」的百分比

6.5.3. Impact of civil servants' pledging allegiance to the Basic Law

Table 24 shows the perceived impact of civil servants' pledging allegiance to the Basic Law on the implementation of 1C2S. The new requirement for civil servants to pledge allegiance to the HKSAR and Basic Law rouse concerns of tightening freedom for civil servants to express their views. Such worry was reflected in the result where almost half of all respondents (48.8%) felt that the requirement has negative impact on the implementation of 1C2S. Those considering the requirement to have positive or no impact were markedly lower at 25.5% and 19.7% respectively. Together, the net value was recorded at -23.3%, showing that the newly implemented policy received a relatively low level of support.

6.5.3. 公職人員宣誓

表24顯示市民對公職人員宣誓要求對「一國兩制」的影響。公眾關注公職人員的言論自由,差不多一半(48.8%)受訪者認為新安排對「一國兩制」有負面影響,認為有正面或沒有影響的明顯地少,分別為25.5%及19.7%。淨值為-23.3%

Table 24: Impact of public servants' pledge of allegiance on 1C2S 表 24: 公職人員宣誓對「一國兩制」的影響

	All respondents 所有受訪者
Positive impact 正面影響	25.5%
Negative impact 負面影響	48.8%
No impact 沒有影響	19.7%
Don't know / Difficult to say 唔知道/ 好難講	6.0%
Net Value 淨值	-23.3%

Net value: Percent who chose 'Positive impact' less percent who chose 'Negative impact'

淨值:「正面影響」的百分比 減去「負面影響」的百分比

6.5.4. Generation gap and political divide

Table 25 and Table 26 are summaries of the net values generated from three key topical questions about recent political controversies, further categorized by age and political inclination.

There were clear, unambiguous patterns in how respondents of different age and political inclinations react to these controversial events, generally, the net values increase with age and decrease as the political inclination move away from the pro-establishment end. For instance, 18-29 age group and the non-establishment supporters were predictably the most critical against the law. Pro-establishment supporters also expectedly produced the only positive net value in the category.

6.5.4. 代溝及政治鴻溝

表25及表26總結近期政治爭議,並按年齡及政治傾向劃分。

受訪者的年齡及政治傾向以及他們對爭議事件的 反應發展出的模式如下,一般情況下,淨值隨年 齡的增長而上升,並隨政治傾向偏離建制派而下 降。例如,18-29歲組別及非建制派支持者一如所 料對《國安法》尤其嚴苛。建制派支持者所產生 的淨值成為題目中唯一的正值。 The stance of moderates on these topical issues are of value as reference points signalling the general public's opinions towards the said issues. According to the net values produced by the Moderates, it is clear the National Security Law was typically negatively received (-35.9%) while the Central government's pandemic-containment assistance was largely welcomed (27.9%). Moderates' reception of the civil servants' pledge of allegiance to the Basic Law was mixed as the net value was recorded at -1.8%, foregrounding the extremity of the views displayed by groups of other political inclinations beside the Moderates which were respectively recorded at 58.8% (pro-establishment) and -76.9% (non-establishment).

溫和派對這些熱門議題的意見往往是重要的參照點,透露著社會大部分市民對事件的觀感。溫和派對《港區國安法》較負面(-35.9%)但對中央提供的抗疫支援則表示歡迎(27.9%)。對公職人員宣誓效忠《基本法》的看法平均,淨值錄得-1.8%,相比建制派的58.8%及非建制派的-76.9%,更突顯溫和派對政治事件的評價理性。


Table 25: Generation gap over recent political controversies (by age) 表 25: 對近期政治爭議之代溝(按年齡劃分)

	National Security Law 《港區國安法》	Central government's assistance to contain pandemic 中央提供醫療支援及協助	Civil servants' pledge of allegiance to the Basic Law 公職人員宣誓
18-29	-77.1%	-17.4%	-36.0%
30-39	-53.4%	15.3%	-29.2%
40-49	-50.4%	-0.1%	-28.6%
50-59	-40.3%	9.8%	-27.8%
60-69	-28.3%	15.6%	-13.3%
≧70	-21.3%	22.2%	-3.1%
All respondents 所有受訪者	-45.0%	7.7%	-23.3%

Table 26: Political divide over recent political controversies (by political inclination) 表 26: 對近期政治爭議之政治鴻溝(按政治傾向劃分)

	National Security Law 《港區國安法》	Central government's assistance to contain pandemic 中央提供醫療支援及協助	Civil servants' pledge of allegiance to the Basic Law 公職人員宣誓
Pro-establishment 建制派	44.5%	61.8%	58.8%
Moderates 溫和派	-35.9%	27.9%	-1.8%
Non-establishment 非建制派	-84.9%	-36.4%	-76.9%
Non-est.: Democrats 非建制派:民主派	-82.5%	-30.9%	-76.6%
Non-est.: Others 非建制派:其他	-91.6%	-51.8%	-77.8%
All respondents 所有受訪者	-45.0%	7.7%	-23.3%





I. 編製方法

I. Methodology



1. Construction of 1C2S Index

To understand the implementation of 1C2S comprehensively, we measure how the public in HK evaluate the current situation from various dimensions. International perception of freedom and democracy in HK is also pivotal as these are core components of 1C2S. Hence, we give an equal weight to scores obtained from the following two indices:

- Index (A): Public Opinion: Hong Kong public's evaluation of 1C2S compiled from telephone polls on 9 dimensions of 1C2S; and
- Index (B): International Perception: Compiled from relevant indices produced by international think tanks on various dimensions of freedom and democracy in HK.

