

‘ONE COUNTRY
TWO SYSTEMS’
INDEX

「一國兩制」指數

2022 | H1 上半年



2022 上半年 (第十版)
2022 H1 (Tenth Edition)

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前言 Preface

The unprecedented pursuit of 'One Country Two Systems' (henceforth 1C2S) demands unyielding exploration and persistence from stakeholders. Since 1997, we have made headway in the realization of 1C2S, but at the same time, have also encountered many challenges. To assist full implementation of 1C2S, in July 2017, Path of Democracy established the 1C2S Index and released its first report in relation thereto with a view to conduct an objective evaluation of the continued implementation of 1C2S by reviewing its accomplishments and shortfalls.

The 1C2S Index is based on both local opinion and international perception on the current state of 1C2S. In order to measure local sentiment, we conduct periodic public surveys in Hong Kong on aspects such as 'Hong Kong people administering Hong Kong', the high degree of autonomy, judiciary independence, and other important issues. We also look at global studies carried out by international think tanks and how Hong Kong is being rated on aspects like human rights, rule of law and democracy. These independent evaluations are incorporated into the Index to give a more balanced view on how the World including Hong Kong people look at the state of 1C2S.

We have devised and introduced a 1C2S Mass Media Index (MMI) by making use of big data analytics to measure the media sentiment of Hong Kong and overseas towards 1C2S. In compiling our reports, views on current issues related to 1C2S are also sought, such as the public's emigration plans, national security and economic integration.

Building on five years of experience, a comprehensive review was conducted in early 2022 to ensure alignment with societal and global development. The main Index will adopt a more timely, objective, distinctive and extensive construction method. We innovate the study of media sentiment by expanding coverage of 1C2S MMI to reflect the changing media landscape and readership. An online data portal is launched to better inform policymakers, researchers, media, and the public through data visualizations and customized analysis with an open and transparent approach.

We extend our sincere gratitude to the research team involved in the production of our tenth edition of the 1C2S Index report: Christina Chan, Ting Hin Yan, Ian Chan and Benson Lam. Special thanks to Maxine Yao and Daphne Choi who assisted in editing this report. We are also grateful to Hong Kong Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies of the Chinese University of Hong Kong for completing the telephone polls and Sentiment.AI for measuring media sentiments on our behalf.

Going forward, we will continue to conduct public surveys and update international indices every six months, and to monitor media sentiment regularly to gauge the latest perceptions of the public, the international community and the media on 1C2S.

Ray Poon

Co-convenor (Research)

August 2022

「一國兩制」是前無古人的嘗試，1997年至今既取得成果，也遇到挑戰，實踐過程需要社會各界不斷探索。民主思路在2017年7月開始發布第一份關於「一國兩制」概況的客觀評價，希望鑑察其成就與缺失，為全面準確貫徹此方針略盡綿力。

「一國兩制」指數編製自關於「一國兩制」現狀的本地民意及國際評價。我們定期進行民意調查，就港人治港、高度自治、司法獨立及其他重要範疇了解香港市民想法。我們亦參考國際機構對香港在人權、法治、民主等範疇的評分，把以上獨立意見揉合於指數之中，為香港及世界各地對「一國兩制」現狀的觀感作出中肯評估。

我們借助大數據技術，推出「一國兩制」輿情指數去衡量新聞情緒，追蹤香港和海外媒體相關報道。編製報告時，我們亦探討「一國兩制」實踐中的熱門議題，例如移民海外、國家安全、經濟融合等。

經過五年的編製，我們在2022年初進行全面檢討，確保指數能夠與香港社會和全球發展保持一致。調整後的編製方法令「一國兩制」指數的更新更及時、來源更客觀、指標更鮮明和層面更廣闊。因應傳媒生態和閱讀習慣改變，我們亦擴大輿情指數的數據範圍，為輿情研究帶來突破。另外，我們推出網上數據平台，遵循公開透明的原則，提供數據視覺化和客製化分析，給予決策者、研究員、媒體和公眾參考。

我們衷心感謝研究團隊：陳慧盈、甄定軒、陳譽仁及林康聖，亦謹此向協助校對的姚潔凝及蔡淑汶、執行電話調查的香港中文大學香港亞太研究所及衡量新聞情緒的輿情科技致以謝意。

展望未來，我們會繼續每半年進行民意調查及更新國際指數，亦會定期追蹤新聞輿情，從而反映香港市民、國際社會及各地媒體對「一國兩制」的最新觀感。


潘學智

民主思路聯席召集人（研究）

2022年8月


摘要 Key Findings





行政摘要

Executive Summary



1. 1C2S Index rebounded remarkably to 5.82 from a low of 5.45 in the first half of 2020 due to the massive protest and riot. Overwhelmingly, 75.7% of the respondents would like 1C2S to continue beyond 2047.
2. International perception of the situation in Hong Kong deteriorated to 6.93 versus 7.52 two years ago, driven by sizeable drop in the categories of expression, association & assembly; political pluralism; and constraints on powers. The need to tell a better HK story is both urgent and challenging. PoD recommends the creation of a 1C2S Office to engage with the western media on a continuing basis to rectify misperceptions.
3. The political landscape changed with moderates representing 71.8% of population, an increase of 9.7 percentage points; while both the pro-establishment and the non-establishment camps witnessed a decline. This is an opportunity to build on this rise of moderates to reduce polarization in our society.
4. People identifying themselves as having dual Chinese and Hong Kong identities increased by 15.2 percentage points to 60.7%. Markedly, the gap between those who saw themselves as only Chinese or only Hong Konger narrowed steadily over the years.
5. People planning to emigrate dropped from 34.5% in June 2020 to 15.8% in July 2022, suggesting a return to the historical norm as an international city with freedom of movement. This is an opportunity to attract new talents to come to HK as we move toward a new, innovative economy.
6. People with an interest to study, work or retire in the GBA area dropped from 11.9% in June 2020 to 4.5% in July 2022, which might be due to the closure of the border. The government should undertake a sustained campaign to highlight the career success stories of HK youth in GBA area, and also create job placement platform to help our youth find GBA jobs easily.
1. 因為大規模示威和騷亂，2020上半年的「一國兩制」指數處於5.45分的低位，最近半年回升至5.82分。絕大部分受訪者（75.7%）支持在2047年後繼續落實「一國兩制」。
2. 比起兩年前的7.52分，香港的國際評價惡化至最近的6.93分，受累於表達、結社和集會；政治多元；權力制約的評分大幅下跌。講好香港故事既是燃眉之急，亦具挑戰性。民主思路建議政府成立「一國兩制」辦公室，與西方媒體保持聯繫，消弭誤解。
3. 香港的政治版圖正在改變，溫和派上升9.7個百分點，佔全港人口的71.8%。建制派和非建制派陣營則錄得下跌。溫和派興起，將會是社會減少政治兩極化的契機。
4. 對中國人與香港人身分擁有雙重認同的市民，上升15.2個百分點至60.7%。認為他們只是中國人或只是香港人的比例差距，在過去幾年期間不斷收窄。
5. 有計劃移民的市民，由2020年6月的34.5%下跌至2022年7月的15.8%，象徵這座擁有遷徙自由的國際城市重回歷史常態。這是香港吸引外來人才的機會，推進創新經濟發展。
6. 可能受到封關影響，有興趣前往大灣區發展的市民由2020年6月的11.9%下跌至2022年7月的4.5%。政府應該加大宣傳，強調香港青年在大灣區成功就業的故事，為青年成立職業配對平台，協助他們在區內更易尋找工作。

指數概覽 Index At-a-Glance

1C2S Index
「一國兩制」指數

5.82
(↑ 3.4%)

2022 H1

1C2S Mass Media Index
「一國兩制」輿情指數

139.2
(↑ 17.8%)

2022 Q2

Moderates
溫和派

71.8%
(↑ 9.7%)

2022.7

Continuation of 1C2S
延續「一國兩制」


75.7%
(↑ 8.3%)

2022.7

Dual Identity
雙重身分認同

60.7%
(↑ 15.2%)

2022.7



Public
Opinion
民意調查

High Degree of Autonomy

高度自治

4.61
(↑ 22.9%)

Human Rights and Freedom

人權自由

4.61
(↑ 14.7%)

Hong Kong-Mainland Relations

陸港關係

4.92
(↑ 14.4%)

International
Perception
國際評價

Economic Openness

經濟開放

9.28
(↓ 0.6%)

Civil Liberty


公民權利

6.35
(↓ 6.6%)


Democratic Development

民主發展

5.17
(↓ 7.5%)



2022 上半年回顧 2022 H1 Overview



The Chief Executive race made headlines in the first half of 2022. After former leader Carrie Lam's abrupt announcement not to seek re-election, the ex-security chief John Lee became the sole candidate and won the CE race unopposed. At this point, all three elections under the new electoral reform were completed, ushering a new era of political system in Hong Kong. All eyes were on the new leadership's manifesto which will be Hong Kong's blueprint for the next 5 years.

Amid the political fervency, suspicions over a citywide lockdown due to the fifth wave of pandemic sparked off public panic which put people's sense of security and freedom of movement in doubts. A handful of cases lingered the fear of deterioration of expression and association freedom, including the closure of two independent media outlets and the moving out of some student unions from university campuses.

Local events in this half year negatively impacted international perception. The global community observed closely the new electoral systems for LegCo and the CE; and the US, EU and G7 continued to criticise prosecutions and arrests related to anti-extradition cases. The implementation of some of the strictest travel restrictions in the world was also cited as one of the reasons for expats to leave Hong Kong.

Public attention started to shift to the economic sphere with a more stabilised political order. Steps of border reopening and for Hong Kong to reconnect with the world became more and more important on the government agenda. In our tenth edition of the 1C2S Index report, we hope to shed some light on the subject with substantial quantitative data from our latest round of survey conducted from June to July 2022, scores given by international think tanks and sentiments expressed by local and overseas media.

2022上半年，特首選舉登上新聞焦點。前特首林鄭月娥宣布不尋求連任，曾任保安局的時任政務司司長李家超參選，成為唯一候選人並勝出選舉。完善選舉制度下的三場選舉順利舉行，揭開香港政治制度的新紀元。社會各界期待新政府的政綱，希望早日了解香港未來五年的發展藍圖。

政圈熱話的同時，第五波疫情傳出疑似封城計劃，牽動全城恐慌，令大眾頓失安全感，擔心行動自由受約束。個別事件亦帶來削弱言論和結社自由的憂慮，包括兩家獨立媒體結束營運，以及多間大學學生會被遷出校園。

香港上半年的本地事件，在國際社會不乏負面聲音。全球密切觀察新選制下的立法會和特首，美國、歐盟、G7繼續批評因修例風波所引起的檢控及拘捕行動。外籍專才批評香港正實施可能是全球最嚴格的旅遊限制，成為他們離港的原因之一。

政治秩序恢復穩定，經濟事務逐漸重獲大眾關注。在特區政府的施政日程中，重開邊境與世界接軌變得更為重要。第十版「一國兩制」指數報告整合2022年6月至7月民意調查的結果、國際智庫的評分及本地和海外媒體的輿情，希望藉著客觀數據探討「一國兩制」的實踐狀況。

Opposing view of local and international confidence in 1C2S

The honeymoon period enjoyed by John Lee's new government inspired hope and confidence in the implementation of 1C2S. The election, however, was regarded as an example of the erosion of democratic elements by the Western coalition. Arrests of organizers in support of the anti-extradition protests also aroused international anxiety over the repression of freedom in Hong Kong. Despite the gradual decline in international perception, a stronger local support contributed to an overall growth in the 1C2S Index. The latest reading rose by 3.4% from 5.63 to 5.82.

All pillars on public opinion continued the rebound from the previous round. A giant leap was witnessed in 'high degree of autonomy' (+22.9%). People in Hong Kong showed greater confidence in the legislature and self-governance of local affairs and after elections at different levels were carried out. Other pillars, 'human rights and freedom' (+14.7%) and 'Hong Kong-Mainland relationship' (+14.4%), also increased greatly.

Due to time lag in the compilation of international indices, negative impacts from earlier events started to catch up at the international level and begin to affect various pillars. Both 'democratic development' (-7.5%) and 'civil liberty' (-6.6%) extended their downward-sloping trend. Concerns over political pluralism as a result of last year's electoral reform were evident by statements of foreign governments. Judicial proceedings of protest cases were in progress which prompted the international community to constantly examine Hong Kong's freedom of expression, association and assembly.

Overwhelming support for the continuation of 1C2S

The 25th anniversary of HKSAR is the halfway mark of the political promise of remaining 'unchanged for 50 years'. The support for the continuation of 1C2S beyond 2047 rose to 75.7%. With fewer people opted for opposing continuation at 8.9%, net support increased by 13.3 percentage points to 66.8%. An overwhelming majority of over three quarters of the respondents still regard 1C2S as the right system for Hong Kong's future.

'Maintaining economic prosperity and stability' (64.2%) overtook 'maintaining a high degree of autonomy' (62.8%) to become the most favourable condition to the continuation of 1C2S. 'Political system democratises further' (35.7%) dropped continuously. 'Maintaining national security' (21.4%) reversed its three-year climb and decreased.

本地與國際信心背道而馳

李家超的新政府正值蜜月期，給予市民對「一國兩制」的希望和信心。是次選舉在西方陣營眼中，卻是民主元素又一次被蠶食。警方拘捕支持反修例運動的組織者，觸發國際社會擔心香港所享受的自由受到壓制。雖然國際評價轉差，不過本地信心強勁，令「一國兩制」指數整體有所增長。最新的指數由5.63分升至5.82分，上升了3.4%。

所有民意調查的支柱評分延續上輪升勢。「高度自治」大幅上升（+22.9%），反映各級選舉順利完成後，香港人對立法機關、自行管理本地事務有更強信心。另外兩項支柱，「人權自由」（+14.7%）和「陸港關係」（+14.4%）也上升不少。

國際智庫整合全球評分需時，數據一般滯後，所以過去事件所帶來的負面影響在今輪始能反映。「民主發展」（-7.5%）和「公民權利」（-6.6%）延續下滑趨勢。香港去年的政制改革，多次引起外國政府對政治多元的關注。示威案件進入司法程序，亦令國際社會恆常審視香港在言論、結社和集會方面的自由程度。

廣泛支持繼續實行「一國兩制」

回歸25周年象徵「50年不變」的政治承諾走到一半。市民對2047年後繼續實行「一國兩制」的支持度上升至75.7%。由於反對的市民稍為減少至8.9%，淨值增加13.3個百分點至66.8%。超過四分之三的絕大多數受訪者依然認為「一國兩制」是適合香港未來的制度。

「經濟維持繁榮穩定」（64.2%）超越「維持高度自治」（62.8%）成為有利於繼續實行「一國兩制」的首要選項。「政制進一步民主化」（35.7%）的重要程度持續下降。「維護國家安全」（21.4%）佔比下跌，逆轉三年來的升勢。

Easing political polarization

The exit of the pro-democracy camp on the political stage resulted in mass apathy and political demobilization. The gap between moderates and non-establishment supporters widened further, as the two moved away from each other with a rise of 9.7 percentage points for the former and a decrease of 6.5 percentage points for the latter. As a result, moderates remained the largest group with a greater dominance (71.8%), followed by non-establishment supporters (13.1%) and pro-establishment supporters (7.5%).

The rise of moderation was also seen among youths (aged 18 to 29), along with the continuous easing of political tension. Moderates rose by 4.2 percentage points to 61.3%. Among non-establishment supporters, democrats fell by 1.7 percentage points to 20.7% while localists rebounded by 5.1 percentage points to 16.0%. The rise of moderation among 18-29 age group has been a healthy development; nevertheless, one should remain vigilant to the possibility of re-radicalization in the near future.

Reconvergence of citizens' identity as Hongkongers or Chinese

Citizens' self-identification as Hongkongers or Chinese started to converge after a period of parallel increase and opposing movement. Although the previous divergence appeared to stop, the gap was still wide. The public's self-identification as 'Hongkongers' increased by 1.9% from 7.84 to 7.99, while 'Chinese' also rose by 15.7% from 5.59 to 6.47.

Most Hong Kong citizens are typically cognizant of their dual identity as both Hongkongers and Chinese. Over half of the public acknowledged dual identity in earlier surveys. This had gradually changed since 2019 and hit rock bottom in June 2020 but has since rebounded. In this round, people who recognized their dual identity rose to the peak of 60.7% by 15.2 percentage points. This was contrasted by the continual decline of 'Hongkonger only' for 4 rounds to 25.8%.

Implications and recommendations

The substantial growth in public opinion against a repeated decline in international perception signified the disparity between how local people and the international community looked at 1C2S. Nonetheless, we still found that people's perception to the current state of 1C2S was less than satisfactory. It is difficult to reconcile the fact that despite a lower level of confidence in the 1C2S, people of Hong Kong still overwhelmingly indicated they were in favour of the continuation of the same beyond 2047. A possible explanation is that they do not see any viable alternative.

政治兩極化緩和

民主派從政治舞台退場，群眾關注和政治動員均有消減。溫和派及非建制派的佔比差距進一步拉闊，前者經歷9.7個百分點升幅，後者經歷6.5個百分點跌幅。溫和派（71.8%）繼續成為最大群組，其次為非建制派（13.1%）及建制派（7.5%）。

18-29歲年輕人中，溫和派同樣冒起，舒緩政治繃緊氣氛。溫和派上升4.2個百分點至61.3%。至於非建制派，民主派下跌1.7個百分點至20.7%，本土派則反彈5.1個百分點升至16.0%。18-29歲年輕人中，溫和政治再現，無疑是良好的發展，但我們仍需保持警惕，以防激進主義重臨。

香港人與中國人身分認同重新匯合

經過一段時間的同步增強和反向而行後，市民對香港人和中國人兩種身分認同開始匯合。雖然過去的背馳傾向似乎已終止，但差距仍然不少。大眾對香港人的認同感上升1.9%，由7.84分輕微上升至7.99分；對中國人的認同感上升15.7%，由5.59分上升至6.47分。

香港市民普遍擁有香港人和中國人雙重身分認同，過往調查均超過一半。情況自2019年起急遽下跌，於2020年6月觸底後反彈。是次調查中，擁有雙重身分認同的市民上升15.2個百分點至60.7%，而「只有香港人」連續四輪調查下跌，跌至25.8%。

啟示及建議

民意評分大幅改善，而國際評價持續下跌，突顯本地和國際社會對如何理解「一國兩制」存在差異。我們發現市民對「一國兩制」的現狀仍未滿意。儘管對「一國兩制」的信心並不算高，我們同時發現香港市民更廣泛地支持於2047年後延續「一國兩制」。兩種取態看似大相逕庭，可能說明市民根本沒有更好的替代方案。

Many indicators returned to early-2019 level. Public discontent sparked by the governance crisis appeared to be relieved. People with emigration plans kept on declining. The proportion of moderates continued to grow while non-establishment supporters steadily declined. More people attributed equal responsibility to both Hong Kong and Mainland when conflicts arise in the implementation of 1C2S. The proportion of population identifying themselves as 'Chinese' also embarked on a modest rate of increase.