1.1. Index (A): Public Opinion

Index (A) is the average of sub-scores obtained from nine dimensions on different dimensions of 1C2S in our telephone polls conducted by the Hong Kong Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies of the Chinese University of Hong Kong. Each round, about 1,000 individuals will be randomly sampled by the CATI (computer assisted telephone interviewing) system, all aged 18 or above; all of them spoke either Cantonese or Mandarin. To better represent the distribution of the Hong Kong population, all data were weighted by the proportion of gender and age of people aged 18 or above (excluding foreign domestic helpers) according to the Census and Statistics Department. Table 27 shows the statistical and scientific standards of each survey.

In the telephone polls, many questions employed 1 to 7 as the rating scale in the survey process, with 4 as the median. This scale, which is known as the Likert scale, is commonly adopted for psychological assessments. This scale was used instead of a 0 to 10 scale as the latter is deemed too finely graduated and cumbersome for respondents to choose from. However, to better conform to existing indices – which tend to be expressed on a 0 to 10 scale (with 5 as the median) – we converted the results mathematically into the popular 0 to 10 scale.

1. 編製「一國兩制」指數

為綜合掌握香港實踐「一國兩制」的情況,我們 從不同範疇衡量市民對香港現狀的評價。自由與 民主是「一國兩制」的重要元素,國際社會對香 港自由民主程度的觀感亦尤其重要。因此,「一 國兩制」指數為以下兩項評分給予相同比重:

- 指數(A):民意調查—香港市民在電話調查 中對九個「一國兩制」範疇的評分;及
- 指數(B):國際評價—國際智庫對香港的自由民主水平所編製的評分。

1.1. 指數(A): 民意調查

指數(A)是香港市民對「一國兩制」的綜合評價,由九個範疇構成。我們委託香港中文大學香港亞太研究所進行電話調查,每輪以電腦輔助電話訪問系統,隨機抽樣,訪問大約1,000人,全部皆屬18歲或以上,能操廣東話或普通話。進行分析時,數據依照香港政府統計處的18歲或以上性別及年齡分佈(扣除外籍家庭傭工)作加權處理,以更符合香港人口分佈的真實情況。表27顯示每次調查的統計和科學標準。

電話調查中,多數題目採用1至7分的評分尺度, 以4分為中位數。這是心理學常用的科學尺度,稱 為李克特量尺 (Likert scale)。現時編製指數常 採用0至10分的尺度,其實分類過於細緻,令市民 難以選擇。不過為了與現行指數匹配,是以我們 利用數學方法將調查結果轉換成為常見的0至10分 尺度(以5分為中位數)。 For a more extensive report on the survey results, please see Survey Results: Frequency and Percentage Distribution, which can be found on the webpage of Path of Democracy (http://www.pathofdemocracy.hk/1c2s-index/).

如欲取得電話調查的詳細結果,請參閱民主思路網頁上的「調查結果:頻數及百分比分佈」(http://www.pathofdemocracy.hk/1c2s-index/)。

Table 27: Survey details

表 27: 調查概況

Round 輪次	Survey Period 調查日期	Number of Respondents 受訪人數	Response Rates 回應率	Confidence Level 置信水平	Sampling Error 抽樣誤差
2017.06	23/5-3/6	1,002	36.8%	95.0%	±3.1%
2017.12	11/12-23/12	1,006	39.5%	95.0%	±3.09%
2018.06	23/5-2/6	1,004	37.2%	95.0%	±3.09%
2018.12	3/12-12/12	1,001	38.8%	95.0%	±3.1%
2019.06	27/5- 6/6	1,002	38.0%	95.0%	±3.1%
2019.08	24/7-7/8	1,001	39.5%	95.0%	±3.1%
2019.10	17/10-31/10	1,002	38.0%	95.0%	±3.09%
2019.12	10/12-20/12	1,000	40.8%	95.0%	±3.1%
2020.06	9/6-29/6	1,001	39.5%	95.0%	±3.1%
2021.01	22/12-13/1	1,002	32.5%	95.0%	±3.1%

1.1.1. Alternative methods of constructing Index (A)

Conceptually, there are different ways to compute the nine dimensions into a composite score as Index (A). We have chosen the method of simple average, which is the most common method employed in constructing indices. Its strength lies in its parsimony and accessibility. It may not be the best method as it assigns equal weighting to all items (i.e. assuming equal importance for all items). Here, we compare the method of simple average to two alternatives methods that are more sophisticated, namely, principal component analysis and factor analysis.

Principal component analysis is a statistical method that processes and simplifies data; it is the standard scientific method employed in constructing indices. Through statistical analysis, it extracts the data set's principal components and identifies their weights in a way that best explains the variations across the data.

Factor analysis extracts common factors from the data, and it shares a similar methodology with Principal component analysis. Its strength lies in its ability to identify hidden and representative factors amongst the many variables and group variables of a similar nature and converting the same into a common factor, which reduces the total number of variables.

1.1.1. 指數(A)的不同編製方式

指數(A)是香港市民對「一國兩制」的綜合評價,由九個範疇構成。要將九個範疇計算為指數(A)的綜合評分,在概念上有不同方式。我們採用了編製指數時最常見的簡單平均數,優點是簡單及容易明白。理論上,不同範疇可能有不同比重,簡單平均數未必是最好的編製方式,是以我們考慮兩種更複雜的方式與簡單平均數比較,分別為主成分分析與因子分析。

主成分分析是一種分析和簡化數據的統計技術, 是以科學化方式編製指數的標準方法,其方法是 通過對數據進行特徵分解,以得出數據的主要成 分與它們的權值,優點是揭露數據的內部結構, 從而更好解釋數據的變化。

因子分析是從數據中提取公性因子的統計方法, 技術與主成分分析類似,其優點是可以在多項變量中找出隱藏及具有代表性的因子,將相同本質的變量歸入一個因子,從而減少變量的數目。 Table 28 shows the negligible difference in scores acquired by the three methods. The results of all three methods are highly similar, largely due to the clustered nature of the public's assessments of the nine dimensions (cf. the distributions of the nine dimensions are highly correlated), which causes the core components or sub-items across all three methods to be highly similar. Both alternative methods involve complex calculations, which render the methods inaccessible to laymen. Given the similarity of the results from all three methods, we adopted the simplest and most commonly used method — i.e. the average of the nine dimensions — in constructing Index (A).

表 28 顯示三種方式所得出的結果,只有微不足道的差異。三種方式的結果十分接近,相信是由於市民對九個範疇的評分相當近似(即九個範疇的分佈高度相關),是以九個範疇的主要成分或主要因子都十分接近。主成分分析及因子分析牽涉複雜計算,一般人難以明白。因為三種方式編製指數結果十分接近,我們選取最簡單常用的方法,即九個範疇的簡單平均數來編製「一國兩制」指數。

Table 28: Index (A): Public Opinion computed by different methods

表 28: 指數 (A) : 民意調查以不同方式編制

D 1 ± \(Simple Average	Principal Component Analysis	Factor Analysis
Round 輪次 簡單平均數		主成分分析	因子分析
2017.06	4.84	4.83	4.82
2017.12	4.98	4.99	4.94
2018.06	5.05	5.06	5.00
2018.12	4.84	4.84	4.76
2019.06	4.58	4.58	4.53
2019.08	3.98	3.96	3.91
2019.10	3.26	3.23	3.18
2019.12	3.53	3.51	3.47
2020.06	3.39	3.37	3.30
2021.01	3.37	3.53	3.48

1.2. Index (B): International Perception

Index (B) is the average of 3 indices, namely, the Economic Freedom Index and Personal Freedom Index of CATO-Fraser Institutes, and the Democracy Index of the Economic Intelligence Unit. The average of the Economic Freedom Index and Personal Freedom Index is known as the Human Freedom Index, which is the most comprehensive index of freedom available.

As the Human Freedom Index covers a very large number of countries, the latest Economic Freedom Index and Personal Freedom Index only reflect conditions two years ago. These two indices are updated based on the latest comparable indicators from other international think tanks. When updating is not possible, the relevant figures are assumed to be unchanged.

1.2. 指數(B):國際評價

指數(B)是「經濟自由指數」、「個人自由指數」及「民主指數」三項指數的平均分。首兩項指數由卡托研究所(Cato Institute)及菲沙研究所(Fraser Institute)編製,第三項指數則由經濟學人智庫編製。「經濟自由指數」和「個人自由指數」的平均分被稱為「人類自由指數」,是目前衡量自由的指數中最全面的一種。

由於「人類自由指數」覆蓋大量國家,「經濟自由 指數」及「個人自由指數」只反映兩年前的狀況。 這兩項指數將按相應的國際指標更新,如未能更 新,我們假設相關數值不變。

1.2.1. Comparable indicators

To obtain the updated scores of Economic Freedom Index and Personal Freedom Index, we first calculate the percentage changes in the comparable indicators for the respective years; then we apply these changes to the latest Economic Freedom Index and Personal Freedom Index of CATO-Fraser. The comparable indicators for the Economic Freedom Index and each of the 7 components of the Personal Freedom Index are listed in Table 29.

1.2.1. 相應指標

為更新「經濟自由指數」及「個人自由指數」, 我們計算相應指標於相關年份的百分比變化,並 將之套用於卡托研究所及菲沙研究所的「經濟自 由指數」及「個人自由指數」。表29顯示「經濟 自由指數」及「個人自由指數」中七個項目的相 應指標。

Table 29: Comparable indicators of Index (B): International Perception 表 29: 指數 (B) :國際評價之相應指標

Indicators 指標	Comparable Indicators 相應指標
Economic Freedom Index 經濟自由指數	The Heritage Foundation's Index of Economic Freedom 傳統基金會經濟自由指數
Rule of Law 法治	World Justice Project's Rule of Law Index – 'Procedural Justice', 'Civil Justice' and 'Criminal Justice' 世界正義項目「法治指數」—「程序公義」、「民事司法」及「刑事司法」
Security and Safety 安全	World Justice Project's Rule of Law Index –'Order and Security' 世界正義項目「法治指數」—「秩序與治安」
Movement 遷徙自由	Freedom House's Freedom in the World Report - 'G1. Do individuals enjoy freedom of movement, including the ability to change their place of residence, employment, or education?' 自由之家「世界自由調查報告」—「G1. 人民是否享有遷徙自由,包括改變居所、就業或教育的能力?」
Religion 宗教自由	Freedom House's Freedom in the World Report – 'D2. Are individuals free to practice and express their religious faith or nonbelief in public and private?' 自由之家「世界自由調查報告」—「D2. 人民能否在公開或私人場合自由地實踐和表達宗教信仰或非信仰?」
Association, Assembly, & Civil Society 結社、集會及公民社會自由	Freedom House's Freedom in the World Report –'E. Associational and Organizational Rights' 自由之家「世界自由調查報告」—「E. 結社及組織權利」
Expression and Information 言論自由	Reporters Without Borders' World Press Freedom Index 無國界記者「全球新聞自由指數」
Identity and Relationships 性別認同及關係	Freedom House's Freedom in the World Report – 'G3. Do individuals enjoy personal social freedoms, including choice of marriage partner and size of family, protection from domestic violence, and control over appearance?' 自由之家「世界自由調查報告」—「G3. 人民是否享有個人社交自由,包括選擇婚姻對象及家庭人數、免受居所暴力及自主改變外貌?」