The two rival camps showed extreme views over the impact of the National Security Law. Moderates was the only group countering this juxtaposition. A rational voice exists in the wider society, but it is vulnerable to populist narratives. Policymakers must take care to ensure that moderate opinions continue to enjoy the benefit of a nourishing and safe environment in a divided culture.

It is important for the HKSAR government to capitalize on the growing confidence and build further momentum by spearheading a concerted effort involving all sectors of Hong Kong including the business community, the academia, professional bodies, and like-minded think tanks and NGOs to promote the image of Hong Kong under 1C2S. Such effort may include:

- Setting up the Office of 1C2S for sustained outreach effort both locally and in the APEC region to mobilize support and enhance Hong Kong's presence. This dedicated office will actively participate in foreign think tank forums directly or through the business community to promote the Hong Kong narrative in the international arena;
- Creating a Press Secretary for the CE Office to hold daily press briefings with local and international media to tackle latest policy issues timely, fully and properly, including the National Security Law to address the fear and anxiety of the foreign community in Hong Kong;
- Providing advanced training to our senior officials of how to counter the negative narrative in the western media with positive HK stories; and
- Educating young members of the public on 1C2S basics, understanding of rule of law, human rights and freedoms and broadening awareness of social, national and global issues.

許多指標回復至修例風波前的水平，反映這場管治危機所引發的不滿情緒似已舒緩。有計劃移民的市民繼續減少。溫和派的佔比持續增加，非建制派則持續下降。當「一國兩制」在實踐上出現矛盾時，更多人認為內地和香港有共同責任。對中國人身分的認同感亦有穩健增長。


兩大政治陣營對《國安法》的反應極端，溫和派則少受政治立場綑綁。社會仍然存在理性聲音，但極容易受到民粹摧毀。決策者應確保溫和意見能夠在撕裂的社會上有一隅之地。

政府應乘勢領導香港各界，如商界、學術界、專業團體、理念相近的智庫和民間組織，共同努力闡釋「一國兩制」的實況，提升香港形象。措施包括：


- 設立「一國兩制」辦公室，專門進行本地及亞太區的推廣及聯絡工作，動員社會各界支持及強化香港的影響力。此專責辦公室將會直接或通過商界積極參與外國智庫論壇，就香港事務在國際舞台發聲；
- 增設特首辦新聞發言人，每天主持記者會，面向本地及國際傳媒，適時、充分及恰當地解釋及回應政策議題，包括外國社群對《國安法》的疑慮；
- 提供進階培訓予高級官員，運用正面的香港故事，以回應西方媒體的負面論述；及
- 著重青年教育，擴闊他們對「一國兩制」的基本認識，豐富對法治、人權和自由的理解，增強社會觸覺、國際視野及國情認識。

第十版報告
Tenth Edition





簡介 Introduction



This is the tenth edition of our 'One Country Two Systems' (henceforth 1C2S) Index report. The purpose of the 1C2S Index is to provide an objective assessment on the implementation of 1C2S. Our first report was released in mid-2017, on the 20th anniversary of the return of Hong Kong to China. We update the 1C2S Index every six months, at mid-year and year end.

Every half year, we update the 1C2S Index through updating public opinion and international perception respectively with a new public survey and with the latest data from international indices. To complement our main Index, we have also introduced the 1C2S Mass Media Index (MMI) that uses big-data techniques to measure the sentiment of Hong Kong and overseas printed, electronic and online media.

We commissioned the Hong Kong Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies of the Chinese University of Hong Kong to conduct telephone poll between June to July 2022 to compile scores on public opinion. We updated scores on international perception to 2022 H1 by scoring and ranking 148 countries and territories based on 9 comprehensive data sources and 128 indicators compiled by international think tanks. MMI was measured by Sentiment.AI and updated to the end of June 2022.

In our latest survey, we continued to include topical issues related to 1C2S, such as the continuation of 1C2S beyond 2047, citizen's identity, attitude towards emigration and public opinions on the Greater Bay Area. To fully capture the socio-political reality of the city, we introduced new questions to gauge the impact of recent socio-political changes, such as the consideration of a political reform and the impact of the National Security Law.

香港回歸20週年之際，民主思路於2017年中首次發布「一國兩制」指數，旨在為香港實踐「一國兩制」作客觀評價。指數於年中與年底，每半年更新，這是第十版報告。

我們每半年進行電話調查及收集國際指數的最新數據，更新民意調查及國際評價，從而更新「一國兩制」指數。我們還推出嶄新的「一國兩制」輿情指數，檢視香港和海外報章、電子傳媒和網絡媒體對「一國兩制」的情緒，利用大數據技術去補充指數之不足。

本報告委託香港中文大學香港亞太研究所，在2022年6月至7月進行電話調查，從而取得民意評分。我們運用國際智庫編製的9個綜合數據庫和128個指標，為148個國家和地區評分和排名，從而計算國際評價，資料已更新至2022年上半年。由輿情科技量度的「一國兩制」輿情指數則更新至2022年6月底。

電話調查也一併探討其他關乎「一國兩制」的重要議題，包括2047年後繼續實行「一國兩制」、市民的身分認同、移民海外與及粵港澳大灣區發展。為更準確拿捏近期的社會及政治變化所帶來的影響，本輪新增圍繞政制改革和《國安法》的題目。

It should be stressed that public opinion, international perception and MMI are determined by perceptions and may or may not reflect the reality. Even so, changes in perceptions of 1C2S of the Hong Kong public, of international think tanks, and of the Hong Kong and overseas media are nevertheless important. We will analyse the reasons for the changes as they are crucial for the implementation of 1C2S.

In our report, all scores are expressed in a scale of 0-10. An asterisk (*) indicates a change in scores compared with the previous round that is big enough to be statistically significant. If there is no mentioning of statistical significance about a score, it means that the change concerned is statistically insignificant.

Some scores are decomposed by age group, educational attainment and political inclination for further analysis. In the past, the non-establishment camp under political inclination was divided into 'democrats' and 'others'. This division is abolished in this edition of report as the size of the latter is too small to support any meaningful analysis.


Please visit the webpage of Path of Democracy (<http://www.pathofdemocracy.hk/1c2s-index/>) to access our data portal for historical data of the 1C2S Index series. An extensive report on the survey results is also available.

民意調查、國際評價及輿情指數的評分取決於觀感，可能不完全反映現實。儘管如此，香港市民、國際智庫和本地媒體的觀感變化對實施「一國兩制」仍然至關重大，所以我們也會分析其背後的變化原因。

本報告的所有評分尺度為0至10分。如不同輪次調查之間的評分差異達統計上顯著水平，將會以星號（「*」）註明。未有註明者，則代表評分差異在統計上並不顯著。


部分結果將根據年齡組別、教育程度和政治傾向劃分，再作分析。以往，政治傾向中的非建制派會細分為「民主派」和「其他」。後者的人數於本輪調查過少，難以作出有意義的分析，因此本版報告不再將非建制派細分為兩組。

「一國兩制」指數的歷年數據已經上載至我們的數據平台，電話調查的詳細報告亦刊於「調查結果：頻數及百分比分佈」，歡迎參閱民主思路網頁。（<http://www.pathofdemocracy.hk/1c2s-index/>）



2. 「一國兩制」指數

2. 1C2S Index



The 1C2S Index is the average score of three pillars on public opinion and three pillars on international perception. The three pillars on public opinion, namely 'high degree of autonomy', 'human rights and freedom' and 'Hong Kong-Mainland relationship' are the evaluation by Hong Kong public on different dimensions of 1C2S. The three pillars on international perception, namely 'economic openness', 'civil liberty' and 'democratic development', are the evaluation by international think tanks on various aspects of freedom and democracy in Hong Kong. The methodology is explained in Appendix I.


「一國兩制」指數為民意調查3項支柱及國際評價3項支柱的平均值。民意調查的3項支柱為「高度自治」、「人權自由」及「陸港關係」，用以量度公眾對「一國兩制」的評價。國際評價的3項支柱為「經濟開放」、「公民權利」及「民主發展」，是國際智庫對香港自由和民主程度的評估。指數的編製方法詳見附件I。

Figure 1 shows scores of the 1C2S Index since 2020 H1. The latest reading in 2022 H1 was 5.82 with an increase of 3.4% from 5.63 half year ago. After a prolonged trough, the Index continued to soar and returned to mid-2019 level. This rise in the latest round was contributed by a huge improvement in public opinion, especially on the high degree of autonomy, which offset the sustained downgrading of international perception. Results obtained in these pillars will be detailed in the following sub-sections.

圖1顯示「一國兩制」指數2020上半年至今的變化。2022年上半年的最新讀數為5.82分，較半年年前的5.63分上升了3.4%。經過一段低潮，「一國兩制」指數繼續上升，回復至2019年中的水平。本輪的上升出於民意評分，尤其是「高度自治」的大幅改善，抵銷了國際評價的持續下跌。各項支柱評分的變化將於以下章節詳細解釋。

Figure 1: 1C2S Index

圖1：「一國兩制」指數



2.1 民意調查 Public opinion

Table 1 shows all pillar and sub-pillars scores. All three pillars grew statistically significantly. 'High degree of autonomy' witnessed a giant leap of 22.9% to 4.61. Both 'human rights and freedom' and 'Hong Kong-Mainland relationship' increased greatly by 14.7% to 4.61 and 14.4% to 4.92 respectively.

Wordings of two sub-pillars were changed and therefore incomparable with previous rounds. All other sub-pillars experienced a statistically significant rise since the last round and most of them a double-digit increase. The three sub-pillars with the highest scores were 'Hong Kong people administering Hong Kong' (+24.5%), 'self-conduct of administrative affairs' (+24.4%) and 'independent legislature' (+23.4%). None of the sub-pillars decreased. Three sub-pillars with the smallest increases were 'safeguarding national sovereignty, security & development interests' (+6.2%), 'democratic development' (+7.8%) and 'original ways of life' (+13.7%).

The three sub-pillars with highest scores were 'safeguarding national sovereignty, security & development interests' (5.81), 'equal protection of the Law' (5.65) and 'maintaining long-term prosperity and stability' (5.61). The three sub-pillars with the lowest scores were 'democratic development' (3.74), 'Hong Kong people administering Hong Kong' (3.96) and 'resolving differences via dialogue and negotiation' (4.06).

表1顯示民意調查的支柱和子支柱評分。三項支柱評分上升均達統計上顯著水平：「高度自治」大幅上升22.9%至4.61分，「人權自由」和「陸港關係」的評分也增加不少，分別上升14.7%至4.61分及14.4%至4.92分。

本輪調查中，兩項子支柱的用字經過修訂，不宜與上輪直接比較。其他所有子支柱經歷達統計上顯著水平的升幅，而且大部份達雙位數。三項升幅最大的子支柱為「港人治港」(+24.5%)、「自行處理行政事務」(+24.4%)和「獨立立法權」(+23.4%)。沒有子支柱評分下降，三項升幅最小的子支柱為「維護國家主權、安全和發展利益」(+6.2%)、「民主發展」(+7.8%)和「原有生活方式」(+13.7%)。

三項分數最高的子支柱為「維護國家主權、安全和發展利益」(5.81)、「法律平等保護」(5.65)和「維持長期繁榮穩定」(5.61)。三項分數最低的子支柱為「民主政制發展」(3.74)、「港人治港」(3.96)和「透過對話協商解決矛盾」(4.06)。

Table 1: Pillar and sub-pillar scores on public opinion

表1：民意調查的支柱及子支柱分數

	2020 H1	2020 H2	2021 H1	2021 H2	2022 H1		
Overall 總分	3.39	3.62	3.62	4.02	4.71		*
A. High Degree of Autonomy 高度自治	3.52	3.43	3.39	3.75	4.61		*
A1. Self-conduct of administrative affairs 自行處理行政事務	3.40	3.34	3.42	3.89	4.84		*
A2. Independent judiciary 獨立司法權	4.16	4.00	3.80	4.09	4.92		*
A3. Independent legislature 獨立立法權	3.71	3.62	3.55	3.84	4.74		*
A4. 'Hong Kong people administering Hong Kong' 「港人治港」	2.82	2.77	2.80	3.18	3.96		*
B. Human Rights and Freedom 人權自由	-	3.83	3.71	4.02	4.61		*
B1. Original ways of life 原有生活方式	4.39	4.41	4.33	4.51	5.13		*
B2. Freedom of speech, association and assembly 言論、結社及集會自由	4.04	3.92	3.61	3.67	3.89 [^]		
B3. Democratic development 民主政制發展	3.08	3.01	3.09	3.47	3.74		*
B4. Equal protection of the Law 法律平等保護	-	3.98	3.80	4.43	5.65 [^]		
C. Hong Kong-Mainland Relations 陸港關係	-	3.61	3.77	4.30	4.92		*
C1. Resolving via dialogue and negotiation 對話協商解決矛盾	2.53	2.59	2.81	3.45	4.06		*
C2. Safeguarding national sovereignty, security & development interests 維護國家主權、安全和發展利益	-	4.99	5.20	5.47	5.81		*
C3. Maintaining long-term prosperity and stability 維持長期繁榮穩定	-	4.15	4.22	4.75	5.61		*
C4. Full implementation of 1C2S in the future 未來全面落實「一國兩制」	2.37	2.70	2.85	3.54	4.19		*

Note: Wordings of two indicators marked '[^]' were revised in this round, namely from 'freedom of speech' to 'freedom of speech, association and assembly' and from 'equality before the Law' to 'equal protection of the Law'. Readers should take careful note of these changes and their interpretations.

註：兩項子支柱標有「[^]」，用字於本輪修訂，分別由「言論自由」改為「言論、集會及結社自由」及「法律面前一律平等」改為「法律平等保護」。讀者應注意這些改變及其含意。

2.1.1 Generation gap and political divide


Figure 2 shows average scores of public opinion by age group. There was a rise for all age groups. All changes were statistically significant except for the 18-29 age group. The growth for the 30-39 age group was the strongest among all age groups, with an increase of 45.1% to 3.83. Although statistically insignificant, the 18-29 age group rose with 17.4% and reached 3.10.

Figure 3 shows average scores of public opinion by political inclination. Average scores produced by all political groups collectively increased with statistical significance. Pro-establishment supporters peaked at 8.34 with an increase of 12.4% while moderates rose to 4.89 by 12.9%. The non-establishment supporters scored higher, with a rise by 34.2% to 1.96.

Statistical tests revealed that there was a clear and consistent divide in evaluation scores between younger and older age groups, and across all political inclinations. Not only were scores increased with age, scores of the three younger age group were also statistically lower than the three older ones. In comparison with moderates, the evaluations of pro-establishment supporters were significantly higher. On the other hand, evaluations of non-establishment supporters were significantly lower.

Figure 2: Public opinion (by age group)

圖2：民意調查（按年齡組別劃分）



2.1.1. 代溝及政治鴻溝

圖 2顯示各個年齡組別在民意調查的總分。所有年齡組別的分數均有所上升，而且除了18-29歲組別外，上升幅度達至統計上顯著水平。30-39歲組別的升幅在所有組別中最大，評分上升45.1%至3.83分。雖然18-29歲組別的改變未達致統計上顯著水平，其評分亦上升17.4%，達3.10分。


圖 3顯示過去調查中，不同政治傾向在民意調查的總分。所有政治傾向的分數集體上升，而且達統計上顯著水平。建制派上升12.4%至8.34分的高峰，而溫和派上升12.9%至4.89分。非建制派的評分也有增長，上升34.2%至1.96分。

經統計檢測，年輕和年長組別之間及所有政治傾向之間，存在明顯且一致的差異。不僅評分隨著年齡而增加，三個年輕組別的分數，在統計學上也低於三個年長組別。與溫和派比較下，建制派評分比溫和派顯著較高，而非建制派評分則比溫和派顯著較低。

Scores 評分	Changes 變化
3.10	+0.46 (↑ 17.4%)
3.83	+1.19 (↑ 45.1%) *
4.43	+0.64 (↑ 16.9%) *
5.06	+0.69 (↑ 15.8%) *
6.01	+1.03 (↑ 20.7%) *
6.77	+1.03 (↑ 17.9%) *
4.71	+0.69 (↑ 17.2%) *

Figure 3: Public opinion (by political inclination)

圖3：民意調查（按政治傾向劃分）



2.2 國際評價 International perception

Table 2 shows Hong Kong's pillar and sub-pillar scores on international perception. The downward trend of all pillars continued. Compared to the last round, 'economic openness' dropped slightly from 9.34 to 9.28 by 0.6%. Both 'civil liberty' and 'democratic development' decreased greatly from 6.80 to 6.35 by 6.6% and from 5.59 to 5.17 by 7.5% respectively.

All sub-pillars fell, except for 'security and safety' (+0.9%) and 'democratic culture' (+0.7%). Three indicators with the greatest drop were 'expression, association and assembly' (-27.6%), 'political pluralism' (-19.9%) and 'constraints on powers' (-8.6%).

The three sub-pillars with highest scores were 'market access' (9.73), 'financial stability' (9.70) and 'business environment' (8.85). The three sub-pillars with the lowest scores were 'expression, association and assembly' (3.25), 'political pluralism' (3.51) and 'constraints on powers' (5.64).