1.3. Refinement and Estimation

After the first survey in June 2017, one out of the nine dimensions, namely the score on Question 4 ('original way of life remained unchanged'), is not comparable with subsequent ones due to refinements of survey questions. The refinement only affects one question in the nine questions used to compute Index (A). Scores of the other eight questions are directly comparable as they are identical in all surveys.

To adjust for the time lag of international indices, scores of Index (B) in previous reports were estimated with data available then. In every report, scores will be revised with latest updates from international think tanks.

For the convenience of comparison, Table 30 shows Index (A) computed by nine questions and by the identical eight questions, the estimated and revised scores of Index (B), and the 1C2S Index constructed by the combination of them. The results suggest that the differences in scores of Index (A), Index (B) and 1C2S Index due to question change and updating are at most 0.15 and therefore negligible.

1.3. 修訂與估算

於2017年6月第一輪調查後,電話調查中九個範疇的第四條題目(「維持原有生活方式」)經過修訂,所以此題的評分不能與其後的調查直接比較。修訂只影響指數(A)中,九個範疇的其中一條題目,另外八條問題在所有調查均相同,評分可以直接比較。

指數 (B) 的評分乃基於當時可得的數據而作出, 以修正國際指數的滯後。該估算值將於其後的報 告按最新的國際指數更新。

以便比較,表30顯示九個範疇及八個相同範疇計算的指數(A)、估算及修訂的指數(B),以及由它們所編製的「一國兩制」指數。結果顯示指數(A)、指數(B)及「一國兩制」指數因為題目修訂和數據更新而帶來的差異不多於0.15,微不足道。

Table 30: Refinement and estimation of 1C2S Index

表 30: 「一國兩制」指數之修訂與估算

Round 輪次	Index (A): Public Opinion 指數(A):民意調查		Index (B): International Perception 指數(B): 國際評價		1C2S Index 「一國兩制」指數		Difference
	8 Dimensions 八範疇	9 Dimensions 九範疇	Estimates 估算	Revised 修訂	Maximum 最大值	Minimum 最小值	差距
2017.06	4.88	-	8.04	7.97	6.46	6.43	0.03
2017.12	4.84	4.98	8.04	7.97	6.51	6.41	0.10
2018.06	4.90	5.05	8.01	7.91	6.53	6.41	0.12
2018.12	4.70	4.84	7.89	7.91	6.38	6.30	0.08
2019.06	4.43	4.58	7.87	7.76	6.23	6.10	0.13
2019.08	3.81	3.98	7.87	7.76	5.93	5.84	0.09
2019.10	3.13	3.26	7.87	7.76	5.57	5.50	0.06
2019.12	3.40	3.53	7.87	7.76	5.70	5.58	0.12
2020.06	3.26	3.39	7.76	7.59	5.58	5.43	0.15

2. Construction of 1C2S Mass Media Index

Our sample consists of around 157,000 newspaper articles related to 1C2S from 21 local daily newspapers that were published between April 1998 and January 2021. The number of articles processed in each newspaper is listed in Table 31.

Each article undergoes a 'tokenisation' process whereby articles are segmented into words/phrases (often referred to as tokens) via a computer algorithm. In the sample period of approximately 23 years, our text corpus contains around 79 million tokens. From this massive dataset, common words that are inconsequential to the understanding of news articles, such as '我', '你', '的', are first removed before further analysis.

To determine the sentiment of an article, words are categorised as: 'positive', 'negative' or 'neutral' (not a sentiment word). A positive word is then given a sentiment score of 1, a negative word is assigned a score of -1, and a neutral word has a score of 0. The classification scheme adopted is given by the sentiment dictionary for Traditional Chinese words developed by the Natural Language Processing and Sentiment Analysis Lab, Institute of Information Science, Academia Sinica. The number of words processed each year since 1998 is given in Table 32.

The positive, or negative as the case may be, sentiment of a paragraph is quantified via a count of the number of positive (negative) words it contains, adjusted by its total word count. The sentiment score of an article is calculated as the average difference between positive and negative proportions among constituent paragraphs. 1C2S MMI is derived as an index that captures the weighted average sentiment score among newspapers in a given month. The base month of set at July 2017 to indicate 20 years after the establishment of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. Since there are substantial differences in the number of news articles published by newspapers during the sample period, the article count of a newspaper alone could be an insufficient representation of its influence and perceived importance among readers. To ensure 1C2S MMI's reliability, the sentiment score for each newspaper is further weighted by public perceptions of its credibility based on the survey 'Public Evaluation on Media Credibility' conducted by Centre for Communication Research, The Chinese University of Hong

2. 編製「一國兩制」輿情指數

「一國兩制」輿情指數的資料由新聞文章組成, 包含1998年4月至2021年1月期間,來自本地21份 日報關於「一國兩制」,約157,000份報導及評 論。表31顯示每份報章所運算的文章數量。

我們就每篇文章進行「分詞」(tokenization), 通過電腦運算將文章分解成語例(token,為單詞 或短語)。我們利用約23年的資料組成語料庫, 包含大約7,900萬個語例。 在進一步分析這個龐大 的語料庫之前,我們首先剔除無助理解文章的常 見單詞(如「我」、「你」、「的」)。

為了辨別一篇文章的情緒,我們採用由台灣中央研究院資訊科學研究所自然語言處理與情感分析實驗室開發的繁體中文情緒字典,把語例分類為「正面」、「中立」(非情感詞)或「負面」。「正面」的語例得1分,「中立」得0分,「負面」得-1分。表32顯示各年所運算的文字數量。

我們計算每段落所包含的正、負面語例數量,每篇文章的情緒評分則為各個段落經字數調整後的淨值。「一國兩制」輿情指數即為當月所有文章的平均情緒評分,基數月訂為2017年7月,基數為100,以標誌回歸20周年的情況。由於不同報章所刊登的文章數目有明顯差別,因此,只考慮文章數目不足以呈現不同報章對讀者觀感的影響力。為確保可靠性,本指數將採用由香港中文大學傳播與民意調查中心「市民對傳媒公信力的評分」為每份報章的情緒評分加權。

Table 31: News sources of 1C2S MMI

表 31: 「一國兩制」 輿情指數之報章來源

Newspaper 報章	Number of Articles 文章篇數
A Daily A 報	81
am730	2,584
Apple Daily 蘋果日報	10,774
Headline Daily 頭條日報	1,334
Hong Kong Commercial Daily 香港商報	15,240
Hong Kong Daily News 新報	4,476
Hong Kong Economic Journal 信報	11,179
Hong Kong Economic Times 經濟日報	4,446
Hong Kong Globe 公正報	194
Lion Rock Daily 香港仔	392
Metro Daily 都市日報	1,436
Ming Pao Daily News 明報	13,087
Oriental Daily News 東方日報	9,236
Sharp Daily 爽報	152
Sing Pao 成報	5,276
Sing Tao Daily 星島日報	8,708
Sky Post 晴報	607
Ta Kung Pao 大公報	30,955
The Sun 太陽報	4,828
Tin Tin Daily News 天天日報	452
Wen Wei Po 文匯報	31,483
Total 總數	156,920

Table 32: Number of words processed

表 32: 處理資料字數

Year	Number of Words
年份	字數
1998	669,676
1999	2,498,254
2000	2,320,584
2001	2,640,690
2002	2,545,546
2003	2,713,403
2004	4,801,621
2005	2,874,994
2006	1,879,834
2007	2,797,512
2008	1,446,629
2009	1,815,839
2010	1,880,198
2011	2,040,824
2012	3,441,893
2013	3,312,415
2014	5,386,835
2015	4,411,567
2016	5,590,354
2017	6,204,647
2018	4,932,978
2019	7,086,984
2020	5,901,439
Total 總數	79,099,946

2.1. Accuracy test

1C2S MMI is underpinned by a lexicon-based model which treats each paragraph as a bag of words and as a result may detract from the overall context of the paragraph. For instance, the model may not be able to detect nuances in writing such as sarcasm and therefore do not understand fully the true meaning of a paragraph. Nonetheless, whilst this may be a limitation when analysing publications such as novels, this is less of an issue for news articles which are written in a more direct manner.

2.1. 準確度覆查

「一國兩制」與情指數是建基於由詞彙組成的模型。此模型視每段落為一籃子的詞語,從而抽離整篇文章的脈絡。其中一個效果是可能無法辨認到如諷刺等寫作手法,因而不能完全理解每一個段落的真正含義。這個局限在分析小說及文學作品時可能較為明顯,但對於寫作手法較直接的新聞文章而言,相信不是一個大問題。

To ascertain the accuracy of this lexicon-based method in identifying the sentiment of a paragraph, two researchers manually categorised around 18,000 paragraphs randomly drawn from the text corpus into 'positive', 'neutral' and 'negative' categories. References to which newspaper a paragraph came from were removed before the paragraph was presented to our team of researchers. If these two researchers classified a paragraph differently, a third researcher would be asked to make the final verdict.

In this accuracy test, sentiment labels given by the first two researchers coincided with each other around 80% of the time. As shown in Table 33, 2,363 paragraphs were considered as 'positive' whereas 1,472 were classified as 'negative.'

Sentiment scores for each group of paragraphs were then derived by the same lexicon model used in the construction of 1C2S MMI. In our model, the sentiment of a paragraph is assumed to be encapsulated in the proportion of positive words minus that of negative words - the higher the sentiment score, the more positive a paragraph is expected to be.

Table 33 also shows the average sentiment scores of these 3 groups of paragraphs. In particular, 'positive' paragraphs identified by the team of researchers have an average sentiment score of 21.76%, around 7.5 times as high as 'negative' paragraphs. In addition, the differences in average sentiment scores among these 3 groups are tested to be statistically significant via a multivariate regression model, suggesting that results given by the lexicon model are largely in line with judgements made by human researchers.