表2顯示香港在國際評價的支柱和子支柱分數。所有支柱的下跌趨勢持續。與上輪比較，「經濟開放」由9.34分微跌至9.28分，跌幅為0.6%；「公民權利」及「民主發展」錄得較大跌幅，分別由6.80分下跌6.6%至6.35分及由5.59分下跌7.5%至5.17分。

除了「安全」(+0.9%)和「民主文化」(0.7%)上升之外，所有子支柱下跌。三項最大跌幅的子支柱為「表達、結社和集會」(-27.6%)、「政治多元」(-19.9%)和「權力制約」(-8.6%)。

三項評分最高的子支柱為「市場門檻」(9.73)、「金融穩定」(9.70)及「營商環境」(8.85)。三項分數最低的子支柱為「表達、結社與集會」(3.25)、「政治多元」(3.51)及「權力制約」(5.64)。

Table 2: Pillar and sub-pillar scores on international perception

表2：國際評價的支柱和子支柱分數

	2020 H1	2020 H2	2021 H1	2021 H2	2022 H1	
Overall 總分	7.52 (33)	7.52 (33)	7.30 (35)	7.25 (36)	6.93 (39)	
D. Economic Openness 經濟開放	9.39 (2)	9.41 (2)	9.36 (2)	9.34 (2)	9.28 (2)	
D1. Business environment 營商環境	8.94 (2)	8.99 (2)	9.02 (2)	8.97 (2)	8.85 (2)	
D2. Market access 市場門檻	9.84 (1)	9.83 (1)	9.74 (1)	9.74 (1)	9.73 (1)	
D3. Regulatory quality 監管質素	8.98 (2)	8.99 (2)	8.95 (2)	8.95 (2)	8.83 (2)	
D4. Financial stability 金融穩定	9.81 (1)	9.82 (1)	9.75 (1)	9.71 (1)	9.70 (1)	
E. Civil Liberty 公民權利	7.25 (46)	7.25 (46)	6.92 (56)	6.80 (60)	6.35 (72)	
E1. Rule of law 法治	7.52 (31)	7.52 (31)	6.87 (38)	6.82 (38)	6.44 (42)	
E2. Security and safety 安全	8.22 (34)	8.22 (34)	8.24 (33)	8.00 (39)	8.07 (36)	
E3. Expression, association and assembly 表達、結社與集會	5.06 (109)	5.06 (109)	4.60 (111)	4.49 (113)	3.25 (123)	
E4. Individual rights 個人權利	8.21 (37)	8.21 (37)	7.97 (37)	7.89 (39)	7.64 (43)	
F. Democratic Development 民主發展	5.91 (69)	5.91 (69)	5.61 (77)	5.59 (77)	5.17 (90)	
F1. Constraints on powers 權力制約	6.62 (44)	6.62 (44)	6.22 (49)	6.17 (49)	5.64 (56)	
F2. Political pluralism 政治多元	4.69 (111)	4.69 (111)	4.38 (114)	4.38 (114)	3.51 (123)	
F3. Civic participation 公民參與	6.31 (37)	6.31 (37)	6.14 (46)	6.14 (46)	5.82 (56)	
F4. Democratic culture 民主文化	6.03 (66)	6.03 (66)	5.70 (73)	5.69 (72)	5.73 (72)	

Note: World ranking in parentheses.

註：括號數字為世界排名。

2.2.1. Comparison with selected regions

As Hong Kong is a highly developed region and given that highly developed regions tend to have comparatively higher scores in freedom and democracy as compared with developing regions – we have selected certain neighbouring developed countries and territories (namely, Japan, South Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan) as benchmarks for comparison and assessment of Hong Kong's performance in international perception. We compared the respective scores of the Mainland and the US, for the purpose of identifying the position of Hong Kong under 1C2S relative to the major powers.

Table 3 compares Hong Kong and its neighbours by pillars on international perception. Hong Kong's superlative performance in 'economic openness' made it one of the world leaders with a score of 9.28. It ranked second after Singapore's 9.47 and was way ahead of Taiwan's 8.20, Japan's 7.61 and Korea's 7.30. The score of 'economic openness' for most developed neighbours rose in the last half year except Korea.

Hong Kong's score for 'civil liberty' was 6.35, close to Singapore's 6.81, but much lower than Japan's 9.04, Korea's 8.39 and Taiwan's 8.24. The performance of Hong Kong's neighbours in 'civil liberty' was varied in the past half year as scores of Japan and Singapore fell while others rose.

For 'democratic development', Hong Kong's score of 5.17 was not keeping in pace with its developed neighbours (Japan's 8.66, Taiwan's 8.31, Korea's 7.89 and Singapore's 6.91). Scores for all developed neighbours rose.

2.2.1. 選定地區比較

一般而言，發達地區的自由與民主評價均高於發展中地區。由於香港是高度發展的地區，所以我們選取鄰近的發達國家及地區，包括日本、南韓、新加坡及台灣作比較，藉以評價香港的表現。我們亦比較中國內地與美國的評分，以觀察在「一國兩制」之下的香港相對於兩個大國的發展。

表 3比較香港和鄰近地區在國際評價支柱的分數。香港在「經濟開放」表現非常突出，以9.28分在全球中名列前茅，緊接新加坡的9.47分排名第二，大幅領先台灣的8.20分、日本的7.61分和南韓的7.30分。除了南韓以外，大部分鄰近已發展地區的「經濟開放」評分均較半年前上升。

香港的「公民權利」評分為6.35分，雖然接近新加坡的6.81，但仍低於日本的9.04分、南韓的8.39分和台灣的8.24分。鄰近地區的「公民權利」表現參差，日本和新加坡下跌，其餘則上升。

香港在「民主發展」評分為5.17分，未盡人意，未能與其他鄰近地區看齊（日本8.66分、南韓7.89分、台灣8.31分、新加坡6.91分）。所有鄰近已發展地區的「民主發展」評分均上升。

Table 3: Pillar scores on international perception of selected regions

表3：選定地區之國際評價支柱分數

	D. Economic Openness				E. Civil Liberty				F. Democratic Development				Overall			
	經濟開放				公民權利				民主發展				總分			
	Score		Rank		Score		Rank		Score		Rank		Score		Rank	
	分數		排名		分數		排名		分數		排名		分數		排名	
Hong Kong 香港	9.28	↓	(2)	-	6.35	↓	(72)	↓	5.17	↓	(90)	↓	6.93	↓	(39)	↓
Mainland China 中國內地	6.65	↑	(47)	↓	3.04	↑	(142)	↑	2.55	↓	(139)	↑	4.08	↑	(126)	↓
Japan 日本	7.61	↑	(22)	-	9.04	↓	(13)	↑	8.66	↑	(12)	-	8.43	↑	(14)	↑
Korea 韓國	7.30	↓	(28)	↓	8.39	↑	(25)	↑	7.89	↑	(28)	↑	7.86	↑	(25)	-
Singapore 新加坡	9.47	↑	(1)	-	6.81	↓	(58)	↓	6.91	↑	(45)	↑	7.73	↑	(29)	-
Taiwan 台灣	8.20	↑	(11)	-	8.24	↑	(29)	↑	8.31	↑	(20)	-	8.25	↑	(19)	-
United States 美國	8.27	↑	(10)	-	8.10	↑	(34)	-	7.53	↑	(35)	-	7.96	↑	(21)	-

Note: World ranking in parentheses.

註：括號數字為世界排名。

2.2.2. Global trend


Figure 4 shows the global trend of the pillar scores on international perception. The decoupling of global trade and investment and a synchronised slowdown in the world marked the rapid fall of 'economic openness' in the second half of 2019. Travel bans and social distancing measures caused by the breakout of COVID-19 extended the low-scoring in for two years. The worldwide relaxation of anti-pandemic policies and post-pandemic recovery contributed to the latest rebound of global average score to 5.90. The top performers for 'economic openness' were Singapore (9.47), Hong Kong (9.28) and Finland (8.78).

A gradual downward trend in 'civil liberty' was recorded in face of repeated occasions of infringement of citizens' and reporters' rights, as well as ethnic conflicts around the world. The global score in 'civil liberty' continued to slip and reached its new bottom at 6.20. The top countries were Finland (9.72), Norway (9.62) and Sweden (9.52).

'Democratic development' also witnessed a steady deterioration around the globe. Dozens of mass protests erupted throughout the world since 2019 with varied degree of success. Some turned violent and met with crackdowns, dampening political pluralism and the democratic culture. The global average score in 'democratic development' oscillated and stayed at 5.73 in the latest round. Similar to 'civil liberty', Nordic countries performed well in this pillar. Norway (9.59), Denmark (9.45) and Sweden (9.32) were the top three in the world.

Figure 4: Global trend of pillar scores on international perception

圖4：國際評價支柱分數的全球趨勢



2.2.2. 全球趨勢

圖4顯示國際評價的全球趨勢。全球貿易和投資脫鉤，經濟同步放緩，導致「經濟開放」的評分於2019年下半年迅速滑落。因新冠疫情而實施的旅遊禁令和社交距離措施，延長了兩年間的弱勢表現。全球開始放鬆防疫措施及後疫情復甦，將全球的「經濟開放」評分推上至最近的5.90分。「經濟開放」表現最佳的是新加坡（9.47）、香港（9.28）和芬蘭（8.78）。

全球多起侵犯公民和記者權利及族裔衝突事件，導致「公民權利」的評分持續下滑，並下降至6.20分的新低。「公民權利」表現最好的國家是芬蘭（9.72）、挪威（9.62）和瑞典（9.52）。

全球「民主發展」亦持續惡化。自2019年起，大量民眾示威爆發，成效有異。部分示威涉及暴力因而受到壓制，令政治多元和民主文化受到打擊。全球的「民主發展」評分迴盪不前，最近一輪為5.73分。與「公民權利」相似，北歐國家表現突出，挪威（9.59）、丹麥（9.45）和瑞典（9.32）得分為全球最高。

2.3 重大事件 Significant events

Changes in scores in the indices are likely to be affected by significant political and other landmark events that occurred during the relevant period. Listed below are major events that occurred since the last report from January to June 2022.

Internal governance issues that are not strictly related to 1C2S appear to have important effects on evaluations of the Hong Kong public and media, but do not necessarily affect international evaluations as much. On the other hand, evaluations of international think tanks may not be free of western ideological biases against the rise of China, but they may also reflect genuine weaknesses in the implementation of 1C2S. It is important to bear these impacts in mind when reading the findings identified in this report.

報告期間發生不少政治爭議和重大事件，與「一國兩制」指數的變化有一定關係。上期報告至今，即2022年1月至6月的重大事件臚列如下。

與「一國兩制」無直接關係的內部管治問題，對香港市民和輿情的評價似乎有一定影響，但對國際評價影響不大。西方愈來愈擔心中國崛起會挑戰其優勢，所以對中國的態度由合作轉向對抗。西方智庫對「一國兩制」的評價不能完全擺脫此意識形態的轉向，但也可能反映「一國兩制」在實踐上的真正弱點。在解讀此報告的結論時，應予以考慮。




Table 4: Significant events

表4：重大事件一覽


1.4 & 6.10	Citizen News and FactWire suspended operations due to a deteriorated media environment.	眾新聞及傳真社認為香港傳媒生存環境惡化，宣布停運。
1.4, 4.6, 4.20 & 5.19	Tonyee Chow of Hong Kong Alliance in Support of Patriotic Democratic Movements of China was found guilty of inciting others to participate in unlawful assembly on June 4 in 2021. 15 people were convicted of rioting in Sheung Wan on July 28 in 2019. Tam Tak-chi of People Power was found guilty of chanting seditious slogans. The administrator of the signal group 'SUCK Channel' was found guilty of conspiring to incite others to commit illegal acts.	支聯會鄧幸彤因2021年六四集結案被控煽動他人參與非法集結罪成、十五人因「7.28」上環暴動案被控暴動罪成、人民力量譚得志於街站發表示威口號被控發表煽動文字等罪罪成、網上頻道「SUCK Channel」擁有人被判串謀煽惑他人參與暴動等罪罪成。
1.20, 1.28, 2.7 & 4.15	The Education University of Hong Kong and Hong Kong Baptist University would no longer recognize their student unions and affiliated associations. The City University of Hong Kong and the Hong Kong Polytechnic University claimed facilities of their student unions and requested relocation out of campus.	香港教育大學及香港浸會大學大學宣布不再承認學生會及其屬會地位，香港城市大學及香港理工大學收回學生會會址，要求遷出校園範圍。
1.21 & 3.1	The European Parliament passed a non-binding resolution which called for targeted sanctions against the CE and seven senior officials in Beijing and Hong Kong. This was strongly opposed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Office of the Commissioner of MFA in Hong Kong.	歐洲議會通過一項無約束力的議案，呼籲各國應對特首及其他七名京港高官實施制裁。中國外交部及外交部駐港特派員公署強烈反對歐洲議會的批評。
2.2	Ryan Thoreson, a researcher at Human Rights Watch, was expected to teach at the Faculty of Law of the University of Hong Kong but he revealed that his employment visa was denied.	獲聘於香港大學法律學院的「人權觀察」研究員Ryan Thoreson 表示來港簽證被拒。
2.17 & 3.2	Upon HKSAR government's call for assistance, the central government gathered medical experts from the Mainland to curb the pandemic in Hong Kong. The first train carrying anti-pandemic supplies reached Hong Kong.	中央政府應特區政府請求，內地第一批援港專家赴港協助抗疫，首趟援港物資鐵路列車從深圳順利抵達香港羅湖。
3.1	Paul Harris, former chairman of the Bar Association, was reported to meet with the National Security Department of HK Police before leaving Hong Kong on the same day.	前大律師公會主席夏博義被警方國安處邀約會面，即日離港。
3.14	The UK-based Hong Kong Watch was accused by the police for violating the Hong Kong National Security Law and was demanded to remove relevant webpage contents. The British government condemned such a request.	警方國安處指英國組織「香港監察」涉嫌違反《港區國安法》，要求移除相關網頁內容。英國政府表示譴責。
3.30	The Hong Kong Confederation of Trade Union failed to submit information in accordance with Societies Ordinance. The police searched three places and took away three former members to assist investigation.	職工盟涉嫌未有按《社團條例》提交資料，三處地點被警方搜查，三名前成員被帶走協助調查。
3.30	The police relaxed the entry requirement of police officers. Applicants would no longer be required to have lived in Hong Kong for at least seven years, as long as they had the right of abode in HKSAR.	警方放寬入職規定，僅要求投考人是為香港永久性居民，無須居港7年或以上。
3.30 & 3.31	Judges of the UK Supreme Court resigned as non-permanent judges of the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal. The central and HKSAR governments refuted false allegations that their resignations were related to the National Security Law, freedom of speech and political freedom.	英國最高法院正副院長辭任香港終審法院非常任法官。中央和特區政府駁斥二人辭任與《港區國安法》或言論和政治自由有關。

4.4 - 5.10	The announcement of Carrie Lam not to run for a second term followed by the resignation of John Lee, the Chief Secretary, who presented himself as the sole candidate and eventually became the next Chief Executive. The European Union and the G7 foreign ministers issued statements expressing serious concerns about the election, a statement strongly rebutted by the HKSAR government.	林鄭月娥宣布不競逐連任特首，政務司司長李家超辭職備選，其後當選成為下任特首。歐盟及G7外長嚴重關切特首選舉，被特區政府強烈駁斥。
4.11, 4.12 & 5.12	Journalist Allan Au was arrested for alleged conspiring to publish seditious materials. Many suspected this was connected with his commentaries on Stand News. Hui Po Keung, Cardinal Joseph Zen, Margaret Ng and Denise Ho, all trustees of the 612 Humanitarian Relief Fund, were arrested for collusion with foreign forces. The US State Department, the White House and the Vatican expressed concerns, while the Office of the Commissioner of MFA in Hong Kong was strongly dissatisfied with US' interference in Hong Kong affairs and China's internal affairs.	資深傳媒人區家麟涉嫌違反串謀發布煽動刊物被捕，疑與他在《立場新聞》的評論有關。「612 基金」信託人許寶強、陳日君樞機、吳靄儀及何韻詩違反串謀勾結外國勢力或者境外勢力危害國家安全罪被警方國安處拘捕。美國國務院、白宮和梵蒂岡表達關注，外交部駐港公署強烈不滿及堅決反對美國干預香港事務和中國內政。
4.13	The Home Affairs Department proposed to introduce an oath-taking arrangement for Rural Representative Elections.	民政事務總署建議在鄉郊代表選舉中引入宣誓就職安排。
4.19	Two people were given a suspended sentence of 18 months for inciting others not to vote or cast invalid vote by reposting social media posts.	二人承認在社交媒體上轉載煽惑他人在選舉投白票的帖文，被判緩刑18個月。
4.25	The Foreign Correspondents' Club in Hong Kong withheld the presentation of Human Rights Press Awards to prevent violation of law.	香港外國記者協會不希望無意中觸犯法律，決定暫停舉辦人權新聞獎。
5.20	The government amended the Social Workers Registration Ordinance. Those convicted of any offence endangering national security are no longer able to act as a registered social worker.	政府修訂《社會工作者註冊條例》，違反危害國家安全罪行，不能擔任註冊社工。
5.23	American lawyer Martin Rogers withdrew from a legal forum on the Hong Kong National Security Law. He was suspected of being pressured by foreign governments.	美國律師馬田·羅傑斯疑受外國政府壓力，退出《港區國安法》法律論壇。
5.24	Benny Tai was sentenced to 10 months in prison for illegal election spending by advertising the ThunderGo Plan in 2016.	戴耀廷於2016年刊登廣告宣傳「雷動計劃」，被控非法招致選舉開支，判監10個月。
5.26	The Hong Kong Institute of Certified Public Accountants announced that it would not renew an agreement of mutual recognition for qualifications signed with a US professional accounting body.	香港會計師公會宣布，不再延續與美國專業會計機構所簽訂的互認雙方會計師資格協議。
6.28	The HKSAR government refused some reporters to join its anniversary celebrations for official duty. Several journalist organizations criticized the arrangement for undermining the public's right to know.	個別記者被政府拒絕採訪七一回歸活動，多個新聞從業員組織批評此安排損害公眾知情權。



3. 「一國兩制」 輿情指數

3. 1C2S Mass Media Index



Media sentiment is an important factor in the formation of public opinion. We attempt to use big data techniques to measure media sentiment towards 1C2S and monitor how performance of 1C2S is covered in the mass media to provide a timely barometer of public sentiment. 1C2S MMI measures daily net sentiment of media reports. A quarterly average is reported in this section to dovetail and complement with our main Index, which is compiled biannually. The methodology is explained in Appendix I.

媒體所傳遞的情緒是形成民意的重要因素，故此，我們嘗試利用大數據技術去衡量媒體情緒，藉此透視大眾傳媒對「一國兩制」的感受及意見，編製輿論情緒對「一國兩制」的晴雨表。「一國兩制」輿情指數為每天媒體文章的情緒淨值，此章節顯示季度平均值，以配合和補充我們每半年出版的主指數。編製方法詳見附錄I。

3.1 近期趨勢 Recent trend

The latter half of 2020 was no less controversial as the much-feared National Security Law was eventually enacted and the LegCo election was postponed for a year. The argument over 'executive-led system' and 'separation of powers' caused unease among some. Such sentiment peaked when the HKSAR government announced immediate disqualification of four lawmakers following an NPCSC decision and the arrest of newspaper mogul Jimmy Lai. Notwithstanding the shock these events induced, MMI steadily rose and reached 109.7 by 2020 Q4. The rise coincided with Xi's assuring remark on the future of 1C2S in a speech he delivered for the 40th anniversary of Shenzhen SEZ as well as the inclusion of 1C2S in China's 14th Five-Year Plan and the 2035 Vision.