為證實此詞彙模型辨別情緒的準確度,我們兩位研究員從語料庫中隨機抽取了約18,000個段落,親自分類為「正面」、「負面」和「中立」,再與詞彙模型比較。各段落的出處在給予研究員之前已經被隱藏。假如兩名研究員對同一個段落的情緒判斷有異,第三名研究員將會重讀並作出判斷。是次覆查中,兩名研究員在大約八成的情況下均能作出相同的判斷。

我們利用與「一國兩制」與情指數相同的詞彙模型為此等段落的情緒評分。在模型中,情緒評分為正、負面詞語量的淨值,所以評分愈高代表情緒愈正面。表33顯示利用詞彙模型計算的情緒評分。2,363及1,472個段落分別被判決為「正面」及「負面」。被研究員判斷為「正面」的段落,情緒評分為21.76%,約為「負面」段落的7.5倍。再者,利用多變量回歸分析,三個類別的情緒評分發現具統計學上的顯著差異,證實詞彙模型的計算結果與我們研究員的人手分類一致。


Table 33: Results of accuracy test

表 33:覆查結果

	Positive	Neutral	Negative
	正面	中立	負面
No. of Paragraphs Classified by Human Researchers 真人研究員對情緒的判斷	2,363	14,202	1,472
Net Value 情緒淨值	21.76%	14.42%	2.92%



II 重大事件一覽 II List of Significant Events



The significant events which may have affected evaluations of 1C2S that occurred in the previous reports (mid-2017 to mid-2021) are listed below.

2017年中至2021年中,可能影響對「一國兩制」 評價的重大事件臚列如下。

2017 H2

714

Disgualification of four LegCo members by the High Court

8.15 & 8.17

Prison sentences of the '13+3' protestors in relation to the demonstration against the Northeast Territories Development and the Civic Square occupation. The court also gave new tougher sentence guidelines for future cases of large-scale unlawful assemblies involving violence

9.1

China's enactment of the national anthem law

10.19

Emphasis on 'overall jurisdiction over Hong Kong' in the Work Report of 19th CPC National Congress

11.15

LegCo's passage of the non-binding motion on the high-speed rail co-location arrangement

12.15

Amendment of the Rules of Procedure of the Legislative Council to restrict filibustering

7.14

高等法院裁定四名立法會議員宣誓無效

8.15 & 8.17

反新界東北發展示威者與強行進入公民廣場示威的「13+3」示威者被判入獄。上訴法庭更提出更嚴厲的量刑準則予未來涉及暴力的大型非法集會 案件

9.1

中國訂立國歌法

10.19

中共十九大工作報告強調對香港的「全面管治權」

11.15

立法會通過關於高鐵「一地兩檢」安排的無約束力議案

12.15

立法會透過修訂議事規則限制拉布

1.27

Agnes Chow Ting, a pro-democracy activist, was banned from running for the LegCo by-election on the grounds that her party, Demosisto, had called for 'self-determination'

2.6

The case of the three student leaders was brought to the Court of Final Appeals (CFA). The CFA overturned the prison sentences on the trio on a technicality but ruled that the Court of Appeals was entitled to give tough sentence guidelines for future cases of large-scale unlawful assemblies involving violence

6.11

Edward Leung, leader of Hong Kong Indigenous, was given a prison sentence of 6 years on June 11 for his role in the civil unrest in Mongkok

6.14

LegCo's passage of the co-location bill on June 14 after protracted debates

1.27

有意代表香港眾志出選立法會港島區補選的周 庭,被裁定參撰提名無效

2.6

「雙學三子」案件上訴至終審法院。終審法院以 技術因素推翻監禁判決,但認可上訴法院對未來 涉及暴力的大規模非法集會案件所提出的更嚴厲 判刑指引

6.11

本土民主前線領袖梁天琦參與旺角騷亂,被判處6 年監禁

6.14

立法會經過漫長辯論後,通過「一地兩檢」議案



8 14

Andy Chan Ho Tin, convenor of the pro-independence Hong Kong National Party, delivered a speech hosted by the Foreign Correspondents' Club

9.24

The Hong Kong National Party was banned on national security grounds

10.5

Visa renewal of Victor Mallet, the Financial Times' Asia News Editor and Vice President of the Foreign Correspondents Club (FCC), was rejected. He had chaired a talk by pro-independence activist Andy Chan Ho Tin, convenor of the Hong Kong National Party, at the FCC

10 12

Lau Siu Lai, a Democrat who had called for Hong Kong self-determination, was barred from running the LegCo by-election

10.23

Opening of the Hong Kong-Zhuhai-Macau Bridge

11.14

The United States-China Economic and Security Review Commission recommended the US Congress to assess its export policy on technology with regard to Hong Kong's status as a separate customs area

11.19

Trial of 9 key figures of the 'Occupy Central' movement started

12.4

Public education campaigns to promote the country's Constitution and Hong Kong's Basic Law were initiated on the National Constitution Day

12.12

Corruption investigation against Leung Chun-ying, former chief executive of HKSAR, for receiving a HK\$50 million payment from an Australian engineering firm was dropped due to lack of sufficient evidence

8.14

支持「港獨」的香港民族黨召集人陳浩天受邀於香港外國記者會演講

9.24

基於維護國家安全,香港民族黨被禁止運作

10.5

《金融時報》亞洲總編輯、香港外國記者會副主席馬凱的簽證續期遭拒。他早期主持主張「港獨」的香港民族黨召集人陳浩天於香港外國記者會的演講

10 12

提倡香港「自決」的民主派候選人劉小麗於立法會補選中的被裁定提名無效

10.23

港珠澳大橋啟用

11.14

美中經濟與安全審查委員會向美國國會建議,重 新審視高科技出口政策,評估香港的獨立關稅區 地位

11.19

「佔中九子」案開審

12.4

「國家憲法日」舉辦宣傳活動,推廣國家《憲 法》與香港《基本法》

12.12

前行政長官梁振英涉嫌收取澳洲工程公司5,000萬港元,案件因證據不足不進行檢控

1.2

Xi Jinping marked the 40th anniversary of the 'Message to Compatriots' by upholding 1C2S as the best solution to cross-strait unification

2.18

Promulgation the Outline Development Plan for the Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area

3.23

Kaohsiung mayor and Taiwan leader hopeful Han Kuo-yu's visited the central government's Liaison Office in Hong Kong

4.9

The 'Umbrella nine' (key leaders of the Occupy Central movement) were found guilty as the District Court ruled that civil disobedience was an invalid defence

5.11 - 5.14

Attempts to start bills committee proceedings in LegCo for the controversial amendments to the extradition law erupted into chaos

5.17 - 5.21

Han Zheng, Vice Premier of the State Council, and Wang Zhimin, Director of the central government's Liaison Office, both confirmed that the central government was supportive of the extradition law amendments

6.9, 6.15 & 6.16

Record-setting demonstrations against the extradition law were staged. The government eventually announced the suspension of the amendment bill

6 - 11

Accusations of police misconduct accentuated after major collisions, including the 6.12 LegCo protest, 7.21 Yuen Long incident, 8.31 Prince Edward station incident, 10.1 and 11.11 gunshot incidents, confrontation in the Chinese University of Hong Kong and the siege of Hong Kong Polytechnic University

1.2

習近平於《告台灣同胞書》發表40周年紀念會指 「一國兩制」為兩岸統一的最佳方式

2.18

《粵港澳大灣區發展規劃綱要》發布

3.23

高雄市市長、台灣總統熱門候選人韓國瑜拜訪香 港中聯辦

4.9

區域法院裁定「佔中九子」罪成,指出公民抗命 不屬抗辯理由

5.11 - 5.14

立法會法案委員會開展審議《逃犯條例》修訂 案,發生衝突

5.17 - 5.21

國務院副總理韓正及香港中聯辦主任王志民開腔 支持《逃犯條例》修訂

6.9, 6.15 & 6.16

反修例遊行集會連破人數紀錄,政府最終決定暫 緩修例

6 - 11

連串衝突引起針對警察濫權失德的投訴,包括 6.12立法會示威、7.21元朗事件、8.31太子站事 件、10.1及11.11槍傷事件、香港中文大學衝突及 香港理工大學衝突

7

Protesters broke into the LegCo Chamber and vandalized the Hong Kong emblem on 1 July and laid siege to the central government's Liaison Office and defaced the Chinese emblem on 21 July

7

示威者分別於7月1日及21日闖入立法會及包圍中 聯辦大樓,途污香港特區區徽及中國國徽

8 - 9

Protesters called for a general strike and began a new campaign to paralyze the airport, inflicting citywide and international disruptions in transportation

8 - 9

示威者發動「三罷」行動及癱瘓機場,令本地及 國際交通受阳

9.4

Carrie Lam officially announced the withdrawal of the amendment bill of the extradition law

9.4

林鄭月娥正式宣布撤回《逃犯條例》修訂案

10.4 & 11.18

The government enacted the anti-mask law under the Emergency Regulations Ordinance but was ruled unconstitutional by the High Court

10.4 & 11.18

特區政府引用《緊急情況規例條例》訂立《反蒙 面法》,及後被高等法院裁定違憲

11.4 & 11.14

Carrie Lam met with Xi Jinping for the first time since the eruption of the social unrest. Xi said the most pressing task is to end violence and restore order. The message was reiterated in his speech in the BRICS summit in Brazil

11 4 & 11 14

習近平於反修例風波爆發後首次與林鄭月娥會面,指出止暴制亂為最迫切任務,並在巴西舉行的金磚國家峰會上重申

11.24

Pan-democrats scored a landslide victory in the District Council election with the highest voter turnout of 71.2%

11.24

泛民主派於區議會選舉得到壓倒性勝利,投票率達71.2%,為歷來最高

11.27

US President Donald Trump signed the 'Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act'

11.27

美國總統特朗普簽署《香港人權及民主法案》

12.19

The bank account of Spark Alliance, fundraising platform for protesters, was froze due to accusation of money laundering

12.19

反修例運動的籌款平台星火同盟的銀行戶口,涉 嫌洗黑錢被凍結

2 13

The State Council restructured the Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Office and appointed Xia Baolong as the new director and the directors of Liaison Offices in Hong Kong and Macau as deputy directors.

21-27

In fighting the COVID-19 crisis, staff of the Hospital Authority went on a five-day strike in the attempt to push for complete closure of border with mainland. HKSAR implemented border closure to some borders and ordered all arrivals to observe fortnight-long quarantine order.

2.28 & 4.18

A group of pan-democrat leaders, including Martin Lee, Jimmy Lai, Margret Ng, Lee Cheuk-yan and Yeung Sum, were charged with participation in unauthorized assembly in relation to the anti-extradition bill movement.

3.18

US-China media row deepened after five Chinese media agents in the US were declared propaganda outlets and the opinion piece titled "China is the real sick man of Asia" was published by the Wall Street Journal in February. China expelled US journalists in retaliation and barred them from journalism in Hong Kong and Macau. Four more Chinese media entities were designated as foreign missions by the US in June.