2020年下半年不乏爭議，廣受恐懼的《國家安全法》終於實施、立法會選舉被推遲一年、有關「行政主導」及「三權分立」的爭論等都引起了公眾的不安。不安的情緒更在特區政府宣佈人大常委會取消立法會四名議員資格以及傳媒大亨黎智英被捕後達至頂峰。儘管這些事件引起了重大的迴響，輿情指數卻穩步上升，2020年第4季時更達109.7點。升幅與習近平在深圳經濟特區成立40週年致辭中就「一國兩制」未來的發言、「一國兩制」在中國的「十四五規劃」中的「2035年遠景」中所佔位置等事件重疊。

The upward trend continued after the decision on electoral reform that foregrounded the principle of 'patriots administering Hong Kong', despite mass arrests against democrat primaries. MMI briefly went down in the first quarter as District Councillors assessed whether to resign or pledge allegiance. Nonetheless, overall sentiment has increased to 124.6 in 2021 Q2 and this appeared to coincide with an apparent adjustment of reporting style of media that used to be highly critical of 1C2S.

儘管「民主派初選」觸發大規模拘捕，彰顯「愛國者治港」原則的選舉制度改革在2021年初公布，持續輿情指數的升勢。指數在第一季短暫下降，期間區議員正考慮是否辭職或宣誓效忠。總括而言，2021年第2季的輿情指數上升至124.6點，而同期部分對「一國兩制」向來較嚴厲的媒體，於評論風格上有所調整。

The triumph of 1C2S was repeatedly applauded during CCP's 100th anniversary events, from the grand celebration to the landmark resolution on its significant achievements and historic experiences. There were high hopes for newly elected members of the Election Committee and Legislative Council, followed by Beijing's white paper on the democratic development under 1C2S that endorsed the overhaul of Hong Kong's electoral system. These official messages prevailed most news sources in 2021 Q4 and boosted MMI to 134.5.


A quiet beginning in 2022 softened the positive sentiment from the previous peak. It did not take long for the Chief Executive race to boost popularity of the incoming leadership and confidence in 1C2S during the so-called honeymoon period. Despite grave concerns expressed by G7 foreign ministers over this election, the visit of Xi Jinping for the 25th anniversary of HKSAR overwhelmed media discussion, pushing MMI to a new height to 93.5 in 2022 Q2.

從周年慶典到歷史決議，中共建黨百年華誕不停褒揚「一國兩制」的勝利。新當選的選委會成員和立法會議員被寄予厚望，隨後國新辦發布《「一國兩制」下香港的民主發展》白皮書，認同完善後的選舉制度。這類官方表述覆蓋2021年第4季大多數新聞來源，將輿情指數提高至134.5。

2022年開局平靜，新聞情緒自之前的頂峰轉弱。不久，特首選舉後的蜜月期帶起新政府的民望和對「一國兩制」的信心。雖然G7外長就是次選舉表達嚴重關注，習近平將會視察香港回歸25周年的討論佔據大部分媒體版面，輿情指數在2022年第2季上升至139.2點的新高。

Figure 5: 1C2S MMI (quarterly average)

圖5：「一國兩制」輿情指數（季度結）



3.2 傳播媒介變化 Channel variations

Figure 6 shows 1C2S MMI by media channels, namely TV and radio, newspaper and online-only media. A general pattern emerged as news reported by TV and radio were persistently more positive while online-only media were more critical. This media landscape changed during the year between the second quarters of 2019 and 2020. TV stations and radios and newspapers joined chorus of criticism towards 1C2S and produced more negative sentiment than online-only media. After this period, TV stations and radios resumed their regular reporting style. Their sentiment score grew stronger than other channels in a generally positive news event. The distinction between newspapers and online-only media, however, were less and less noticeable. The trend of sentiment generated by these two channels were often intertwined with each other.


In the recent quarter, the overall growth in 1C2S MMI was shared by all media channels. Net sentiment displayed in TV and radio increased by 16.3 points to 143.4, newspaper by 28.2 points to 135.0 and online-only media by 15.4 points to 134.5. Although there are differences in magnitude, the impact of news events on their overall trends is consistent regardless of media channels.


圖6顯示按傳播媒介劃分的「一國兩制」輿情指數，即電視電台、報紙和純網媒。普遍現象是電視電台所報道的新聞長期更正面，而純網媒則較嚴厲。這種傳媒生態於2019年第2季至2020年第2季的一年間有所改變。電視台和電台加入對「一國兩制」的集體批評，而且新聞情緒比純網媒更負面。自此之後，電視台和電台回復原先的報道風格，在較為正面的新聞事件中，情緒分數的增幅比其他媒介更強。但是，報紙和純網媒之間的差異則越來越少，這兩種媒介的情緒比過往交疊得更多。

最近季度，所有傳播媒介共同貢獻輿情指數的增長。電視電台的輿情指數上升16.3點到143.4點，報紙上升28.2點到135.0點，純網媒增加15.4點至134.5點。它們的變幅在個別新聞事件有異，但不同傳播媒介的總體趨勢基本一致。

Figure 6: 1C2S MMI (by media channels)

圖6：「一國兩制」輿情指數（按傳播媒介劃分）





4. 去激進化跡象

4. Sign of De-radicalization




Figure 7 shows the composition of Hong Kong population by political inclination. Moderates (which include centrists and those without specific political inclination) remained the largest group (71.8%), followed by non-establishment supporters (13.1%) and pro-establishment supporters (7.5%).

Over the last half year, the gap between the moderates and non-establishment supporters were steadily widening, as the two diverged from each other with a rise of 9.7 percentage points of the former and a drop of 6.5 percentage points of the latter. The gentle climb of pro-establishment supporters reversed and its size fell by 4.9 percentage points. Some pro-establishment and non-establishment supporters started to identify themselves as moderates, resulting in a driving force of political moderation.

A hopeful trend of de-radicalisation and the rise of moderation endured from mid-2017 to early 2019. The proportion of moderates and pro-establishment in the population rose while that of non-establishment supporters declined. Radicalism resurged abruptly since then leading to a reversal of trend until the political rift began to heal in early 2020. The pro-establishment camp regained supporters, while the non-establishment shrank from its peak and the moderates rebounded from its bottom.

In the latest round, moderates and non-establishment supporters continued their respective trends of rise and decline. The steadily declining population in support of political extremity pointed to a narrowing political divide and polarization. It appeared that the subsiding momentum of political controversies, such as the enactment of NSL and electoral reform, began to show in the political makeup of the population.


圖7顯示香港市民的政治傾向。溫和派繼續成為最大組別（71.8%），包括「中間派」和「沒有政治傾向」的市民。非建制派排列第二（13.1%），建制派佔最少（7.5%）。

在過去半年，溫和派及非建制派的佔比差距穩定地擴闊，前者上升9.7個百分點，而後者下降6.5個百分點。但是，建制派的上升趨勢逆轉，下跌4.9個百分點。部分建制派和非建制派開始自認為溫和派，推動政治緩和。

去激進化及溫和政治在2017年中至2019年初興起，溫和派與建制派的比例上升，而非建制派則下降。激進主義的突然冒起逆轉了形勢，直至2020年初，政治撕裂才開始癒合。建制派開始增加，而非建制派則由高峰開始收縮，溫和派也從谷底回升。

最新一輪，溫和派及非建制派維持各自的升勢及跌勢。光譜兩極的支持者下跌，政治分野和激進化有收窄的跡象。政治爭議逐步冷卻，例如《港區國安法》的實施和選舉改革，開始在市民的政治面貌中反映出來。

Figure 7: Political inclination of population
圖7：香港市民政治傾向



4.1 香港青年的去激進化 De-radicalisation of youths

Figure 8 shows the change in the composition of youths (aged 18 to 29) by political inclination. The proportion of moderates continued to rise by 4.2 percentage points to 61.3%. Non-establishment supporters were further divided into ‘democrats’ and ‘others’, which represented mostly the localist camp. Democrats fell by 1.7 percentage points to 20.7% while other non-establishment supporters rebounded by 5.1 percentage points to 16.0%. The proportion of pro-establishment fell to 0.3% by 3.2 percentage points, which was close to non-existence.


From mid-2017 to early 2019, there had been encouraging signs of de-radicalization of youths, when population of moderates was high and rising. This trend, however, was reversed as the proportion of non-establishment supporters witnessed a steep rise, surpassing moderates for some time. Furthermore, within the non-establishment group, localists overtook democrats in certain periods. Since mid-2020, the situation of radicalisation clearly eased as the proportion of localists subsided and moderates surpassed the entire non-establishment group. Nonetheless, despite some steady decline in the proportion of other non-establishment population, the sudden surge of youths identifying themselves as belonging to the localist camp is still a worrisome phenomenon.

圖8顯示青年（18至29歲）的政治傾向變化。溫和派的比例上升4.2個百分點到61.3%。非建制派可再劃分為「民主派」和「其他」，後者絕大部分為本土派。民主派下跌1.7個百分點至20.7%，而本土派則回升5.1個百分點至16.0%。建制派下跌3.2個百分點至0.3%，人數微乎其微。

由2017年中至2019年初，青年溫和派不但高企，還慢慢攀升，呈現令人鼓舞的去激進化跡象。但趨勢急速扭轉，溫和派屈居於急速增長的非建制派之後。更甚者，青年本土派在部分時期超越民主派。2020年中開始，激進化局面緩和，本土派比例下降，溫和派規模更超越整個非建制陣營。儘管其他非建制派持續下降，更多年輕人突然定位自己為本土派，情況仍然令人擔憂。

Figure 8: Political inclination of youths

圖8：青年的政治傾向



5. 2047 年後延續「一國兩制」

5. Continuation of 1C2S beyond 2047

An issue of utmost importance for the future of Hong Kong is the continuation of 1C2S beyond 2047. Table 5 shows that 75.7% agreed to the continuation of 1C2S beyond 2047, while 8.9% held an opposite view, leading to a significant increase of 13.3 percentage points in net support rate to 66.8%. An overwhelming majority of over three quarters of the respondents still regard 1C2S as the right system for Hong Kong's future.

Figure 9 shows the net support produced by respondents of different age groups. All of the age groups recorded an increase. The increase of 33.7 percentage points in the 30-30 age group was the largest and this change was statistically significant. Its net support reached 79.4%, which was the highest level since records began. Another significant increase was recorded in the 70 or above age group.

Figure 10 shows the net support produced by respondents of different political inclinations. Moderate remained as the highest group with a significant increase of 16.1 percentage points to 73.6%. Net support for non-establishment supporters increased by 6.3 percentage points to 48.5%. Net support for pro-establishment supporters fell by 7 percentage points to 46.9%.

2047年後是否繼續實行「一國兩制」乃關乎香港前途的關鍵議題。表5顯示75.7%市民同意香港應該於2047年後延續「一國兩制」，反對的下跌至8.9%，因此支持淨值最新上升13.3個百分點至66.8%，達到統計上顯著水平。超過四分之三的絕大部分市民依然相信「一國兩制」是適合香港未來的體制。

圖9顯示不同年齡組別的支持淨值變化。所有年齡組別的支持淨值均上升，30-39歲組別的支持淨值升幅更大，上升33.7個百分點至79.4%，是有記錄以來的新高，並達到統計上顯著水平。另外，70歲或以上組別的升幅亦達統計上顯著水平。

圖10顯示不同政治派別的支持度淨值變化。溫和派的支持淨值顯著上升16.1個百分點達73.6%，成為數值最高的組別。非建制派的支持淨值上升6.3個百分點至48.5%，而建制派的支持淨值則下跌7個百分點至46.9%。

Table 5: Attitudes towards the continuation of 1C2S beyond 2047

表5：2047年後香港應否繼續實行「一國兩制」

	2020.6	2021.1	2021.7	2022.1	2022.7
Should 應該	77.2%	74.1%	67.7%	67.4%	75.7%
Should not 不應該	11.3%	14.3%	18.4%	13.9%	8.9%
Don't know 唔知道	11.5%	11.6%	14.0%	2.4%	11.5%
Net value 淨值	65.9%	59.9%	49.3%	53.5%	66.8% *

Net value: Percent who chose 'Should' / less percent who chose 'Should Not'

淨值：認為「應該」的百分比減去認為「不應該」的百分比

Figure 9: Net support for continuation of 1C2S (by age group)

圖9：繼續實行「一國兩制」的支持度淨值（按年齡組別劃分）





Figure 10: Net support for continuation of 1C2S (by political inclination)

圖10：繼續實行「一國兩制」的支持度淨值（按政治傾向劃分）



5.1 2047 年後繼續實行「一國兩制」的有利條件 Favourable conditions to the continuation of 1C2S beyond 2047

If respondents agreed to the continuation of 1C2S after 2017, they were then asked to choose what conditions would be favourable to the continuation of 1C2S from the following list (they were allowed to choose more than one item):

- Maintaining a high degree of autonomy;
- Maintaining economic prosperity and stability;
- Political system democratises further;
- Maintaining national security; and
- Others (please specify).

如果受訪者同意於2047年後繼續實行「一國兩制」，他們會進一步被邀從下列清單中選出有利於2047年後繼續實行「一國兩制」的條件（可選擇多於一項）：

- 維持高度自治；
- 經濟維持繁榮穩定；
- 政制進一步民主化；
- 維持國家安全；及
- 其他（請註明）。

Figure 11 shows the percentages of respondents who chose each of the five conditions. Overall, 'maintaining economic prosperity and stability' (64.2%) overtook 'maintaining a high degree of autonomy' (62.8%) and considered the most important condition. 'Political system democratises further' continued its downward trend and fell further by 5.2 percentage points when compared to the last round (35.7%). 'Maintaining national security' (21.4%) reversed its three-year climb and fell slightly by 2.7 percentage points.

圖11顯示受訪者可選的五項因素所佔的比例。「經濟維持繁榮穩定」（64.2%）超越「維持高度自治」（62.8%），被認為首要選項。「政制進一步民主化」繼續下跌5.2個百分點（35.7%），「維護國家安全」（21.4%）逆轉連續三年的升勢，輕微下跌2.7個百分點。

Figure 11: Favourable conditions for the continuation of 1C2S beyond 2047

圖11：2047年後繼續實行「一國兩制」的有利條件




Figure 12 shows how the patterns of choice and their stark contrast differed by political inclination. Moderates viewed 'maintaining economic prosperity and stability' and 'maintaining a high degree of autonomy' as almost equally important. Pro-establishment supporters pursued the former above every other choice. Non-establishment supporters shared moderates' view by ranking the latter as a key condition but also placed similar emphasis to 'political system democratises further'.

For pro-establishment supporters, 'maintaining national security' continued to rise by 4.2 percentage points to a record high (50.8%). Other conditions fell, including 'maintaining economic prosperity and stability' (74.5%) by 6.7 percentage points and 'maintaining a high degree of autonomy' (33.8%) by 7.4 percentage points.

Moderates' view remained largely stable. The only increase recorded was the slight rise of 3.6 percentage points in 'maintaining economic prosperity and stability' (66.4%) which surpassed 'maintaining a high degree of autonomy' (64.3%) and ranked first.

The non-establishment supporters preserved the same view on 'maintaining a high degree of autonomy' (78.4%) with no change compared to last round. The shares for 'political system democratises further' (63.7%) and 'maintaining economic prosperity and stability' (46.4%) fell drastically by 6.7 and 3.6 percentage points respectively.

圖12按政治傾向顯示市民選擇各條件的比例，他們的差異鮮明。溫和派認為「經濟維持繁榮穩定」和「維持高度自治」同等重要。建制派堅持「經濟維持繁榮穩定」，重要程度凌駕於其他因素。非建制派與溫和派同樣認為「維持高度自治」重要，但亦重視「政制進一步民主化」。


建制派對「維持國家安全」的重視程度繼續上升，上升4.2個百分點至記錄高位（50.8%）。其他因素下跌，包括「經濟維持繁榮穩定」下跌6.7個百分點（74.5%）和「維持高度自治」下跌7.4個百分點（33.8%）。


溫和派對上述五項條件的評價保持原有觀點，只有「經濟維持繁榮穩定」輕微上升 3.6 個百分點（66.4%），超越了「維持高度自治」（64.3%），排名第一。

與上輪相比，非建制派對「維持高度自治」的意見平穩（78.4%）。「政制進一步民主化」（63.7%）和「維持高度自治」（46.4%）分別大幅度下跌 6.7 和 3.6 個百分點。

Figure 12: Favourable conditions for the continuation of 1C2S beyond 2047 (by political inclination)


圖12：有利於2047年後繼續實行「一國兩制」的條件（按政治傾向劃分）





6. 市民的身分認同

6. Citizens' Identity



We also surveyed how citizens identify themselves: whether as Hongkongers or Chinese. Figure 13 shows members of the public continued to identify themselves much more strongly as Hongkongers than as Chinese. The scores for these identities started to reconverge after a period of parallel increase and opposing movements. In the latest round, the divide between them narrowed as ratings for Hongkongers and Chinese rose by 1.9% to 7.99 and increased by 15.7% to 6.47 respectively. The change for the Chinese identity was statistically significant.

The extent to which the public identified themselves as Hongkongers and Chinese can be better demonstrated by Figure 14, a graph mapping the mix of identities rated by respondents against time. On a 0 to 10 scale, the median score of 5 indicates a moderate level of identification. Ratings that are higher than the median indicate relatively strong identification; ratings that are lower than the median indicate relatively weak identification. These levels of strength can be grouped into four categories, dual identity (strong in both identifications), stronger identification as Hongkongers only, stronger identification as Chinese only, and others which include those without a dominant identity.

Earlier surveys showed a clear pattern that most Hong Kong citizens are typically cognizant of their dual identity as both Hongkongers and Chinese. This had gradually changed since mid-2019 and rebounded after hitting rock bottom in mid-2020. Dual identity became the dominant identity again by overtaking 'Hongkonger only' since last round. A further increase of 15.2 percentage points was recorded in this round resulting in the latest reading of 60.7%.

Identification as Chinese may not be the same as patriotic, but identification as both Hongkongers and Chinese is a pre-requisite for 'devotion to China and Hong Kong'. The fact that the proportion of Hong Kong people with dual identity is continuing to rebound after months of sharp decline since December 2018 suggests easing societal tension that would doubtlessly be beneficial to the implementation of 1C2S. We have not overlooked a possibility that current persistent international condemnation of China also has an impact on how Hongkongers look at themselves. The importance or otherwise of this will hopefully become clearer in time.

我們分別詢問市民對香港人及中國人身分的認同程度。圖13顯示市民繼續對香港人的認同強於中國人，經過一段時間的同步增強和反向而行後，兩種身分認同開始匯合。最新一輪結果顯示兩種身分的分野縮小，香港人及中國人分別上升1.9%至7.99分及上升15.7%至6.47分，後者的變幅達統計上顯著水平。


圖14更清晰地呈現市民對兩種身分的認同程度。按0分至10分的尺度，中位數為5，代表中等認同。高於中位數代表較強認同，低於則代表較弱認同。對兩種身分不同程度的認同可歸為四類：雙重身分（對兩種身分均擁有較強認同）、只對香港人身分有較強認同、只對中國人身分有較強認同，以及包括沒有主要身分的其他身分認同。

香港市民普遍擁有香港人和中國人雙重身分認同，情況自2019年起逐步轉變，從2020年中起重新反彈。雙重身分重新變成香港市民身分認同的主流，自上輪起其比例超過「只有香港人」。是次調查中，雙重身分的比例上升了15.2個百分點至60.7%。

認同「中國人」身分未必等於「愛國」，不過同時認同「中國人」及「香港人」兩種身分卻是「愛國愛港」的先決條件。市民的雙重認同自2018年12月後下跌，現時續漸回升；顯示社會緊張慢慢的放緩無疑地會對有利實施「一國兩制」。現在，國際社會對中國口誅筆伐，對塑造香港人自我認同的作用不能忽略，其影響力需時瞭解。

Figure 13: Citizens' identity mix


圖13：市民的混合身分認同



	Scores 評分	Changes 變化
Hongkonger 香港人	7.99	+0.15 (↑ 1.9%)
Chinese 中國人	6.47	+0.88 (↑ 15.7%) *

Figure 14: Citizens' identity mix

圖14：市民的混合身分認同



	Share 佔比	Changes 變化
Dual identity 雙重認同	60.7%	(↑ 15.2%)
Hongkonger only 只有香港人	25.8%	(↓ 10.3%)
Chinese only 只有中國人	1.9%	(↓ 3.8%)
Others 其他	11.5%	(↓ 1.3%)

6.1 等級相關係數
Rank correlation


Statistical analysis yields the observation that there was a positive correlation between identification as a Hongkonger and a Chinese, suggesting that the more strongly one identified with Hong Kong, the more strongly one identified with China. The converse also held as the rank correlation coefficient was 0.430 and was statistically very significant. The finding that the two identities as 'Hongkongers' and 'Chinese ' were mutually reinforcing each other and again provided a strong basis for the implementation of 1C2S.

統計分析發現市民對香港人及中國人身分認同呈現正相關，即越認同香港人身分的市民亦越認同中國人身分，反之亦然。等級相關係數為0.430，統計上非常顯著。結果證實香港人及中國人身分認同相輔相成，是落實「一國兩制」的有利條件。

Table 6: Rank correlation of citizens' identity
表6：市民的身分認同等級相關係數


	2020.6	2021.1	2021.7	2022.1	2022.7
Correlation 相關係數	-0.059	-0.068	-0.027	0.141	0.430
t-statistic t 檢定統計	-1.82	-2.26	-0.83	4.39	14.25





7. 熱門議題

7. Topical Issues



7.1 出現矛盾的責任

Responsibility of conflicts

Table 7 shows allocation of blame between Mainland and Hong Kong when conflicts arise in the implementation of 1C2S. 21.2% of the public suggested that Mainland would be responsible while 15.8% assigned the responsibility to Hong Kong. There were more people attributing equal responsibility to both Hong Kong and Mainland, as the latest round recorded a rise of 8.9 percentage points to 52.3%. The tendency of blaming only Mainland continued to subside in this round and the decrease in net value was statistically significant.

表7顯示當實踐「一國兩制」出現矛盾時，市民認為應歸咎責任予內地或香港。21.2%市民認為責任屬於內地，15.8%則認為責任屬於香港。選擇「一半半」的人數稍微上升，在最新一輪調查中錄得8.9個百分點的升幅至52.3%。將矛盾責任歸咎於內地的傾向在本輪調查維持跌勢，淨值的降幅達統計上顯著水平。

Table 7: Responsibility for conflicts

表7：出現矛盾時的責任

	2020.6	2021.1	2021.7	2022.1	2022.7
The Mainland 內地	50.1%	46.6%	40.2%	30.8%	21.2%
Hong Kong 香港	8.3%	14.2%	18.5%	19.0%	15.8%
Equally Responsible 一半半	35.7%	34.2%	37.7%	43.4%	52.3%
Don't Know 唔知道	5.8%	5.0%	3.6%	6.8%	10.7%
Net Value 淨值	41.8%	32.4%	21.6%	11.9%	5.4% *

Net Value: Percent who chose 'The Mainland' less percent who chose 'Hong Kong'. Higher (lower) value means greater responsibility lies with the Mainland (Hong Kong)

淨值：認為屬「內地」的百分比減去認為屬「香港」的百分比，比例越高代表內地（香港）需負較大責任

7.2 移民海外 Emigration

Table 8 shows public's emigration plans. Those who had 'no plans' to emigrate remained the majority (74.4%), exceeding those who 'have plans' (15.8%). The two groups recorded an increase of 8.7 percentage point and a drop of 7.2 percentage point respectively. As a result, the net value experienced a fall of 15.9 percentage points since last round to -58.6%. The change of net value was statistically significant.

Figure 15 and Figure 16 show the net value of different age groups and political inclinations who planned to emigrate respectively. Net values of all age groups fell. Only changes in the 40-49, 50-59 and 60-69 age groups were statistically significant. The decline in their net value were 21.1 percentage points to -58.9%, 26.8 percentage points to -65.7% and 11.4 percentage points to -77.9% respectively.

Expectedly, non-establishment supporters were more likely to have plans to emigrate than respondents of other political inclinations. Their net value of 15.8% rose by 18.7 percentage points and was statistically significant. For moderates, the net value decreased by a statistically significant level of 23.1 percentage points to -70.8%.

Past studies have suggested that surveys often inaccurately amplify the number of individuals who seek to emigrate, for only a fraction of those who express interest in emigrating eventually do so in reality. Caution should therefore be exercised in interpreting the above findings, though they still provide valuable references of degree and extent of concern. The laxing of immigration requirements by 'popular' countries in response to the implementation of the Hong Kong National Security Law might also mean that plans to emigrate might not necessarily be induced by a lack of confidence in 1C2S or the socio-political situation of Hong Kong but simply seen as 'opportunities not to be missed' by those who had wanted to immigrate in any event.

表8顯示市民的移民計劃。「無打算」移民的人數（74.4%）遠遠拋離「有打算」者（15.8%），兩者分別錄得8.7個百分點升幅及7.2個百分點跌幅。比較上一輪調查，淨值下降15.9個百分點至-58.6%，變化達統計上顯著水平。

圖15和圖16分別顯示按年齡組別及政治派別劃分的市民移民計劃的百分比。所有年齡組別的淨值也下降，只有40-49歲、50-59歲和60-69歲的改變達統計上顯著水平。他們的淨值跌幅為21.1個百分點至-58.9%、26.8個百分點至-65.7%和11.4個百分點至-77.9%。

一如預期，非建制派比其他派別更有計劃移民。該組別的移民淨值為15.8%，上升18.7個百分點。溫和派的移民淨值下跌23.1個百分點至-70.8%，變幅達到統計上顯著水平。

根據過往研究，在民調中聲稱移民的人數，往往遠超真正移民的人數。民調結果雖有一定參考價值，但要小心解讀。溫和派聲稱無信心而計劃移民，一方面可能是對中央政府及建制派不滿，另一方面亦可能是擔心非建制派破壞社會穩定，例如覺得激進政治將會損害香港法治及經濟，兩種可能性皆不能排除。除此之外，就《港區國安法》的實施，多國以放寬移民門檻向北京施壓，不能排除有人視之為不能缺失的機會，並不一定是對「一國兩制」失去信心的表現。

Table 8: Public's emigration plans

表8：市民移民海外的計劃

	2020.6	2021.1	2021.7	2022.1	2022.7
Have Plans 有打算	34.5%	32.7%	32.9%	23.0%	15.8%
No Plans 無打算	62.5%	61.1%	58.4%	65.7%	74.4%
Don't Know 唔知道	3.0%	6.2%	8.7%	11.3%	9.8%
Net Value 淨值	-28.0%	-28.4%	-25.5%	-42.7%	-58.6%

*

Net Value: Percent who chose 'Have Plans' less percent who chose 'No Plans'
淨值：認為「有打算」的百分比減去認為「無打算」的百分比

Figure 15: Public's emigration plans (by age group)

圖15：市民移民海外的計劃（按年齡組別劃分）





Figure 16: Public's emigration plans (by political inclination)

圖16：市民移民海外的計劃（按政治傾向劃分）



7.3 前往粵港澳大灣區其他城市居住或發展的意願 Willingness of living or working in other cities of Greater Bay Area (GBA)

Table 9 shows willingness of living or working in other cities of GBA. The proportion for those who were 'willing' to live or work in GBA was 4.5% and those 'unwilling' was 69.6%, leading to a decrease in net willingness by 4.3 percentage points to -65.2%.

Figure 17 and Figure 18 show the willingness of living or working in other cities of GBA by age group and by political inclination respectively. Net willingness of youths (aged 18 to 29) decreased by 11.7 percentage points to -80.7% at a statistically significant level. All other groups also fell, except for the 30-39 age group which rose slightly by 2.0 percentage points to -67.1%.

The net value of non-establishment supporters rose to -85.9% by 5.4 percentage points, while the net value of moderates fell to -66.8% by 11.0 percentage points. Both changes were statistically significant.

表9顯示受訪者前往大灣區居住或工作的意願。願意前往大灣區的受訪者有4.5%，不願意的則有69.6%，導致淨值下跌4.3個百分點到-65.2%。

圖17和圖18分別顯示按不同年齡組別和政治傾向劃分的北上大灣區居住或發展的意願。青年（18至29歲）的意願淨值下跌11.7個百分點至-80.7%，達統計上顯著水平。其他組別亦下降，除了30-39歲組別的淨值上升2.0個百分點至-67.1%。

非建制派的淨值上升5.4個百分點至-85.9%，而溫和派的淨值下跌11.0個百分點至-66.8%。這兩組的改變是達至統計上顯著水平。

Table 9: Willingness of living or working in other cities of Greater Bay Area (GBA)

表9：前往粵港澳大灣區居住或發展的意願

	2020.6	2021.1	2021.7	2022.1	2022.7
Willing 會考慮	11.9%	8.2%	7.0%	5.6%	4.5%
Not willing 不會考慮	72.6%	67.8%	68.6%	66.5%	69.6%
Maybe / Don't Know 或者 / 唔知道	15.6%	24.0%	24.4%	27.9%	25.9%
Net Value 淨值	-60.7%	-59.6%	-61.6%	-60.9%	-65.2%

Net Value: Percent who chose 'Willing' less Percent who chose 'Not willing'

淨值：「會考慮」的百分比減去「不會考慮」的百分比

Figure 17: Willingness of living or working in GBA (by age group)

圖17：前往粵港澳大灣區居住或發展的意願（按年齡組別劃分）






Figure 18: Willingness of living or working in GBA (by political inclination)
圖18：前往粵港澳大灣區居住或發展的意願（按政治傾向劃分）



7.4 對香港教育制度的信心 Confidence in the education system of Hong Kong

Table 10 shows the level of confidence the public displayed in relation to the education system of Hong Kong. Respondents showing confidence in the education system of Hong Kong rose by 8.0 percentage points to 26.7%. Those opted for the opposite dropped sharply by 27.2 percentage points to 40.6%. These changes were statistically significant, leading to an increase of 35.3 percentage points in net value to -13.9%.

表10顯示市民對香港教育制度的信心。對教育制度有信心的受訪者增加8.0個百分點至26.7%，無信心的下跌27.2個百分點至40.6%。淨值增加了35.3個百分點到-13.9%，變幅達統計上顯著水平。

Table 10: Confidence in the education system of Hong Kong

表10：對香港教育制度的信心

	2021.7	2022.1	2022.7
Confident 有信心	14.6%	18.7%	26.7%
Not Confident 無信心	74.8%	67.8%	40.6%
Unchanged 沒有改變	7.9%	11.3%	29.5%
Don't know / Difficult to say 唔知道 / 好難講	2.7%	2.2%	3.2%
Net Value 淨值	-60.1%	-49.2%	-13.9% *

Net value: Percent who chose 'Confident' less percent who chose 'Not Confident'
淨值：「有信心」的百分比減去「無信心」的百分比

7.5 對公務員服務水平的滿意度 Satisfaction with the performance of civil service

Table 11 shows the level of satisfaction the respondents demonstrated in the performance of civil service. Respondents who were satisfied with the performance rose to 42.6%. Those who were dissatisfied reduced sharply by 19.4 percentage points to 29.8%. These changes led to a massive increase of 35.8 percentage points in net value to 12.8% and it was the first time reaching a positive figure with statistically significance.

表11顯示受訪者對公務員服務水平的滿意度。表示滿意的受訪者上升至42.6%。不滿意的受訪者大幅下降19.4個百分點至29.8%。因此，淨值大幅增加35.8個百分點至12.8%，這是淨值第一次轉為正數，亦達至統計上顯著水平。

Table 11: Level of satisfaction in the performance of civil service

表11：對公務員服務水平的滿意度

	2021.7	2022.1	2022.7
Satisfied 滿意	26.2%	26.2%	42.6%
Dissatisfied 不滿意	52.7%	49.2%	29.8%
Half-half 一半半	19.9%	21.7%	25.8%
Don't know / Difficult to say 唔知道 / 好難講	1.2%	3.0%	1.7%
Net Value 淨值	-26.5%	-23.0%	12.8% *

Net value: Percent who chose 'Satisfied' less percent who chose 'Dissatisfied'
淨值：「滿意」的百分比減去「不滿意」的百分比

7.6 近期政治爭議 Recent political controversies

7.6.1. Consideration of political reform

Table 12 shows the public's consideration of political reform after the implementation of the national security law and new electoral system. More than one-third of respondents agreed that the political reform should be considered (37.5%). Yet, the shares of respondents who disagreed (31.4%) and didn't know (31.2%) were very similar. As a result, the net value was 6.1%.

7.6.1. 考慮政改

表12顯示市民對香港應否在落實《國安法》和實施新選舉制度後考慮政改的反應。多於三分之一的受訪者認同應該考慮政改（37.5%）。同時，不認同應該考慮政改（31.4%）和表示不知道的受訪者（31.2%）佔的比例相當接近。因此，淨值為6.1%。

Table 12: Consideration of political reform after the implementation of the National Security Law and new electoral system

表12：在落實《國安法》和實施新選舉制度後考慮政改

	All Respondents 所有受訪者
Should 應該	37.5%
Should not 不應該	31.4%
Don't know 不知道	31.2%
Net Value 淨值	6.1%

Net value: Percent who chose 'Should' less percent who chose 'Should not'
淨值：「應該」的百分比減去「不應該」的百分比

7.6.2. Impact of National Security Law on 1C2S

Table 13 shows the perceived impact of National Security Law on 1C2S after two years of implementation. More respondents (40.0%) believed that it would bring a negative impact than a positive impact (24.7%). But the gap was narrowed compared with January 2021. At the same time, 20.1% of respondents deemed that there would have no impact. Together, the net value was recorded at -15.3%.

7.6.2. 落實《國安法》對「一國兩制」的影響

表13顯示市民對落實《國安法》對「一國兩制」的影響。更多的受訪者認為這會帶來負面影響（40.0%）多於正面影響（24.7%）。與2021年1月比較，兩者差距收窄。同時，20.1%的受訪者認為沒有影響。支持淨值為-15.3%。

Table 13: Impact of the National Security Law on 1C2S

表13：《國安法》對「一國兩制」的影響

	2021.1	2021.7	2022.7
Positive impact 正面影響	17.3%	21.4%	24.7%
Negative impact 負面影響	62.3%	58.4%	40.0%
No impact 沒有影響	14.8%	13.5%	20.1%
Don't know / Difficult to say 唔知道 / 好難講	5.7%	6.7%	15.2%
Net Value 淨值	-45.0%	-37.0%	-15.3%

Net value: Percent who chose 'Positive impact' less percent who chose 'Negative impact'
淨值：「正面影響」的百分比減去「負面影響」的百分比

7.6.3. Generation gap and political divide

Table 14 and Table 15 are summaries of the net values generated from questions about selected political controversies, further categorized by age and political inclination.

There were unambiguous patterns in how respondents of different age and political inclinations react to these controversial events. Generally, the net values increase with age and decrease as the political inclination move away from the pro-establishment end. For instance, the 18-29 age group and non-establishment supporters were the most critical about the political controversies while pro-establishment supporters tended to produce the highest net values, often the only positive net values in any category.

Taking the extreme views displayed by different political camps into accounts, the stance of moderates is of value as reference points signalling the general public's opinions towards the topical issues. As for this round, moderates' view towards the impact of the National Security Law was again independent from the pro-establishment and non-establishment camps, suggesting rationality and pragmatism were rooted in the Hong Kong community.

Table 14: Generation gap over selected political controversies (by age group)

表14：對選定政治爭議之代溝（按年齡劃分）

	National Security Law 《港區國安法》 (2021.1)	National Security Law 《港區國安法》 (2021.7)	Improvement of Electoral System 完善選舉制度 (2021.7)	LegCo Election 立法會選舉 (2022.1)	National Security Law 《港區國安法》 (2022.7)
18-29	-77.1%	-73.5%	-73.5%	-50.9%	-64.1%
30-39	-53.4%	-56.4%	-52.5%	-52.4%	-42.9%
40-49	-50.4%	-39.2%	-45.9%	-26.2%	-24.7%
50-59	-40.3%	-29.9%	-25.8%	-15.6%	-4.3%
60-69	-28.3%	-12.6%	-18.1%	-4.0%	15.2%
≥ 70	-21.3%	-12.6%	-14.5%	11.4%	18.5%
All respondents 所有受訪者	-45.0%	-37.0%	-38.1%	-22.2%	-15.3%

Table 15: Political divide over selected political controversies (by political inclination)

表15：對選定政治爭議之政治鴻溝（按政治傾向劃分）

	National Security Law 《港區國安法》 (2021.1)	National Security Law 《港區國安法》 (2021.7)	Improvement of Electoral System 完善選舉制度 (2021.7)	LegCo Election 立法會選舉 (2022.1)	National Security Law 《港區國安法》 (2022.7)
Pro-establishment 建制派	56.3%	56.3%	52.8%	63.8%	80.5%
Moderates 溫和派	-29.2%	-29.2%	-28.9%	-19.1%	-13.0%
Non-establishment 非建制派	-84.9%	-84.9%	-87.8%	-81.9%	-88.2%
All respondents 所有受訪者	-38.1%	-37.0%	-38.1%	-22.2%	-15.3%

7.6.3. 代溝與政治鴻溝


表 14及表 15總結市民對近期政治爭議的淨值，並按年齡及政治傾向劃分。

受訪者的年齡及政治傾向對於爭議事件的取態有明確關係。一般而言，淨值隨年齡增長而上升，並隨政治傾向偏離建制派而下降。例如，18-29歲組別及非建制派對政治爭議評價尤其負面。建制派通常給予最高淨值，有時更是所有組別中唯一的正值。

有別於其他政治派別的極端觀點，溫和派在這些熱點問題上的立場甚具參考價值，表明公眾的看法。就今輪而言，溫和派對《國安法》的看法有別於建制派與非建制派，反映社會仍有理性務實的聲音。


附錄 Appendix





I. 編製方法

I. Methodology



1. 編製「一國兩制」指數

1. Construction of 1C2S Index

We construct a conceptual framework to capture the current situation of 1C2S through 3 pillars based on public opinion and 3 pillars based on international perception. The 3 pillars on public opinion are Hong Kong public's evaluation compiled from telephone polls on the implementation of 1C2S. The 3 pillars on international perception are compiled from relevant indices produced by international think tanks on the state of freedom and democracy in the world. Each pillar has 4 sub-pillars. As such, we create a measurement system comprising 6 pillars and 24 sub-pillars. An equal weight is given to sub-pillars to produce a pillar score. The 1C2S Index is the simple average of all 6 pillar scores. Table 16 below lists out the 6 pillars and 24 sub-pillars used in our index.