4.9

Countering High Court's ruling last year of the unconstitutionality of anti-mask ban, the Court of Appeal ruled that the ban was constitutional at unlawful gatherings.

4.13, 4.17 & 4.21

The Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Office and the Liaison Office in Hong Kong issued statements condemning LegCo member Dennis Kwok for preventing the House Committee from electing a chairman for more than six months. The pro-democracy camp challenged that the two Offices were violating Article 22 of the Basic Law by intervening the internal operation of LegCo. In the subsequent statements, they positioned that they were bodies authorised by the central government to handle Hong Kong affairs, leading to further controversy over the applicability of the Article. The filibustering ended in May with the appointment of election host by the LegCo president after seeking external legal advice.

2 13

國務院重組港澳辦並委任夏寶龍為主任,香港及 澳門中聯辦主任同列為副主任。

2.1-2.7

新型冠狀病毒擴散,醫管局員工發動五天罷工, 要求政府全面封關。政府宣布關閉部分口岸,並 要求所有入境人士強制隔離14天。

2.28 & 4.18

多名民主派人士,包括李柱銘、黎智英,吳靄 儀、李卓人及楊森,被控參與反修例運動的「未 經批准集結」。

3.18

自2月初《華爾街日報》發表〈China is the real sick man of Asia〉文章及美國將五家中國新聞機構列為官方宣傳媒體後,中美媒體關係繼續緊張。中國驅逐數名駐華美籍記者,並禁止在港澳境內採訪。6月,美國再列四家中國媒體為外交使團。

4.9

上訴庭推翻高等法院去年的判決,裁定政府引用 《緊急法》訂立《禁蒙面法》合憲,並適用於非 法集會中。

4.13, 4.17 & 4.21

港澳辦及中聯辦發表聲明,譴責郭榮鏗拖延立法 會內務委員會主席選舉六個月。民主派質疑兩辦 干預立法會運作,違反《基本法》第22條。兩辦 表示它們是中央授權專責處理香港事務的機構, 引起該法的適用性爭議。尋求外間法律意見後, 立法會主席指派另一名議員主持選舉,拉布於5月 結束。

4.20

Fitch downed the investment grade of HK twice within the past 7 months to AA-, the HKSAR government expressed disappointment at Fitch's exaggeration of the ongoing political issues in its rating.

4.27 & 5.25

In response to the controversial district court verdict that expressing sympathy with a knifeman who was jailed over triple stabbing, Chief Justice Geoffrey Ma warned that judges should refrain from unnecessary political views to maintain the public's confidence in the impartiality of the judiciary.

5.14

The People's Bank of China, the China Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission, China Securities Regulatory Commission and State Foreign Exchange Administration of the State Administration of Foreign Exchange promulgated "Opinions on Financial Support to the Development of Guangdong-HK-Macau Greater Bay Area" promoting financial cooperation, openness and innovation in the area.

5.15-5.22

An HKDSE history question on Sino-Japanese relations in a period including Japnese invasion of China in World War II was criticized to have provided 'biased' sources that were overwhelmingly positive of Japan. The question was subsequently withdrew. Xinhua News Agency stated that Hong Kong should establishment a new education system in accordance to 1C2S.

5.28

The Commerce and Economic Development Bureau announced the establishment of a task force to review the governance and management of RTHK, inviting concerns over political censorship after suspected police insult in an episode of 'Headliner' and infringement of the one-China principle in 'The Pulse'.

5.28

The US State Secretary, Mike Pompeo, submitted the 2020 Hong Kong Policy Act Report to Congress, certifying that HK no longer warrants separate treatment from mainland China under US laws.

4.20

惠譽在七個月內再度調低香港評級至AA-,港府對其「過度着眼於社會政治議題」表示失望。

4.27 & 5.25

區域法官對斬人案被告判囚表示同情後,首席 法官馬道立告戒法官應避免做不必要的整治表 態,以免影響大眾對司法獨立失去信心。

5.14

人民銀行、銀保監會、中證監及外滙局發布 《關於金融支持粵港澳大灣區建設的意見》 提出深化內地與港澳金融合作並發展金融開 放創新,支持粵港澳大灣區建設力度,提升大 灣區在國家經濟發展和對外開放中的引領作 用。

5 15-5 22

香港中學文憑試歷史科一條中日關係題目,牽 涉二戰日本侵華時期,所提供的資料被批評具 引導性,對日本偏向正面。該題最後被考評局 取消。新華社文章指出「香港必須建立與一國 兩制相適應的新教育體制」。

5.28

商務及經濟發展局宣布成立專責小組,檢討 香港電台管治及管理,惹來政治審查的嫌疑。 較早前,香港電台節目《The Pulse》被指違 反「一中原則」及《頭條新聞》內容被指侮 辱警方。

5.28

美國國務卿蓬佩奧向國會提交《2020年香港政策法報告》,宣布不再承認香港擁有高度自治,並要求取消對香港的特殊待遇。

6.4

Enactment of the Anthem Law.

6.30

The Hong Kong National Security Law was introduced, passed and enacted. The Office for Safeguarding National Security of the Central People's Government of the HKSAR will be established. The self-determination group Demosistō announced its dissolution shortly after the enactment.

6.4

通過《國歌法》。

6.30

《港區國安法》宣布、通過及執行。中央駐港 維護國家安全公署成立。提倡自決的香港眾 志,於法案生效後馬上宣布解散。

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