我們建構一個觀念框架以量度香港實踐「一國兩制」的情況，基於民意調查的3項支柱及國際評價的3項支柱。民意調查的3項支柱是取自香港市民在電話調查中對落實「一國兩制」的評分。國際評價的3項支柱取自國際智庫就全球自由和民主狀況而製作的相關指數。每項支柱各設4項子支柱，使此指標體系共6項支柱和24項子支柱。每項子支柱賦予均等權重，以計算支柱的分數。「一國兩制」指數是6項支柱的簡單平均分數。表 16列出指數所使用的6項支柱和24項子支柱。



Table 16: Pillars and sub-pillars of 1C2S Index

表16：「一國兩制」指數的支柱和子支柱

Pillar 支柱	Sub-pillar 子支柱
Public Opinion 民意調查	A1. Self-conduct of administrative affairs 自行處理行政事務
	A2. Independent judiciary 獨立司法權
	A3. Independent legislature 獨立立法權
	A4. 'Hong Kong people administering Hong Kong' 「港人治港」
	B1. Original ways of life 原有生活方式
	B2. Freedom of speech, association and assembly 言論、結社和集會自由
	B3. Democratic development 民主發展
	B4. Equal protection of the Law 法律平等保護
	C1. Resolving differences via dialogue and negotiation 對話協商解決矛盾
International Perception 國際評價	C2. Safeguarding national sovereignty, security & development interests 維護國家主權、安全和發展利益
	C3. Maintaining long-term prosperity and stability 維持長期繁榮穩定
	C4. Full implementation of 1C2S in the future 未來全面落實「一國兩制」
	D1. Business environment 營商環境
	D2. Market access 市場門檻
	D3. Regulatory quality 監管質素
	D4. Financial stability 金融穩定
	E1. Rule of law 法治
	E2. Security and safety 安全
	E3. Expression, association and assembly 表達、結社與集會
	E4. Individual rights 個人權利
	F1. Constraints on power 權利制約
	F2. Political pluralism 政治多元
	F3. Civic participation 公民參與
	F4. Democratic culture 民主文化

1.1. Public Opinion

We obtain 3 pillar and 12 sub-pillar scores on the implementation of 1C2S from our telephone polls conducted by the Hong Kong Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies of the Chinese University of Hong Kong. Every sub-pillar is represented by one survey question. Table 17 shows the survey questions asked to obtain the sub-pillar scores.

Each round, about 1,000 individuals will be randomly sampled by the CATI (computer-assisted telephone interviewing) system. All of the respondents aged 18 or above and spoke either Cantonese or Mandarin. To better represent the distribution of the Hong Kong population, all data are weighted by the proportion of gender and age of people aged 18 or above (excluding foreign domestic helpers) according to the Census and Statistics Department.

Table 18 shows the statistical and scientific standards of each survey. The telephone surveys have started to employ a dual-frame sampling design since 2021 H1. It randomly selects phone numbers from a combined sample of residential landline and mobile phone numbers. Given many individuals may own both landline and mobile phone numbers, additional steps are taken in the weighting method to avoid estimation inaccuracy caused by double-counting or other unknown factors. The calculations are detailed in the below sub-section.

In the telephone polls, many questions employed 1 to 7 as the rating scale in the survey process, with 4 as the median. This scale, which is known as the Likert scale, is commonly adopted for psychological assessments. This scale is used instead of a 0 to 10 scale as the latter is deemed too finely graduated and cumbersome for respondents to choose from. However, to better conform to existing indices – which tend to be expressed on a 0 to 10 scale (with 5 as the median) – we converted the results mathematically into the popular 0 to 10 scale.

1.1. 民意調查

我們委託香港中文大學香港亞太研究所進行電話調查，以整合市民對落實「一國兩制」的3項支柱和12項子支柱評分。每一條問卷問題代表一項子支柱。表17顯示每項子支柱相應的問卷問題。

每輪的電話調查會以電腦輔助電話訪問系統，隨機抽樣，訪問大約1,000人，全部皆屬18歲或以上，能操廣東話或普通話。進行分析時，數據依照香港政府統計處的18歲或以上性別及年齡分佈（扣除外籍家庭傭工）作加權處理，以更符合香港人口分佈的真實情況。

表18每輪電話調查的統計和科學標準。電話調查部分於2021上半年起採用雙框抽樣設計，從家居固網電話號碼及流動電話號碼的結合樣本群中隨機抽取號碼。由於大部分人同時擁有家居固網電話號碼及流動電話號碼，為免重複計算或其他不明原因帶來的估算偏差，加權的計算方法將於下一個章節詳細解釋。

電話調查中，多數題目採用1至7分的評分尺度，以4分為中位數。這是心理學常用的科學尺度，稱為李克特量尺。現時編製指數常採用0至10分的尺度，其實分類過於細緻，令市民難以選擇。不過為了與現行指數匹配，是以我們利用數學方法將調查結果轉換成為常見的0至10分尺度（以5分為中位數）。

Table 17: Questions on public opinion

表17：民意調查問題

Sub-pillar 子支柱	Survey Question 民調問題
A1 'After the handover, Hong Kong has been able to practice a high degree of autonomy, and has been able to handle its own internal administrative affairs. To what extent would you agree?'	「回歸之後，香港實行到高度自治，自行處理特區內嘅行政事務。你有幾同意呢？」
A2 'After the handover, Hong Kong has been able to maintain independent judiciary powers. To what extent would you agree?'	「回歸之後，香港繼續保持到獨立嘅司法權。你有幾同意呢？」
A3 'After the handover, Hong Kong has been able to maintain independent legislative powers. To what extent would you agree?'	「回歸之後，香港繼續保持到獨立嘅立法權。你有幾同意呢？」
A4 'How successful has the practice of "Hong Kong people administering Hong Kong" been?'	「整體嚟講，你認為落實『港人治港』有幾成功呢？」
B1 'After the handover, the original ways of life of the Hong Kong people have maintained. To what extent would you agree?'	「回歸之後，香港人繼續維持原有嘅生活方式。你有幾同意呢？」
B2 'After the handover, Hong Kong continues to enjoy the freedoms of speech, association and assembly. To what extent would you agree?'	「回歸之後，香港繼續享有言論、結社同集會自由。你有幾同意呢？」
B3 'After the handover, the development of Hong Kong's democratic system has been progressively implemented, following the provision of the Basic Law. To what extent would you agree?'	「回歸之後，香港嘅民主政制發展，正係按照基本法嘅規定，循序漸進地落實。你有幾同意呢？」
B4 'After the handover, people in Hong Kong continue to be protected by the Law regardless of their economic capabilities, identities and social classes. To what extent would you agree?'	「回歸之後，香港人不論經濟能力、身份同社會地位都能夠得到法律保護。你有幾同意呢？」
C1 'When conflicts between mainland China and Hong Kong arise, how confident are you that the conflicts can be resolved through consultation and dialogue?'	「對於當內地同香港出現嘅矛盾時，兩地可透過對話協商得以解決，你有幾大信心呢？」
C2 'After the handover, Hong Kong is able to safeguard national sovereignty, security and development interests. To what extent would you agree?'	「回歸之後，香港可以做到維護國家主權、安全和發展利益。你有幾同意呢？」
C3 'After the handover, Hong Kong is able to maintain long-term prosperity and stability. To what extent would you agree?'	「回歸之後，香港能夠維持到長期繁榮穩定。你有幾同意呢？」
C4 'How confident are you in the full implementation of "One Country, Two Systems" in Hong Kong in the future (before 2047)?'	「你有幾大信心香港嚟未來（即2047年前）能全面落實『一國兩制』呢？」

Table 18: Survey details

表18：調查概況

Round 輪次	Survey Period 調查日期	Number of Respondents 受訪人數			Response Rates 回應率		Confidence Level 置信水平	Sampling Error 抽樣誤差
		Landline 固網	Mobile 手機	Total 總數	Landline 固網	Mobile 手機		
2017 H1	5.23 - 6.3	1,002	-	1,002	36.8%	-	95.0%	±3.10%
2017 H2	12.11 - 12.23	1,006	-	1,006	39.5%	-	95.0%	±3.09%
2018 H1	5.23 - 6.2	1,004	-	1,004	37.2%	-	95.0%	±3.09%
2018 H2	12.3 - 12.12	1,001	-	1,001	38.8%	-	95.0%	±3.10%
2019 H1	5.27 - 6.6	1,002	-	1,002	38.0%	-	95.0%	±3.10%
*	7.24 - 8.7	1,001	-	1,001	39.5%	-	95.0%	±3.10%
*	10.17 - 10.31	1,002	-	1,002	38.0%	-	95.0%	±3.09%
2019 H2	12.10 - 12.20	1,000	-	1,000	40.8%	-	95.0%	±3.10%
2020 H1	6.9 - 6.29	1,001	-	1,001	39.5%	-	95.0%	±3.10%
2020 H2	12.22 - 1.13	1,002	-	1,002	32.5%	-	95.0%	±3.10%
2021 H1	6.21 - 7.9	498	503	1,001	30.9%	31.4%	95.0%	±3.10%
2021 H2	12.20 - 1.10	497	506	1,003	30.6%	30.0%	95.0%	±3.09%
2022 H1	6.23 - 7.11	481	521	1,002	26.9%	28.2%	95.0%	±3.10%

Note: '*' denotes surveys conducted in addition to the biannual exercise.

註：「*」為半年調查的額外輪次。

1.1.1. Weighting method for dual-frame sampling

In dual-frame sampling, weighting adjustments are made for the ownership of phone numbers in addition to the distribution of the Hong Kong population. Since each individual owns a different amount of landline and mobile numbers, each has a different probability of selection as respondents. To eliminate over-representation of any individual, the first weight factor (WT1) approximates the probability of selection for each respondent. It is a ratio of the amount of landline and mobile numbers owned by a respondent to the total number of those in the territory. WT1i is calculated by the inverse of probability of selection of individual i , i.e. $WT1i = \pi_i^{-1}$.

1.1.1. 框電話號碼取樣的加權方法

在雙框電話號碼取樣中，除了以香港人口的分布作調整外，亦需要為擁有手提電話這個因素作出調整。由於每人擁有不同數目的固網及流動電話號碼，他們被抽中的機率也有不同。為剔除任何一人被超額代表的機會，第一步驟是估算每名受訪者被隨機抽中的機會率，即以每位受訪者擁有家居固網電話號碼和手機號碼數目，對比全港家居固網電話及手機號碼總數。加權因子1 (WT1i) 之計算方式為受訪者 i 被抽中訪問的逆向機會率，即 $WT1i = \pi_i^{-1}$ 。

$$\pi_i = \frac{n_L}{N_L} \times \frac{t_i^L}{e_i^L} + \frac{n_m}{N_m} \times \frac{t_i^m}{e_i^m}$$

Where 當中 i = i -th person selected 第 i 名被抽中的人士

n_L = amount of sample's landline numbers 家居固網電話號碼樣本數目

N_L = amount of population's landline numbers 全部家居固網電話號碼總數

t_i^L = amount of i -th person's landline numbers 第 i 名人士家中擁有的固網電話號碼數目

e_i^L = amount of eligible respondents in the household 住戶中合資格受訪人數

n_m = amount of sample's mobile numbers 手機號碼樣本數目

N_m = amount of population's mobile numbers 全部手機號碼總數

t_i^m = amount of i -th person's mobile numbers 第 i 名人士個人擁有的手機號碼數目

Sampling in telephone surveys is randomized by phone numbers without demographic consideration. The second weight factor (WT2) adjusts the size of every sample group to match population distribution in terms of gender and age. WT2 is calculated by dividing the population estimates of a gender and age group by its sample size and the sample's probability of selection.

$$WT2 = \frac{\text{group population estimates}}{\text{group sample size} \times WT1}$$

The final weighting factor (WT_F) is calculated by the following formula.

$$WT_F = WT1 \times WT2 \times \frac{\text{total sample size}}{\text{total population estimates}}$$

Where 當中 WT_F = final weighting factor 最後加權因子

WT1 = weight factor adjusting for the ownership of phone numbers 調整電話號碼的加權因子

WT2 = weight factor adjusting for the distribution of the Hong Kong population
調整香港人口分布的加權因子

電話調查的隨機抽樣是電話號碼，沒有考慮人口特徵。加權因子2（WT2）按性別和年齡，調整每一個抽樣群組以配合人口分布。加權因子2是將性別和年齡分布的人口估算中除以樣本大小和樣本的選擇概率。

$$WT2 = \frac{\text{每組人口估算}}{\text{每組樣本大小} \times WT1}$$

最後加權因子計算如下。

$$WT_F = WT1 \times WT2 \times \frac{\text{總樣本大小}}{\text{總人口估算}}$$

1.2 International perception

We obtain 3 pillar and 12 sub-pillar scores on the state of freedom and democracy in the world from tracking indices compiled by international think tanks. Every sub-pillar is derived from multiple indicators. They offer a wide coverage of scopes and territories enabling us to compare Hong Kong's position on the global stage with an 1C2S perspective. There are two selection criteria for data sources. First, their datasets must cover Hong Kong to allow a direct comparison. Second, their indicators must capture key areas of 1C2S that draw international attention. Also, every data source has a different geographic coverage, only locations observed by at least three quarters of all data sources are included. As a result, 128 indicators from 9 data sources are adopted in our model to score and rank 148 countries and territories. Tables below show the list of indicators and their sources. Data sources include:

1.2. 國際評價

我們收集國際智庫編製的長期追蹤指數，以整合國際社會對世界自由民主狀況的3項支柱和12項子支柱評分。每項子支柱均由多個指標組成，這些指標涵蓋廣泛的範疇和地區，使我們能夠用「一國兩制」視角，在全球舞台上比較香港的地位。我們按兩個原則選擇數據來源：一、它們的數據集必須涵蓋香港，以便進行直接比較；二、它們的指標必須涵蓋國際社會所關心的「一國兩制」關鍵領域。此外，每個數據來源也有不同的地理覆蓋範圍，我們只採納所有數據來源中，最少獲四分之三涵蓋的地區。因此，我們的模型採用來自9個數據來源的128個指標對148個國家和地區進行評分和排名。以下列表顯示指標清單及其來源。數據來源包括：

- Cato Institute and Fraser Institute: Human Freedom Index (HFI);
- Economist Intelligence Unit: Democracy Index (DI);
- Freedom House: Freedom in the World (FiW);
- International Institute for Management Development (IMD): World Competitiveness Yearbook (WCY);
- Reporters Without Borders: World Press Freedom Index (WPFI);
- V-Dem Institute: V-Dem Dataset (V-Dem);
- World Bank: Doing Business Index (DB);
- World Economic Forum: Global Competitiveness Index (GCI); and
- World Justice Project: Rule of Law Index (RoLI).

Table 19: List of indicators on international perception (D. Economic Openness)

表19：國際評價之指標列表（D. 經濟開放）

Sub-pillar 子支柱	Area 範疇	Indicator 指標	Description 描述	Source 來源	Scale 尺度
D1. Business Environment 營商環境	Business facilitation 方便營商	D1.1	Pillar 1: Institutions - 1.10 Burden of government regulation	GCI	1-7
		D1.2	5C Business regulations	EFW	0-10
		D1.3	Paying Taxes	DB	0-100
		D1.4	Resolving Insolvency	DB	0-100
	Labour market 勞動市場	D1.5	Pillar 8: Labour market	GCI	0-100
		D1.6	Business Efficiency - 3.2 Labor Market	WCY	0-100
D2. Market Access 市場門檻	Free trade 自由貿易	D2.1	4 Freedom to trade internationally	EFW	0-10
		D2.2	Pillar 7: Product market - Trade openness	GCI	0-100
		D2.3	Trading across Borders	DB	0-100
	Market competition 市場競爭	D2.4	Starting a Business	DB	0-10
		D2.5	Government Efficiency - 2.4 Business Legislation	WCY	0-100
		D2.6	Business Efficiency - 3.5 Attitudes and Values	WCY	0-100
		D2.7	Pillar 7: Product market - Domestic competition	GCI	0-100
D3. Regulatory Quality 監管質素	Protection of property rights 保障私有產權	D3.1	2C Protection of property rights	EFW	0-10
		D3.2	Infrastructure- 4.3.21 Intellectual property rights	WCY	0-10
		D3.3	Pillar 1: Institutions - Property rights	GCI	0-100
	Enforcement of contracts 履行合約	D3.4	2F Legal enforcement of contracts	EFW	0-10
		D3.5	Government Efficiency - 2.3.09 Legal and regulatory framework	WCY	0-10
		D3.6	Enforcing Contracts	DB	0-100
		D3.7	Pillar 1: Institutions - 1.11 Efficiency of legal framework in settling disputes	GCI	1-7
	Corporate governance 企業管治	D3.8	Business Efficiency - 3.3.06 Auditing and accounting practices	WCY	0-10
		D3.9	Pillar 1: Institutions - Corporate governance	GCI	0-100
		D3.10	Protecting Minority Investors	DB	0-100
D4. Financial Stability 金融穩定	Public finance 公共財政	D4.1	3 Sound Money	EFW	0-10
		D4.2	Government Efficiency - 2.1.07 Public finance	WCY	0-10
		D4.3	Pillar 4: Macroeconomic stability	GCI	0-100
	Money market 金融市場	D4.4	5A Credit market regulations	EFW	0-10
		D4.5	Business Efficiency - 3.3.06 Banking and financial services	WCY	0-10
		D4.6	Getting Credit	DB	0-100
		D4.7	Pillar 9: Financial system	GCI	0-100

Table 20: List of indicators on international perception (E. Civil Liberty)

表20：國際評價之指標列表（E. 公民權利）

Sub-pillar 子支柱	Area 範疇	Indicator 指標	Description 描述	Source 來源	Scale 尺度
E1. Rule of Law 法治	Judicial independence 司法獨立	E1.1	F. Rule of Law - F1. Is there an independent judiciary?	FiW	0-4
		E1.2	Pillar 1: Institutions - 1.07 Judicial independence	GCI	0-100
	Civil and criminal justice 民事與刑事公義	E1.3	F. Rule of Law - F2. Does due process prevail in civil and criminal matters?	FiW	0-4
		E1.4	Government Efficiency - 2.5.01 Justice	WCY	0-10
		E1.5	Factor 7: Civil Justice	RoLI	0-1
		E1.6	Factor 8: Criminal Justice	RoLI	0-1
	Equal protection 平等保障	E1.7	F. Rule of Law - F4. Do laws, policies, and practices guarantee equal treatment of various segments of the population?	FiW	0-4
		E1.8	Access to justice	V-Dem	0-1
	Regulatory enforcement 監管執法	E1.9	Factor 6: Regulatory Enforcement	RoLI	0-1
		E1.10	Rigorous and impartial public administration	V-Dem	0-4
		E1.11	Transparent laws with predictable enforcement	V-Dem	0-4
E2. Security and Safety 安全	Absence of crime 杜絕犯罪	E2.1	Pillar 1: Institutions - 1.01 Organized crime	GCI	1-7
		E2.2	Pillar 1: Institutions - 1.04 Reliability of police services	GCI	1-7
		E2.3	Factor 5: Order and Security - 5.1 Crime is effectively controlled	RoLI	0-1
	Right to life 生存權利	E2.4	B Security and Safety - Bi Homicide	PFI	0-10
		E2.5	F. Rule of Law - F3. Is there protection from the illegitimate use of physical force and freedom from war and insurgencies?	FiW	0-4
		E2.6	Physical violence index	V-Dem	0-1
		E2.7	Factor 4: Fundamental Rights - 4.2 The right to life and security of the person is effectively guaranteed	RoLI	0-1
	Civil conflict and terrorism 內戰與恐怖主義	E2.8	B Security and Safety - Bii. Disappearances, conflicts, and terrorism	PFI	0-10
		E2.9	Pillar 1: Institutions - 1.03 Terrorism incidence	GCI	0-100
		E2.10	Factor 5: Order and Security - 5.2 Civil conflict is effectively limited	RoLI	0-1
E3. Expression, Association and Assembly 表達、結社與集會	Expression 表達	E3.1	F Freedom of Expression - Fi Press Killed	PFI	0-10
		E3.2	F Freedom of Expression - Fii Press Jailed	PFI	0-10
		E3.3	D. Freedom of Expression and Belief - D1. Are there free and independent media?	FiW	0-4
		E3.4	D. Freedom of Expression and Belief - D3. Is there academic freedom, and is the educational system free from extensive political indoctrination?	FiW	0-4
		E3.5	D. Freedom of Expression and Belief - D4. Are individuals free to express their personal views on political or other sensitive topics without fear of surveillance or retribution?	FiW	0-4
		E3.6	World Press Freedom Index	WPFI	0-100
		E3.7	Freedom of expression index	V-Dem	0-1
		E3.8	Alternative sources of information index	V-Dem	0-1
		E3.9	Factor 4: Fundamental Rights - 4.4 Freedom of opinion and expression is effectively guaranteed	RoLI	0-1
	Association and Assembly 結社和集會	E3.10	E. Associational and Organizational Rights	FiW	0-12
		E3.11	Freedom of peaceful assembly	V-Dem	0-4
		E3.12	CSO entry and exit	V-Dem	0-4
		E3.13	CSO repression	V-Dem	0-4
		E3.14	Factor 4: Fundamental Rights - 4.7 Freedom of assembly and association is effectively guaranteed	RoLI	0-1

Sub-pillar 子支柱	Area 範疇	Indicator 指標	Description 描述	Source 來源	Scale 尺度
E4. Individual Rights 個人權利	Religion 宗教	E4.1	D. Freedom of Expression and Belief D2. Are individuals free to practice and express their religious faith or nonbeli in public and private?	FiW	0-4
		E4.2	Freedom of religion	V-Dem	0-4
		E4.3	Religious organization repression	V-Dem	0-4
		E4.4	Factor 4: Fundamental Rights- 4.5 Freedom of belief and religion is effectively guaranteed	RoLI	0-1
	Movement 遷徙	E4.5	G. Personal Autonomy and Individual Rights G1. Do individuals enjoy freedom of movement, including the abi to change their place of residence, employment, or education?	FiW	0-4
		E4.6	Freedom of domestic movement	V-Dem	0-1
		E4.7	Freedom of foreign movement	V-Dem	0-4
	Labour 勞動	E4.8	G. Personal Autonomy and Individual Rights G4. Do individuals enjoy equality of opportunity and freedom from economic exploitation?	FiW	0-4
		E4.9	Government Efficiency 2.5.11 Equal opportunity	WCY	0-10
		E4.10	Freedom from forced labor	V-Dem	0-1
		E4.11	Factor 4: Fundamental Rights 4.8 Fundamental labor rights are effectively guaranteed	RoLI	0-1
	Property rights 私有產權	E4.12	G. Personal Autonomy and Individual Rights G2. Are individuals able to exercise the right to own property ar establishprivate businesses without undue interference from state or nonstate actors?	FiW	0-4
		E4.13	Property rights	V-Dem	0-1
	Relationship 關係	E4.14	Relationship Freedoms	PFI	0-10
		E4.15	G. Personal Autonomy and Individual Rights G3. Do individuals enjoy personal social freedoms, including choi of marriage partner and size of family, protection fro domestic violence, and control over appearance?	FiW	0-4
	Privacy, non-discrimination and equal treatment 私隱、非歧視和平等對待	E4.16	Factor 4: Fundamental Rights- 4.1 Equal treatment and absence of discrimination	RoLI	0-1
		E4.17	Factor 4: Fundamental Rights- 4.6 Freedom from arbitrary interference with privacy is effectively guaranteed	RoLI	0-1

Table 21: List of indicators on international perception (F. Democratic Development)

表21：國際評價之指標列表（F. 民主發展）

Sub-pillar 子支柱	Area 範疇	Indicator 指標	Description 描述	Source 來源	Scale 尺度
F.1. Constraints on Power 權利制約	Executive check 制約行政權	F1.1	Functioning of government	DI	0-100
		F1.2	Factor 1: Constraints on Government Powers	RoLI	0-1
		F1.3	Judicial constraints on the executive index	V-Dem	0-1
		F1.4	Legislative constraints on the executive index	V-Dem	0-1
		F1.5	C. Functioning of Government C1. Do the freely elected head of government and national legislative representatives determine the policies of the government?	FiW	0-4
		F1.6	Pillar 1: Institutions 1.08 Efficiency of legal framework in challenging regulations	GCI	0-100
	Absence of corruption 杜絕貪腐	F1.7	C. Functioning of Government C2. Are safeguards against official corruption strong and effective?	FiW	0-4
		F1.8	Government Efficiency 2.3.13 Bribery and corruption	WCY	0-10
		F1.9	Political corruption index	V-Dem	0-1 (inverted 倒數)
		F1.10	Factor 2: Absence of Corruption	RoLI	0-1

Sub-pillar 子支柱	Area 範疇	Indicator 指標	Description 描述	Source 來源	Scale 尺度
F2. Political Pluralism 政治多元	Electoral process 選舉過程	F2.1	A. Electoral Process	FiW	0-12
		F2.2	Electoral process and pluralism	DI	0-100
		F2.3	Clean elections index	V-Dem	0-1
		F2.4	Share of population with suffrage	V-Dem	0-1
		F2.5	Disclosure of campaign donations	V-Dem	0-4
	Political competition 政治競爭	F2.6	B. Political Pluralism and Participation B2. Is there a realistic opportunity for the opposition to increase its support or gain power through elections?	FiW	0-4
		F2.7	B. Political Pluralism and Participation B3. Are the people's political choices free from domination by forces that are external to the political sphere, or by political forces that employ extrapolitical means?	FiW	0-4
		F2.8	Public campaign finance	V-Dem	0-4
		F2.9	Divided party control index	V-Dem	z score z 分數
		F2.10	Elected officials index	V-Dem	0-1
	Party development 政團發展	F2.11	B. Political Pluralism and Participation B1. Do the people have the right to organize in different political parties or other competitive political groupings of their choice, and is the system free of undue obstacles to the rise and fall of these competing parties or groupings?	FiW	0-4
		F2.12	Barriers to parties	V-Dem	0-4
		F2.13	Party ban	V-Dem	0-4
		F2.14	Opposition parties autonomy	V-Dem	0-4
		F2.15	Party institutionalization index	V-Dem	0-1
F3. Civic Participation 公民參與	Political rights and awareness 政治權利與意識	F3.1	B. Political Pluralism and Participation B4. Do various segments of the population (including ethnic, racial, religious, gender, LGBT+, and other relevant groups) have full political rights and electoral opportunities?	FiW	0-4
		F3.2	Political participation	DI	0-100
		F3.3	Mass mobilization	V-Dem	0-4
		F3.4	Civil society participation index	V-Dem	0-1
	Citizen engagement 公民參與	F3.5	Engagement in state-administered mass organizations	V-Dem	0-4
		F3.6	Engagement in independent trade unions	V-Dem	0-4
		F3.7	Engagement in independent political associations	V-Dem	0-4
		F3.8	Engagement in independent non-political associations	V-Dem	0-4
	Transparency and open government 政務公開	F3.9	Pillar 1: Institutions- 1.06 Budget transparency	GCI	0-100
		F3.10	Pillar 1: Institutions- 1.12 E-participation	GCI	0-100
		F3.11	C. Functioning of Government- C3. Does the government operate with openness and transparency?	FiW	0-4
		F3.12	Factor 3: Open Government	RoLI	0-1
		F3.13	Government Efficiency- 2.3.11 Transparency	WCY	0-10
F4. Democratic Culture 民主文化	Public attitude 大眾態度	F4.1	Political culture	DI	0-100
		F4.2	Deliberative component index	V-Dem	0-1
		F4.3	Political Polarization	V-Dem	0-4 (inverted 倒數)
		F4.4	Political violence	V-Dem	0-4 (inverted 倒數)
		F4.5	Factor 5: Order and Security - 5.3 People do not resort to violence to redress personal grievances	RoLI	0-1
	Political equality 政治平等	F4.6	Equal protection index	V-Dem	0-1
		F4.7	Equal access index	V-Dem	0-1
		F4.8	Equal distribution of resources index	V-Dem	0-1

1.2.1. Aggregation method for composite indicators

International indices are often released with a considerable time lag due to the extensive data compilation from a large number of countries. Very few indicators are collected for release in the immediate index period. Hence, we offset the time difference by rolling data forward to the release date. In other words, indicators are assigned to the index period in which they become available. Figure 19 shows the number of indicators by years offset. An alternative approach is to backdate data to the collection period. However, this approach has three disadvantages. No change will be observed in the latest issue because new scores are applied to an earlier period. Our biannual report will always record identical values in the first and second halves because most datasets are compiled on a yearly basis. Published scores will be revised substantially in the subsequent issue because indicators are updated retrospectively. It is noteworthy that backdating or time offsetting affects only the presentation of historical scores. Both approaches produce the latest pillar scores based on the latest available data.

Countries and territories covered by insufficient data sources are omitted in our model. For remaining included locations, an imputation process is carried out to replace missing data. Countries and territories are categorized into 7 regions according to the World Bank region groups. When a missing value arises, it is substituted with the regional average of recorded values. To standardize the range of data values, the complete dataset is transformed into a common scale by min-max normalisation as the below formula. For each indicator in each index period, the frontier value will be rescaled to 10 and the bottom value to 0. Even if a country or territory has the same raw score over time, its normalized score can be changed due to a change in the minimum or maximum value of the data series.

1.2.1. 綜合指數的整合方法

搜集大量國家數據需時，因此國際指數出版的時一般會滯後，只有少數指標能夠即期發布。因此，我們會將數據向前滾動至出版日期，以補上時間落差。換言之，當國際智庫一發布最新指標，我們便會馬上更新至即期指數。圖 19顯示經年期調整之指標數目。另外值得考慮的方法，是將數據回溯至它們的收集時期，但是有三個缺點。第一，我們的評分在每次發布時不會有改變，因為新分數只會被更新至較早的收集時期。第二，我們在上半年和下半年公布的數字往往會相同，因為大部分國際指數只會每年更新一次。第三，已發布的數字會在期後報告大幅修訂，因為指標只會往後更新。值得注意的是，向前滾動或向後回溯只會影響歷史分數如何呈現。發布時，它們的最新評分將會相同，因為兩者皆以最新數據去計算最新分數。

數據來源不足的國家或地區將會被省略，如尚有缺失的數據，我們將會以插補方式填補。我們根據世界銀行的標準將所有地區歸類為7個地理組別，並以該地理組別中有紀錄的平均值去填補缺失的數據。為將各個指標的高低範圍標準化，整個數據庫會以最小—最大標準化方式轉換至一個共同尺度，公式如下。每個時期的每個指標中，最高的數值將會被縮放為10，最低的數值則會是0。隨著一項指標的最低或最高值改變，即使一個國家或地區在不同時期擁有相同的原始分數，經標準化後的分數亦有機會改變。

$$\text{normalized score 標準化分數} = \frac{x_i - \min(x)}{\max(x) - \min(x)}$$

A sub-pillar score is generated by its indicators with weights determined by principal component analysis. It is a standard statistical method that processes and simplifies data scientifically in index construction. It extracts a dataset's principal components and identifies their weights in a way that best explains variations across the data through the below statistical analysis. Table 22 shows the weights of every indicator in recent index periods. Measuring about 60 countries and territories only, the coverage of IMD's World Competitiveness Yearbook is significantly smaller than other data sources. As there are more missing than recorded entries, we will assign a zero weight to IMD indicators for unobserved countries and territories instead of imputing with sub-regional average. The weights of available indicators from the remaining data sources will be enlarged proportionately.

子支柱分數整合自多個指標，而各個指標的權重由主成分分析產生。這是一種分析和簡化數據的統計技術，是以科學化方式編製指數的標準方法。此方法通過對數據進行特徵分解，以得出數據的主要成分與它們的權值，優點是揭露數據的內部結構，從而更好解釋數據的變化。表 22顯示近期指數的各個指標權重。IMD世界競爭力年報只覆蓋約60個國家和地區，比其他數據來源的覆蓋量顯然較少，缺失的數值比有紀錄的更多。所以，未被收錄的國家或地區，我們會將相關指標的權重調整為零，而非以地理組別的平均值填補，其他數據來源的權重則會按比例地增大。

Figure 19: Number of indicators by offsetting years
圖19：經年期調整之指標數目




Table 22: PCA weights (%)

表22：主成分權重 (%)

D. Economic Openness 經濟開放						E. Civil Liberty 公民權利						F. Democratic Development 民主發展					
	2020 H1	2020 H2	2021 H1	2021 H2	2022 H1		2020 H1	2020 H2	2021 H1	2021 H2	2022 H1		2020 H1	2020 H2	2021 H1	2021 H2	2022 H1
D1.1	12.5	12.7	12.1	11.8	12.1	E1.1	9.0	9.0	9.1	9.1	9.4	F1.1	12.6	12.6	12.5	12.4	12.4
D1.2	20.7	20.7	19.8	20.2	20.6	E1.2	7.6	7.6	7.5	7.4	7.1	F1.2	12.2	12.2	12.3	12.6	12.6
D1.3	19.1	19.1	18.8	18.6	18.8	E1.3	10.3	10.3	10.5	10.4	10.6	F1.3	11.4	11.4	11.2	11.1	11.1
D1.4	17.3	17.1	16.8	16.9	17.3	E1.4	2.9	2.9	2.7	2.7	2.5	F1.4	9.1	9.1	8.8	8.6	9.3
D1.5	23.4	23.5	22.5	22.2	22.5	E1.5	10.4	10.4	10.3	10.5	10.5	F1.5	9.6	9.6	10.0	10.0	10.1
D1.6	7.0	7.0	10.1	10.4	8.7	E1.6	10.6	10.6	10.6	10.8	10.8	F1.6	5.0	5.0	5.0	5.0	4.9
D2.1	15.4	13.6	13.7	14.8	14.6	E1.7	8.4	8.4	8.7	8.6	8.7	F1.7	12.4	12.4	12.7	12.5	12.6
D2.2	15.6	16.1	15.9	15.3	15.2	E1.8	9.5	9.5	9.5	9.5	9.5	F1.8	4.4	4.4	4.0	4.2	3.6
D2.3	13.1	13.2	13.3	13.5	13.8	E1.9	10.7	10.7	10.7	10.9	10.9	F1.9	12.5	12.5	12.7	12.6	12.4
D2.4	9.7	9.6	9.4	9.9	11.6	E1.10	10.6	10.6	10.7	10.5	10.5	F1.10	10.7	10.7	10.8	11.1	11.0
D2.5	17.5	17.7	17.3	17.1	16.2	E1.11	10.1	10.1	9.7	9.6	9.5	F2.1	9.6	9.6	9.6	9.6	9.6
D2.6	10.8	11.2	11.7	11.5	9.6	E2.1	9.7	9.7	9.9	10.2	10.2	F2.2	9.4	9.4	9.3	9.4	9.3
D2.7	18.0	18.6	18.7	17.9	18.9	E2.2	10.3	10.4	10.5	10.6	10.6	F2.3	8.0	8.0	8.0	8.1	8.0
D3.1	13.7	13.6	13.3	13.3	13.1	E2.3	10.5	10.6	10.6	11.1	11.2	F2.4	1.7	1.7	1.7	1.6	1.5
D3.2	9.8	9.7	11.7	11.7	10.7	E2.4	5.3	5.2	5.3	5.1	5.1	F2.5	5.1	5.1	5.2	5.2	5.2
D3.3	13.7	13.8	13.8	13.7	13.5	E2.5	13.1	13.0	13.4	13.6	13.6	F2.6	9.3	9.3	9.5	9.5	9.4
D3.4	10.3	10.5	10.5	10.5	10.3	E2.6	11.6	11.6	11.1	11.1	10.8	F2.7	8.7	8.7	8.6	8.6	8.7
D3.5	6.7	6.6	4.6	4.5	6.5	E2.7	13.7	13.6	13.6	14.2	14.3	F2.8	3.6	3.6	3.7	3.7	3.8
D3.6	8.0	8.1	8.2	8.2	8.0	E2.8	13.0	13.6	13.5	12.7	12.8	F2.9	0.2	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.2
D3.7	11.0	10.9	9.9	9.7	10.5	E2.9	6.1	5.8	5.8	5.2	5.1	F2.10	4.0	4.0	4.1	4.1	4.4
D3.8	9.5	9.4	9.8	9.8	9.6	E2.10	6.6	6.4	6.3	6.3	6.4	F2.11	9.8	9.8	9.8	9.8	9.9
D3.9	10.3	10.4	10.9	10.9	10.4	E3.1	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	F2.12	8.4	8.4	8.3	8.3	8.3
D3.10	7.0	7.0	7.5	7.7	7.3	E3.2	3.0	2.9	2.9	3.2	3.0	F2.13	6.3	6.3	6.3	6.1	6.2
D4.1	16.5	16.8	16.4	15.6	15.9	E3.3	8.4	8.4	8.5	8.5	8.4	F2.14	9.1	9.1	9.0	8.9	8.9
D4.2	13.2	13.0	8.6	9.2	7.0	E3.4	8.5	8.5	8.3	8.3	8.3	F2.15	6.7	6.7	6.9	6.9	6.5
D4.3	22.1	21.9	21.9	21.3	21.6	E3.5	8.2	8.2	8.4	8.3	8.3	F3.1	13.0	13.0	13.3	13.3	12.9
D4.4	12.3	11.7	11.5	11.8	12.6	E3.6	8.3	8.3	8.2	8.0	7.7	F3.2	13.0	13.0	13.0	13.0	13.0
D4.5	10.2	10.3	14.6	14.9	15.5	E3.7	8.9	8.9	8.9	8.8	8.9	F3.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.0
D4.6	5.1	5.4	5.3	5.8	6.5	E3.8	7.6	7.6	7.7	7.6	7.9	F3.4	11.2	11.2	11.4	11.1	10.8
D4.7	20.6	21.0	21.6	21.4	21.0	E3.9	7.0	7.0	6.9	7.1	7.1	F3.5	7.1	7.1	7.0	7.0	6.3
						E3.10	8.8	8.7	8.8	8.7	8.7	F3.6	4.5	4.5	4.7	4.4	4.8
						E3.11	7.5	7.5	7.6	7.6	7.7	F3.7	4.4	4.4	4.0	4.0	3.8
						E3.12	8.1	8.1	8.1	8.1	8.1	F3.8	2.5	2.5	2.6	2.6	2.8
						E3.13	8.4	8.4	8.5	8.4	8.5	F3.9	10.3	10.3	10.5	10.5	10.3
						E3.14	7.3	7.3	7.2	7.4	7.4	F3.10	7.4	7.4	7.4	7.5	7.5
						E4.1	6.0	6.0	6.4	6.1	6.1	F3.11	14.2	14.2	14.0	13.9	14.1
						E4.2	5.7	5.7	5.9	5.6	5.6	F3.12	11.8	11.8	11.7	12.2	12.1
						E4.3	6.2	6.2	6.0	5.7	6.0	F3.13	0.6	0.6	0.4	0.5	0.6
						E4.4	6.1	6.1	6.2	6.5	6.6	F4.1	12.5	12.5	12.7	12.6	13.3
						E4.5	8.2	8.2	8.2	8.1	7.9	F4.2	13.6	13.6	13.0	12.8	13.1
						E4.6	7.4	7.4	6.2	6.0	6.2	F4.3	8.2	8.2	8.3	8.2	7.2
						E4.7	6.2	6.2	5.5	5.4	5.6	F4.4	10.3	10.3	10.8	10.8	11.0
						E4.8	7.7	7.7	7.9	8.0	7.9	F4.5	8.2	8.2	8.4	9.0	8.7
						E4.9	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.1	F4.6	17.4	17.4	17.1	17.0	16.3
						E4.10	5.5	5.5	5.4	5.3	5.3	F4.7	14.4	14.4	13.8	13.8	14.1
						E4.11	5.6	5.6	5.8	6.3	6.2	F4.8	15.5	15.5	15.9	15.8	16.3
						E4.12	7.8	7.8	8.2	8.2	8.0						
						E4.13	5.9	5.9	6.2	6.2	6.3						
						E4.14	4.3	4.3	4.2	4.3	4.3						
						E4.15	7.0	7.0	7.2	7.1	7.0						
						E4.16	3.7	3.7	3.7	4.4	4.3						
						E4.17	6.3	6.3	6.5	6.6	6.5						

1.3. Revisions and refinement

After the first survey in June 2017, our questionnaire for public opinion was refined in the 2017 H2, 2020 H2 and 2022 H1 rounds to increase validity. These refinements include change of wordings and addition and removal of questions, affecting five of the twelve questions used to compute public opinion scores. Scores of the other seven questions are directly comparable as they are identical in all surveys. Table 23 and Table 24 show the history of the refinement of our questionnaire and the score differences from it respectively.

We have expanded the measurement system for international perception with more indicators and data sources since the 2022 H1 report to enhance objectivity. Figure 20 compares every country's score in the original and revised measurement systems in the same index period. The overall correlation is very strong. Despite a broader selection of indicators leads to slight score differences, both systems are consistent with the performance of a country.

Table 23: Revisions of questions on public opinion

表23：民意調查問題之修訂

Round 輪次	Revision 修訂	
2017 H2	Removed 'After the handover, the internal affairs of Hong Kong have not been interfered with by the central and local governments of China. To what extent would you agree?'	移除「回歸之後，特區內部事務並無受到中央各部門同其他內地省市嘅干預。你有幾同意呢？」
2017 H2	Revised 'After the handover, the way of life of the Hong Kong people has not been affected by mainland China. To what extent would you agree?' to 'After the handover, Hong Kong has been able to maintain their original way of life. To what extent would you agree?'	修訂「回歸之後，香港人原有嘅生活方式受到內地影響。你有幾同意呢？」為「回歸之後，香港人繼續維持原有嘅生活方式。你有幾同意呢？」
2020 H2	Added 'After the handover, people in Hong Kong continue to be treated equally before the Law. To what extent would you agree?'	新增「回歸之後，香港人繼續喺法律面前一律平等。你有幾同意呢？」
2020 H2	Added 'After the handover, Hong Kong is able to safeguard national sovereignty, security and development interests. To what extent would you agree?'	新增「回歸之後，香港可以做到維護國家主權、安全和發展利益。你有幾同意呢？」
2020 H2	Added 'After the handover, Hong Kong is able to maintain prosperity and stability in the long term. To what extent would you agree?'	新增「回歸之後，香港能夠維持到長期繁榮穩定。你有幾同意呢？」
2022 H1	Revised 'After the handover, Hong Kong continues to enjoy the freedom of speech.' to 'After the handover, Hong Kong continues to enjoy the freedoms of speech, association and assembly.'	修訂「回歸之後，香港繼續享有言論自由。你有幾同意呢？」為「回歸之後，香港繼續享有言論、結社同集會自由。你有幾同意呢？」
2022 H1	Revised 'After the handover, people in Hong Kong continue to be treated equally before the Law. To what extent would you agree?' to 'After the handover, people in Hong Kong continue to be protected by the Law regardless of their economic capability, identity and social status. To what extent would you agree?'	修訂「回歸之後，香港人繼續喺法律面前一律平等。你有幾同意呢？」為「回歸之後，香港人不論經濟能力、身份同社會地位都能夠得到法律保護。你有幾同意呢？」

1.3. 修訂與調整

在2017年6月進行第一次調查之後，我們的民意調查問卷在2017下半年、2021上半年和2022上半年的輪次中經歷三次修訂，以提高調查的應用性。修訂包括更改調查問題的用字，增加或移除問題，過程影響到民意調查評分中的5條問題，另外7條問題在所有調查均相同，評分可以直接比較。表 23和表 24分別顯示調查問題的修訂歷史和得分差異。

為加強國際評價的客觀性，我們在2022上半年擴展了國際評價的指標體系，採納更多的指標和數據來源。圖 20比較每個國家在原有和修訂後的指標體系中，同一指數時期的得分，顯示整體相關性非常強。儘管指標數量增加導致分數略有差異，但每個地區的得分在兩個指標體系之中表現一致。


Table 24: Score difference due to revisions of questions on public opinion

表24：修訂民意調查問題之評分差距

Round 輪次	Identical 相同	Revised 修訂	Difference 差距
2017 H1	4.70	4.84	0.14
2017 H2	4.67	4.98	0.31
2018 H1	4.78	5.05	0.27
2018 H2	4.59	4.84	0.25
2019 H1	4.30	4.58	0.28
2019 H2	3.66	3.98	0.32
2020 H1	3.00	3.26	0.26
2020 H2	3.27	3.53	0.26
2021 H1	3.15	3.39	0.24
2021 H2	3.15	3.62	0.47
2022 H1	3.19	3.62	0.43
2017 H1	3.64	4.02	0.38
2017 H2	4.35	4.71	0.36

Figure 20: Score difference of revised measurement systems on international perception

圖20：修訂國際評價指標體系後之評分差距



2. 編製「一國兩制」輿情指數 2. Construction of 1C2S Mass Media Index

We build up a massive dataset by collecting media articles that contain the keyword 'One Country, Two Systems' from news database. Our sample consists of 232,825 news reports from 6 television and radio stations, 21 local daily newspapers and 10 online-only media that were published between April 1998 and June 2022. Each article undergoes a 'tokenisation' process whereby articles are segmented into words/phrases (often referred to as tokens) via a computer algorithm. In the sample period of over 20 years, our text corpus contains around 118 million tokens. The number of articles processed from each media source is listed in Table 25.

Common words that are inconsequential to the understanding of news articles, such as pronouns, prepositions and particles, are first removed before further analysis. To determine the sentiment of an article, words are categorised as: 'positive', 'negative' or 'neutral'. The classification scheme adopted is given by the sentiment dictionary for Traditional Chinese words developed by the Natural Language Processing and Sentiment Analysis Lab, Institute of Information Science, Academia Sinica.

An article is made up of paragraphs. For each paragraph, net sentiment is calculated by the difference between the number of positive and negative words divided by the total word count. At the article level, a net sentiment score is then derived by averaging the net sentiment of its constituent paragraphs with the below equation. To each news source, a daily net sentiment score is further assigned by averaging the score of all articles published in the past 30 days. This time frame of 30 days is a reporting standard of the media industry. MMI is set at 100 on the base day of 1 January 2021.

我們以關鍵字「一國兩制」搜集新聞文章，組成累計232,825篇報道的龐大數據庫，包含1998年4月至2022年6月期間，來自本地6間電視電台、21份日報和10間純網媒。我們就每篇文章進行「分詞」，通過電腦運算將文章分解成語例（單詞或短語）。我們利用超過20年的資料組成語料庫，包含大約1億180萬個語例。表 25顯示每份報章所運算的文章數量。

在進一步分析這個龐大的語料庫之前，我們首先剔除無助理解文章的常見單詞，如代詞、介詞和助詞。為了辨別一篇文章的情緒，我們採用由台灣中央研究院資訊科學研究所自然語言處理與情感分析實驗室開發的繁體中文情緒字典，把語例分類為「正面」、「中立」或「負面」。

每篇文章由段落組成。我們首先計算每一段落中，正負語例數量的相差，再除以整個段落的字數。每篇文章的情緒評分則為所有段落的平均值，見以下方程式。每個新聞來源的每日情緒評分為過去30日所有出版文章的平均分數。媒體行業習慣以30日作為報告單位。輿情指數在2021年1月1日設定為基數日。

$$\text{net sentiment score 情緒評分} = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^N \frac{(a_i - b_i)}{w_i}}{N}$$

N = total number of paragraphs 段落總數

i = the i^{th} paragraph 第 i 個段落

a_i = number of positive words 正面語例數目

b_i = number of negative words 負面語例數目

w_i = total number of words 正面語例數目

People often receive news from multiple sources and channels. Since there are substantial differences in the number of news articles published by various sources and in the number of viewership via various channels, the article count of a news source alone could be an insufficient representation of its influence and perceived importance among readers. To ensure 1C2S MMI's reliability, the sentiment score for each news source is weighted by public perceptions of its credibility based on the survey 'Public Evaluation on Media Credibility' conducted by the Centre for Communication and Public Opinion Survey, The Chinese University of Hong Kong and each media channel is weighted based on people's main sources of news from the survey 'Appraisal of the Local News Media' conducted by Hong Kong Public Opinion Research Institute.

市民一般從多個新聞來源和傳播媒介取得資訊。由於不同媒體在不同媒介刊登的文章數目、接觸人數有明顯差別，因此，只考慮文章數目不足以呈現不同媒體對讀者觀感的影響力。為確保可靠性，本指數將採用由香港中文大學傳播與民意調查中心「市民對傳媒公信力的評分」為每個新聞來源的情緒評分加權，以及由香港民意調查中心「新聞傳媒評價」中市民的主要新聞來源為每個傳播媒介的覆蓋度加權。



Table 25: Articles processed in 1C2S MMI

表25：輿情指數之處理報道數

	2021 Q2	2021 Q3	2021 Q4	2022 Q1	2022 Q2	Database Total 數據庫總量
TV & Radio 電視電台	1,054	965	1,044	455	842	22,878
Cable TV / Hong Kong Open TV 有線電視/香港開電視	42	40	53	31	23	767
Commercial Radio 商業電台	96	87	113	52	87	3,075
Metro Radio 新城電台	100	82	108	56	105	1,897
Now TV	246	317	328	145	237	4,808
RTHK 香港電台	468	300	282	105	235	7,611
TVB 無線電視	102	139	160	66	155	4,720
Newspaper 報章	3,677	4,649	4,158	2,127	3,880	189,174
am730	110	89	104	15	92	4,566
Apple Daily 蘋果日報	156	-	-	-	-	13,076
Headline Daily 頭條日報	39	51	14	20	36	1,620
Hong Kong Commercial Daily 香港商報	257	205	92	137	258	17,983
Hong Kong Daily News 新報	-	-	-	-	-	4,476
Hong Kong Economic Journal 信報	120	161	156	113	154	5,255
Hong Kong Economic Times 經濟日報	55	65	71	34	70	8,976
Lion Rock Daily 香港仔	74	74	73	17	67	430
Metro Daily 都市日報	-	-	-	-	-	1,528
Ming Pao Daily News 明報	188	207	210	133	217	14,729
Oriental Daily News 東方日報	93	117	94	81	92	9,932
South China Morning Post 南華早報	23	40	29	24	88	543
Sharp Daily 爽報	-	-	-	-	-	152
Sing Pao 成報	-	-	30	5	44	5,228
Sing Tao Daily 星島日報	546	548	459	257	396	14,606
Sky Post 晴報	9	10	15	4	15	774
Ta Kung Pao 大公報	1,216	1,544	1,306	697	1,156	40,938
The Standard 英文虎報	-	6	6	-	6	87
The Sun 太陽報	-	-	-	-	-	4,828
Tin Tin Daily News 天天日報	-	-	-	-	-	452
Wen Wei Po 文匯報	791	1,532	1,499	590	1,189	38,995
Online-Only Media 純網媒	1,345	1,473	1,525	562	1,017	20,773
Bastille Post 巴士的報	710	891	863	322	619	9,089
Citizen News 眾新聞	103	84	110	-	-	1,186
HK01 香港 01	265	328	337	194	311	6,875
Hong Kong Free Press 香港自由新聞	2	6	4	4	5	24
Initium Media 端傳媒	6	5	12	5	7	136
In-Media 獨立媒體	56	35	30	22	31	478
Passion Times 熱血時報	18	38	46	14	35	469
Post 852 852 郵報	13	-	-	-	-	631
Speak Out HK 港人講地	-	6	9	1	9	25
Stand News 立場新聞	172	80	114	-	-	1,860
Total 總數	6,076	7,087	6,727	3,144	5,739	232,825

2.1. Accuracy test

1C2S MMI is underpinned by a lexicon-based model which treats each paragraph as a bag of words and as a result may detract from the overall context of the paragraph. For instance, the model may not be able to detect nuances in writing such as sarcasm and therefore do not understand fully the true meaning of a paragraph. Nonetheless, whilst this may be a limitation when analysing publications such as novels, this is less of an issue for news articles which are written in a more direct manner.

To ascertain the accuracy of this lexicon-based method in identifying the sentiment of a paragraph, two researchers manually categorised around 18,000 paragraphs randomly drawn from the text corpus into 'positive', 'neutral' and 'negative' categories. References to which newspaper a paragraph came from were removed before the paragraph was presented to our team of researchers. If these two researchers classified a paragraph differently, a third researcher would be asked to make the final verdict. In this accuracy test, sentiment labels given by the first two researchers coincided with each other around 80% of the time.

Sentiment scores for each group of paragraphs were then derived by the same lexicon model used in the construction of 1C2S MMI. In our model, the sentiment of a paragraph is assumed to be encapsulated in the proportion of positive words minus that of negative words - the higher the sentiment score, the more positive a paragraph is expected to be. As shown in Table 26, 2,363 paragraphs were considered as 'positive' whereas 1,472 were classified as 'negative.' It also shows the average sentiment scores of these three groups of paragraphs. In particular, 'positive' paragraphs identified by the team of researchers have an average sentiment score of 21.76%, around 7.5 times as high as 'negative' paragraphs. In addition, the differences in average sentiment scores among these three groups are tested to be statistically significant via a multivariate regression model, suggesting that results given by the lexicon model are largely in line with judgements made by human researchers.

Table 26: Results of accuracy test

表26：覆查結果

	Positive 正面	Neutral 中立	Negative 負面
No. of Paragraphs Classified by Human Researchers 真人研究員對情緒的判斷	2,363	14,202	1,472
Net Value 情緒淨值	21.76%	14.42%	2.92%

2.1. 準確度覆查

「一國兩制」輿情指數是建基於由詞彙組成的模型。此模型視每段落為一籃子的詞語，從而抽離整篇文章的脈絡。其中一個效果是可能無法辨認到如諷刺等寫作手法，因而不能完全理解每一個段落的真正含義。這個局限在分析小說及文學作品時可能較為明顯，但對於寫作手法較直接的新聞文章而言，相信不是一個大問題。

為證實此詞彙模型辨別情緒的準確度，我們請兩位研究員從語料庫中隨機抽取了約18,000個段落，親自分類為「正面」、「負面」和「中立」，再與詞彙模型比較。各段落的出處在給予研究員之前已經被隱藏。假如兩名研究員對同一個段落的情緒判斷有異，第三名研究員將會重讀並作出判斷。是次覆查中，兩名研究員在大約八成的情況下均能作出相同的判斷。

我們利用與「一國兩制」輿情指數相同的詞彙模型為此等段落的情緒評分。在模型中，情緒評分為正、負面詞語量的淨值，所以評分愈高代表情緒愈正面。表26顯示利用詞彙模型計算的情緒評分。2,363及1,472個段落分別被判決為「正面」及「負面」。被研究員判斷為「正面」的段落，情緒評分為21.76%，約為「負面」段落的7.5倍。再者，利用多變量回歸分析，三個類別的情緒評分發現具統計學上的顯著差異，證實詞彙模型的計算結果與我們研究員的人手分類一致。

‘ONE COUNTRY TWO SYSTEMS’

I N D E X

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‘ONE COUNTRY TWO SYSTEMS’

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2022 | H1 上半年

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